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Foreword
Farmers throughout the developing world face considerable challenges in 
accessing finance, and this can often influence their decision-making. For 
instance, even if they know they should not sell soon after harvest, when 
prices are typically low, they are often forced to sell because they need the 
cash to meet their family basic needs.
These challenges must be addressed with financing solutions tailored to the 
different actors of the agricultural value chain. Warehouse receipt financing 
enables the post-harvest part of the value chain to function more efficiently 
and is a potentially useful tool for helping farmers access to funding. This is 
the core subject of this report. If farmers have access to warehouse receipt 
finance, it gives them flexibility in timing their sales. Instead of selling their 
crops to meet immediate cash-flow needs, they can store them and pledge 
them as collateral for a loan, and postpone selling to a later date when prices 
are supposed to be higher. 
From the financier’s perspective, warehouse receipts, when used as collateral, can 
facilitate lending to farmers. Warehouse receipt finance also makes it possible for 
processors to fund the stock they need for their operations throughout the year 
and for exporters to optimise the timing of their expected sales. In addition, it 
gives international banks a way of bringing loans to customers at interest rates 
that tend to be lower than those offered by local banks.
Warehouse receipt finance is a far ancient financing technique that has 
been found on Mesopotamian clay tablets. It played an important role in the 
financing of agriculture and agricultural processing  in the USA and Europe. 
It is widely used across the developing world – but mostly for the financing 
of import and export operations. In recent years, there has been much effort 
by governments (supported by their development partners) to extend its use 
to national food value chains. This has proved difficult, partly because local 
financiers – the most logical candidates for financing national and regional 
trade flows – are usually unfamiliar with this approach and are wary of the 
political, legal and regulatory conditions that surround its use. 
In late 2013, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the Technical 
Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) issued a tender for a study to review the 
scope for warehouse receipt finance in Africa and help formulate policies and 
strategies for its expansion. The Platform for Agricultural Risk Management 
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(PARM), funded by the European Commission, Italian Development Cooperation, 
IFAD and AFD, and hosted by IFAD, also contributed to finance this study. 
A large, multidisciplinary team investigated the situation on the ground in nine 
African countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Niger, Senegal and Uganda), identified bottlenecks to the wider 
use of various forms of warehouse receipt finance and formulated proposals 
for action. The team consisted of practitioners, including international and 
local experts from legal, banking and warehouse management backgrounds 
from the nine countries. This publication aims to be a standard reference 
document on warehouse receipt finance in Africa for many years to come.
The authors of the report focus on four main types of finance:
·	 Type A: Community inventory credit for smallholder farmers, often 
supported by microfinance institutions (MFIs), which re-finance their 
operations with commercial banks. Stocks are normally held under a 
double-padlock arrangement in community stores or domestic buildings, 
with the keys to one lock held by the producers’ organisation (PO) or group 
of farmers, and the other by the MFI.
·	 Type B: Private warehouses. Financing against commodities stored in 
a private warehouse under the control and responsibility of a collateral 
manager (CM). This can include a field warehouse, where the goods are 
held in the borrower’s store, which is temporarily leased to the CM.
·	 Type C: Public warehouses. Financing against commodities stored in a 
public warehouse. This is a warehouse that is open to depositors from the 
general public; it does not mean that the warehouse belongs to the State; 
indeed most public warehouses are privately owned.
·	 Type D: Lending against the security of current or future production. 
In this case, the funding agencies lend against a documented security 
representing current or future production, such as the Cedulas de Produtos 
Rural (agricultural bonds) popularised in Brazil. 
All these forms are well adapted for certain purposes. In many ways, they 
complement each other. 
AFD, CTA and IFAD/PARM hope that this publication will inspire action on 
the ground by policy-makers to remove obstacles and create an enhancing 
vii
regulatory environment; by banks to use opportunities created by the use of 
warehouse receipt systems; by farmers and other stakeholders in agriculture 
to become better prepared to use innovative financing mechanisms; and by 
development partners to give warehouse receipt finance its proper place 
in their agricultural development programmes. As the discussions in this 
publication show, warehouse receipt finance is feasible in Africa, and its 
strengths are already recognised by a number of agricultural lenders and 
borrowers. The time is ripe to create the conditions for up-scaling this approach 
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The aim of this study is to foster the emergence of warehouse operators and 
collateral managers who can provide storage and collateral management 
services that will facilitate access to warehouse receipt finance (and other 
forms of commodity-based finance) in favour of smallholder farmers. The 
subject countries targeted are: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal and Uganda. The analysis comprises 
legal and institutional due diligence with the aim of both identifying obstacles 
and making recommendations that can be operationalised in the subject 
countries and, possibly, in member countries of the francophone Treaty on 
the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). The authors focus on 
four main financing types, as follows:
(a) Type A: Community inventory credit for smallholder farmers, often 
supported by microfinance institutions (MFIs) which refinance their 
operations with commercial banks. Stocks are normally held under a 
double-padlock arrangement in community stores or domestic buildings, 
with the keys to one lock being held by the producer organisation (PO) 
or group of farmers and the other by the MFI.
(b) Type B: Private warehouses. Financing against commodities stored in 
a private warehouse under the control and responsibility of a collateral 
manager (CM). This can include a field warehouse, where the goods are 
held in the borrower’s store which is temporarily leased to the CM under 
a tripartite collateral management agreement (CMA).
(c) Type C: Public warehouses. Financing against commodities stored in a 
public warehouse. This means a warehouse open to depositors from the 
general public; it does not mean that the warehouse belongs to the State; 
indeed most public warehouses are privately owned. In practice however, 
we may find a variation on this type, where the company operating the 
Introduction1
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warehouse is the only depositor and does not receive deposits from the 
general public. 
(d) Type D: Lending against the security of current or future production. In 
this case the funding agencies have in mind lending against a documentary 
security representing current or future production, such as the Cedulas de 
Produtos Rurais (agricultural bonds) popularised in Brazil.
In addition to the above, there are also two non-
focus types, being financing: (a) with a third party 
carrying out stock monitoring on the financier’s 
behalf (under stock monitoring agreements 
or SMAs) and; (b) where the financier does 
the surveillance of the goods itself. These 
types are normally carried out in conditions of 
relative security, where the borrower enjoys 
considerable trust with the financier, or where 
the financier has strong non-legal means of 
enforcing its rights over the borrower. Stock 
monitoring is closely allied to Type B financing 
(private warehouses), since the monitors are 
normally the same inspection companies that 
act as collateral managers and sometimes combining both services within a 
single contract.
The above typology is approximate. In practice, there is overlap among the 
different types. For this reason, the reader should consider the report as a 
whole rather than focusing on a particular type.
Local technical consultants were contracted to produce country reports in 
each of the subject countries and these are presented in Volume II of this 
report. Legal consultants were contracted in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, 
Mozambique, and Madagascar1 and reviews of applicable laws and regulations 
in each of the subject countries are presented in Volume III. 
1 The Madagascan legal consultant has expertise across the OHADA region including in Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal.
The aim of this 
study is to 
foster the emergence 
of warehouse 
operators and collateral 
managers who can 
provide storage and 
collateral management 
services that will 
facilitate access to 
warehouse receipt 
finance in favour of 
smallholder farmers
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The authors start the report with this type because it is firmly focused on 
farmers who are at the base of the value chain. It is a highly decentralised type 
of financing, practised primarily in Madagascar, under the name of Greniers 
Communautaires Villageois (GCVs) and in a few countries of francophone West 
Africa, as warrantage communautaire (henceforth warrantage c.). As currently 
practised, this type of financing allows farmers to hold back their crop to meet 
lean season food requirements and to sell surplus food at higher prices and 
thereby avoid overselling their crop at harvest time. In the majority of cases, 
stocks are held identity-preserved with bags marked in the name of individual 
depositors/farmers and once loans are repaid, each depositor/farmer is 
individually responsible for disposing of the product. Reported repayment 
rates are normally close to 100%. 
The degree of seasonal price variability for coarse grains (maize, millet, 
etc.) and legumes varies widely from country to country but the variability 
is generally much higher than in the Republic of South Africa – the African 
country with the most highly developed marketing system and where average 
seasonal price increases for maize are below 20%. This difference suggests 
that there is significant scope for price stabilisation in the subject countries. 
The GCVs are Madagascar’s singular achievement in commodity-collateralised 
lending, with annual deposits of the order of 100,000 to 120,000 t per annum 
(typically 1-2 t per depositor) and on an upward trend. Over 90% of the tonnage 
is paddy rice; much of the rest is milled rice, while cloves and coffee are also 
significant in value terms. GCVs account for over 40% of the loan portfolio of 
two major MFI networks, which have been built up largely around this lending 
product. GCVs have taken off with other MFIs; they account for 25% of the 
portfolio of a leading more urban-based network. 
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The product is not without risks, due to government intervention in rice 
markets and the lending practices of some MFIs, with one network recently 
reported to have declared bankruptcy. At the same time, lack of knowledge of 
post-harvest handling and pest control is considerably slowing diversification 
towards other crops. Addressing the knowledge problem presents an important 
opportunity to the participating MFIs. There is currently a move towards more 
centralised purpose-built and rented stores. This presents potential challenges 
for the MFIs and the refinancing banks but it also provides an opportunity to 
develop a national warehousing profession, with public warehouses (Type C 
operations) and an appropriate regulatory structure.
Warrantage c. was developed in Niger from 1988/89, and after 10 years it 
accounted for financing of about 5,000 t of varied commodities including grains, 
oilseeds, legumes and dehydrated horticultural products belonging to around 
12,500 depositors. Since then, the volume of lending appears to have stagnated 
due to poor harvests, financial difficulties with one of the key lenders, the 
inflexibility of the double padlock system, a leading PO (Mooriben Federation) 
adopting another financing model, the end of FAO technical support and a 
shortage of warehouses. Warrantage c. has also been tried with Niger’s major 
export crop, onions, so far unsuccessfully. The approach has subsequently 
been introduced to other West African countries including Burkina Faso, where 
in 2013 it accounted for about 3,400 t of commodities belonging to 4,021 
producers, and Senegal, where an initial pilot was not continued.
There are two basic models of warrantage c.: a decentralised model, where the 
FI finances an individual PO along the lines set out above, and a centralised 
model, where a second or higher tier organisation (a union or a federation) 
coordinates several grassroot POs and represents them vis-à-vis financial 
institutions. The MFI delegates much of its supervisory role to the union or 
federation, which holds the key to its padlock on its behalf. While the centralised 
model may not always be advantageous, it can simplify relationships with the 
financial institutions, reduce the costs of credit and increase the chances of 
institutional viability. There is a third, more commercial approach that involves 
the collective marketing of stored produce, sometimes with a collateral 
management company handling the storage and supporting the collective 
effort with input supply and brokerage services. With this approach Type A 
begins transitioning to Types B and C. 
Warrantage c. is found to have some strong elements of sustainability: local 
appropriation, strong peer pressure among borrowers, accountability with the 
lender, a forced savings aspect (which makes it easier to handle widely varying 
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seasonal price movements), decentralised management and no requirement 
for costly collateral managers or insurance cover. However, certain features 
detract from its sustainability, notably: the inflexibility of the product (a largely 
fixed calendar for depositing, borrowing and reimbursement); the shortage of 
effective MFIs present in the area where the farmers live (in contrast to many 
areas of Madagascar); dependency on outside support to build warehouses; 
a need for continuous and sustained educational inputs; government actions 
that upset market fundamentals and cause depositors to lose money; and 
limited ability of small producers to play the market.
Nevertheless, the positive externalities of warrantage c. may justify further 
external support: because farmers can hold food stocks back in rural areas, 
the population is made more resilient in face of crises, and it can be a stepping 
stone towards more market-oriented forms of organisation. However, continued 
large scale expenditure in promoting the tool can only be justified where there 
are prospects for large-scale and sustained adoption.
In the case of Mozambique, opportunities for community inventory credit are 
limited by various factors, notably the poor state of microfinance provision 
(compounded by the polluting effect of government subsidised loans which 
impose no sanctions on defaulters), and the management capacity of POs. 
Nevertheless, the study has led to the formation of a working group that 
is planning to pilot an inventory credit scheme with a few market-oriented 
groups. Some initiatives in Cameroon are noted and the Cameroon country 
report proposes promoting the activity with the IFAD-backed PADMIR project.
The practical elements of warrantage c. (notably the procedures, trust and 
peer pressure) contribute much more to collateral security than the legal 
framework does, for which reason the legal regime is not a high priority in 
encouraging this type of financing in its most decentralised form. However, 
as Type A financing takes on characteristics of Types B and C, the legal 
considerations for these types become more relevant. There is a particular 
need for regulatory scrutiny in Madagascar, given the importance of GCVs to 
the lending portfolio of MFI networks. 
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Type B financing is carried out in all subject countries except Madagascar, 
where financiers prefer to do the surveillance themselves. 
Most of the activity is focused on import and export of commodities. It is 
concentrated near the ports, although there is a more patchy service in up-
country areas and landlocked countries, typically in support of processing 
of agricultural products. With some exceptions, smallholder farmers do 
not make much use of private warehousing services, primarily because the 
POs representing them tend to lack the means to hire a collateral manager 
(typically costing upwards of US$ 1,000 per month), and/or they do not enjoy 
the confidence of financiers, while their remote location poses a challenge 
to financiers and collateral managers. However, the healthy use of CMAs 
and SMAs is important to farmers as they are a key element in the supply 
chain for agricultural commodities on which they depend. The service is 
disproportionately used by local African exporters and it helps level the playing 
field vis-à-vis multinational companies which can source cheap funds offshore. 
The collateral managers include a mixture of international inspection/
credit management and logistics companies and an increasing number of 
local operators. Some inspection companies and countries have been badly 
affected by warehousing frauds, and this situation has driven up the cost of 
professional indemnity insurance and caused some companies to withdraw 
from the business or to concentrate on the less risky inspection and stock 
monitoring services. 
Providing that collateral managers perform correctly, financiers do not 
normally have problems with financing against CMAs. They know their 
customers and usually the commodity off-takers. Prices tend to be tied up in 
structured transactions with invoices and letters of credit, and there is access 
to accurate market information for most exported commodities – with the 
3 Type B financing: Private warehouses
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notable exception of cashew. However, the prospect of working with up-country 
operations, with relatively unknown clients lacking off-taker agreements gives 
financiers much more anxiety; they will tend to insist on other collateral, such 
as real estate or personal guarantees. This requirement is partly a function of 
the risks involved and partly a function of the financiers’ lack of experience of, 
and preparedness for, working with players in local value chains, as opposed 
to with international traders of commodities with which they do most of their 
commodity lending business. If financiers wish to enter this market, they need 
to develop new internal capabilities such as analysing historical price trends, 
variable haircutting, monitoring domestic market price movements, marking-
to-market and margin calls. However, given the small scale of the prospective 
market and financiers’ apprehensions, few have invested in these. 
This paper considers the role of CMAs and SMAs with two export crops, cocoa 
and cotton. A review of Ivorian and Cameroonian experiences with cocoa show 
there is an important debate about the most appropriate strategy for value 
chain development in countries that have liberalised their export markets: 
that is, whether producer cooperatives should seek to develop downstream 
marketing, making use of warehouse receipt financing, or whether they 
should focus on linking up with international buyers under contract farming 
arrangements. Cameroon has just negotiated a  30 million international line 
of credit that seems more aligned with the first of these options, and it is 
suggested that the funding agencies seek to monitor performance over time.
The biggest constraint to up-country financing with local staples and feed 
ingredients is the atomisation of production and the lack of scale economies 
which tends to make the employment of a collateral manager quite onerous. 
Notwithstanding these constraints, certain collateral managers in landlocked 
countries (e.g. Burkina Faso and Uganda) have attempted to bring their 
services closer to farmers and/or small-scale 
processors. In Burkina Faso, there is now a 
national consensus around the importance 
of warrantage c. and collateral management, 
and three new collateral managers (some 
established by domestic and regional banks) 
have developed innovative forms of lending for 
producers, small-scale processing and the rice 
value chain. The Burkina Faso country report 
posits that there is considerable potential for further development, but this 
rapid expansion is not without risk. As in most countries, the shortage of 




have attempted to bring 
their services closer 
to farmers and/or 
small-scale processors
11P A R T  A  –  C H A P T E R  3
There are two key areas where the legal regime could be improved: (1) 
regulation of collateral management; and (2) removal of barriers to taking 
security over commodity. These barriers include the requirement to pay ad 
valorem stamp duty on security documents, difficulties with the registration 
of security interests, and onerous formalities to taking security interests 
(particularly in Mozambique). Côte d’Ivoire is the only country to have 
attempted to regulate collateral managers, but these laws only apply to the 
four leading export commodities (cocoa, coffee, cotton and cashew). Collateral 
managers must satisfy financial requirements, but these appear too lenient to 
deter unsuitable applicants. 
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Type C financing is only relevant in countries that have supported, or are 
considering supporting, the establishment of public warehouses. As of this 
publication, these countries include Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal 
and Uganda. Public warehouses also serve as delivery locations for commodity 
exchanges and they are vital to the establishment of these exchanges. 
Uganda is the only country to date to have passed enabling legislation for 
public warehousing. Uganda has also installed an electronic warehouse receipt 
system (eWRS) linked to the same server used by the South African system of 
grain silo certificates. An attempt to implement the system with grains (mainly 
maize) saw the licensing of five warehouses, the involvement of four banks, 
and the depositing of about 22,600 t from 2008 to 2013. However, this was 
far from the volume required to cover costs of most warehouses and of the 
regulatory authority. Notwithstanding these issues, at least two warehouses 
remain operational; one of them reports working with 162 POs representing 
10,000 farmers and handling 8,000 t of maize per season including both 
outright purchases and storage for third parties. However, the regulatory 
system is not presently operational. 
In Ghana, a novel private sector membership body called the Ghana Grains 
Council (GGC) has, since the end of 2012, sought to run a regulated WRS for 
its paid-up members. Some 29,500 t have been deposited of which 6,900 t 
have been financed, all of it through a company called CCH under a repurchase 
(Repo) scheme, which channels funds from the financiers. CCH’s strong 
involvement is related to the incipient nature of the scheme, so it is difficult 
to draw conclusions at this stage about the longer term attractiveness of Repo 
financing for direct lending by the banks. The real challenge for CCH, and 
one to which the promoter is committed, is to develop the Repo into a short-
term financial instrument for sale to institutional investors, which can thereby 
radically reduce the cost of warehouse financing in Ghana. 
4 Type C financing: Public warehouses
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However, the major event in the Ghanaian maize value-chain is a contract 
farming scheme for maize that is promoted by the input suppliers YARA and 
Weinco (the main depositor under the GGC WRS) and which, along with other 
intensification initiatives, has massively increased maize surpluses in northern 
Ghana. At the same time, the Ghanaian Government is preparing legislation for 
a regulated WRS and commodity exchange (GCX), with the Ministry of Trade 
promoting the exchange with eight x 10,000 t linked warehouses with the firm 
Eleni and a group of international and domestic investors, with a view to start 
trading maize in 2015. 
Côte d’Ivoire has drafted a WR Bill and it plans to pilot the system with a single 
crop, probably cashews, starting in 2015. The Government of Mozambique 
has already established a commodity exchange (BMM) and has drafted a 
Warehouse Receipt Bill. BMM is in the process 
of assuming responsibility for 39 new silos 
with a capacity of approximately 200,000 t of 
grain, but as of this publication, the enterprise 
appears far from functional. The approach is 
very much government-driven, in contrast with 
the case in Côte d’Ivoire, where there have been 
incremental moves toward the establishment of 
a public warehousing system and a commodity 
exchange, with much more consultation of 
relevant stakeholders. However, the drafting of 
a new WRS law could provide the opportunity to engage government seriously 
about the legal and institutional framework for different kinds of warehouse 
receipting in Mozambique, including CMAs and SMAs. 
The Madagascar country report recommends building on the trend towards 
central MFI-controlled warehouses (as opposed to home-based GCVs) and 
developing a national warehousing profession, with an appropriate regulatory 
structure. Indeed, Madagascar probably presents one of the strongest 
opportunities for public warehousing in the nine countries surveyed, depending 
on the willingness of the MFIs and their ability to reach out to government, 
banks and other value-chain players. 
Those seeking to establish a regulated system face the choice of going for 
legislation (following the examples of Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia) or 
creating the system out of contractual arrangements between the relevant 
parties (following the examples of South Africa and, so far, by the Ghana Grains 
Council). Both routes are likely to be difficult. The contractual route requires 
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industry motivation, available finance and a high level of stakeholder cohesion 
that is difficult to achieve, at least with domestic food commodities, given the 
relatively atomised nature of production, distribution, and even processing in 
sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). With a voluntary system, there is 
also a legal risk of claims from third parties outside of the system, though this 
has not prevented successful implementation in South Africa. The legislative 
route is also difficult, as illustrated by the case of Uganda, where the local 
and international project sponsors did not share a cohesive view of what they 
were trying to achieve. There are also risks that the regulatory agency will be 
underfunded and/or poorly managed, or that governments will focus on short-
term political objectives and thereby alienate private players.
Another option is the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX) route and variants 
on it which have been widely promoted with governments around Africa. By 
getting the governments enthusiastically involved and enlisting the large-
scale support of aid donors, international financial institutions, banks and 
investment funds, the promoters seek to create the critical mass whereby 
regulatory obstacles are quickly overcome, and the exchange and its linked 
public warehousing system takes off fast. However, there are some potential 
snags, notably: difficulty in translating Ethiopian conditions to other countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa; that domestically-consumed field crops like maize and 
soybeans cannot be effectively mandated through the exchange as they were 
in Ethiopia (scope for evasion is infinite); in the case of Ghana, it is unclear how 
the exchange will reach break-even; the approach may appeal to short-term 
and interventionist motives in governments and prove counter-productive; 
and prestigious, flagship projects can snuff out debate about pros and cons. 
The authors consider the case for implementing WRS legislation across the 
whole OHADA region, but they conclude that it will be a difficult task, because 
it would require unanimity among voting countries. Individual Member 
States could, however, legislate in respect of warehouse receipts as part of a 
possessory pledge over stocks.
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It would not be realistic to expect financiers to take security over paper (like 
the Brazilian agricultural bonds) in most African countries, given that there 
are so many cases where they are unwilling to finance against the security of 
possessory collateral held in warehouses. The small scale of most agricultural 
producers and the weakness of cooperatives also make this a challenging 
type. However, there may be scope for testing such a product with commercial 
rubber producers in Côte d’Ivoire, an industry where financiers are already 
lending to producers on the security of the crop.
Type D financing: 
Lending against the 
security of current or 
future production
5
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Warehouse receipting and collateral management are not a panacea; they 
are tools that can be used in the development of agricultural value chains, 
alongside or in combination with a range of other tools. Table 1 outlines key 
pros and cons of the different approaches reviewed.
Scale factors are vital to the success of all kinds of WR/CM initiatives. In the 
case of Type B and Type C operations, need for scale is due to the high fixed 
costs of operating/collaterally managing warehouses, to which regulatory 
frameworks may result in additional costs. Type A warehouses have low 
overheads, and, providing they can access a financier, they can be run on a 
much smaller scale in rural communities. However, given the high expenditure 
on promoting the tool, its use can only be economically justified if there are 
prospects for sustained adoption by large numbers of communities.
Economic factors, including both demand and scalability, are fundamental to 
the success of warehousing and collateral management initiatives, and these 
factors are sometimes overlooked at the time of project design. This was the 
case with the regulated WRS in Uganda, where there was a lack of clarity at 
the project design stage. Economic factors also adversely affected the rice 
pilot in the Senegal River valley where the government had to deal with a 
long-standing political hot-potato, that is, the trade-off between supporting 
domestic production and of ensuring low-cost rice to the urban population. 
6 Conclusion
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Table 1: Key pros and cons of financing types
Type Pros Cons
Main subject countries 
using it to date
A
• Low scale, direct 
farmer involvement
• High accountability 
and repayment 
• Improved management 
of home economy/ 
forced savings
• Possible stepping 
stone to market-
oriented approach
• Inflexible product with 
fixed calendar
• Dependency on project 
support, specially for 
warehouse construction
• Producers lack of market 
knowledge
• Madagascar,
• Burkina Faso and 
Niger 
B
• Important component 
of key value chains 
supporting millions of 
families
• Spontaneous activity, 
not dependent on 
governments or 
donors
• Economies of scale – 
high fixed costs per site/ 
inaccessible to most  
rural clients
• Vulnerable to fraud in 
some countries
• All countries except 
Madagascar
C
• Open, contestable 
system, allowing public 
access
• Facilitates price 
discovery, trading 
and development of 
commodity exchanges
• Requires regulation or 
self-regulation, either of 
which is difficult
• Economies of scale in 
operation and regulation 
of warehouses
• High initial cost of 
external support
• Uganda, Ghana
Other key success factors include: (1) the vision and leadership of promoters; 
(2) private sector involvement and initiative; (3) the scope to modify 
approaches based on experience; and (4) the role of government, particularly 
whether it is supportive or otherwise. Addressing these factors is largely about 
process, and for this reason the funding agencies may need to provide patient 
long-term support, often for upwards of a decade, if they want to get results. 
They also need to move away from the current project-based approaches 
towards a programme-based approach which will provide them with a thematic 
repository of information upon which they can draw.
There is a widespread need for capacity building of financiers, collateral 
managers, producers and others, and there is a shortage of warehouse capacity 
as noted throughout the subject countries. In the case of the Sahelian countries 
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(particularly Burkina Faso), it is necessary to carefully evaluate different 
approaches to more downstream marketing, involving (a) development of 
service cooperatives and (b) outreach by financiers and collateral managers, 
in terms of their respective potential, limits and complementarity, with a view 
to optimising the support strategy. In terms of typology, these approaches 
cover the transition from Type A to Types B and C financing.
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Strategic recommendation to establish a joint Agricultural Commodity 
Programme
The three funding agencies should continue their partnership by establishing 
this joint programme, with a view towards developing commodity-collateralised 
funding and related value-chain innovations in Africa. The roles of the 
programme would be to: provide independent analyses and backstopping for 
the funding agencies; provide capacity building through training, mentoring 
and workshops; help CMs to develop their own systems of capacity certification; 
develop and test a robust model for partially subsidised funding of warehouse 
construction; leverage the efforts of leading international companies and other 
relevant international programmes (not least the World Food Programme); 
support specific country initiatives; and learn lessons and feed them back into 
the public domain. In supporting warehouse construction, it is important that 
warehouses are effectively utilised and do not become white elephants. For 
this reason, beneficiaries should pay a substantial part of the cost and obtain 
clear ownership. 
The programme should have its own governance, staff, budget and a set of 
rules and operating procedures that will allow it to focus on the subject area 
long-term, with the ability to launch, review and curtail initiatives. These 
conditions should allow it to assist and monitor local initiatives around the 
continent flexibly and as opportunity presents.
Legal and regulatory recommendations
With regard to warehouse regulation and taking account of the limitations of 
the alternative approaches described above (legislated, voluntary and ECX-
inspired), the authors advocate a gradual approach led by local stakeholders, 
leading to legislation. Where the necessary support or infrastructure to 
7 Recommendations
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developing a regulated system are lacking, steps should be taken to improve 
the security regime: (1) by ensuring creditors can easily take effective, 
enforceable security over stored commodity by other means (e.g., by removing 
stamp duty and registration fees); and (2) by improving the functionality of 
collateral registers and/or by abolishing the requirement to register.
In the case of the OHADA region, it is probably best to start by introducing 
suitable national legislation in one or two individual countries, and then use 
this experience to frame legislation for the entire region. Côte d’Ivoire may be a 
good place to start, given the scale of existing collateral management activity, 
the regulatory experience, the impetus to establish public warehousing, the 
positive approach of government and broad stakeholder involvement. 
Near-term initiatives
The funding agencies should approach the Malagasy MFIs and key financiers 
involved in refinancing GCV lending with a view to establishing a programme 
to: (1) make improvements in price-risk management; (2) develop a national 
warehousing profession and regulatory structure; (3) improve post-harvest 
handling and funding of commodities other than paddy; and (4) promote more 
supportive public policies for rice marketing.
In the case of Burkina Faso, there should be an in-depth multidisciplinary 
assessment of approaches leading to the design of a multi-component support 
project, which may include: expert mentoring of players; a challenge fund 
for capacity building/business development; schemes to develop and enforce 
professional standards; peer-based mutual guarantee schemes; and support 
for warehouse construction. The funding 
agencies should also contribute to discussions 
about warehouse legislation and regulation.
In Niger, priority should be given to an updated 
inventory of warehouse lending and more in-
depth analysis of certain cases. In both Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire, a priority is to improve collateral 
registries, enforcement systems and other legal 
aspects so as to complement planned warehouse legislation. The funding 
agencies should also investigate the scope for technical support to the planned 
warehousing pilot. In Mozambique, they should offer backstopping support to 
the pilot planned by the newly formed WRS working group, and they should also 
seek to engage government on the legal framework for warehouse receipting.
A priority is to 
improve collateral 
registries, enforcement 
systems and other 
legal aspects so as to 
complement planned 
warehouse legislation
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The funding agencies should investigate the scope for a pilot initiative, 
probably in Malawi, for the coordination of WR/CM with local and regional 
procurement of food (by the World Food Programme).
Further initiatives
A long-term engagement with Sahelian countries is proposed with a view 
to developing national strategies for WR/CM and their implementation. 
Recommendations are also made for Ghana, Cameroon, Ghana and Senegal. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background to the assignment
This report in three volumes has been prepared by J Coulter Consulting Ltd. 
(J Coulter) and Sullivan & Worcester UK LLP (S&W), together the authors 
of this report who have respectively led the technical and legal sides of the 
work. They have prepared the report for Agence Française de Développement 
(AFD), the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation ACP-
EU (CTA) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
(together, the funding agencies).
The authors have prepared this report in fulfilment of a study commissioned 
by the funding agencies into warehousing and collateral management systems 
in sub-Saharan Africa (the study), following terms of reference (TOR) provided 
by the funding agencies (see Annex 1). The purpose of the study is to promote 
access to finance through warehouse receipt finance (and other forms of 
commodity-based finance) in favour of smallholder farmers in the subject 
countries. The objective is to foster the emergence of warehouse operators 
and collateral managers (CMs) who can provide the necessary storage and 
collateral management services. 
The subject countries targeted in the study are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal and Uganda. 
The analysis was to comprise both legal and institutional due diligence; its 
aim was to identify obstacles and make recommendations that could be 
operationalised in the subject countries and, possibly, in member countries of 
the Treaty on the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). OHADA 
is composed of 17 francophone countries of West and Central Africa, five of 
which are subject countries.
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1.2 Methodology
Typology
Based on desk research and initial field research, the authors decided to focus 
on the following four financing types (the financing types), as follows. 
(a) Type A: Community inventory credit for small farmers, known as 
warrantage communautaire (warrantage c.) in francophone West Africa 
and Greniers Communautaires Villageois (GCVs) in Madagascar.
(b) Type B: Private warehouses. Financing against commodities stored in 
a private warehouse under the control and responsibility of a collateral 
manager (CM). This type can include field warehouses, where the goods 
are held in the borrower’s store which is temporarily leased to the CM.
(c) Type C: Public warehouses. Financing against commodities stored in 
a public warehouse, which is a warehouse open to depositors from the 
general public. It does not mean that the warehouse belongs to the State; 
indeed, most public warehouses are privately owned. In practice however, 
we may find a variation on this type, where the company operating the 
warehouse is the only depositor, and does not receive deposits from 
the general public, either because other parties are not interested in 
depositing or because the operator wants sole access.2 
(d) Type D: Lending against the security of current or future production. 
This type involves lending against a documentary security representing 
current or future production, such as the Cedulas de Produtos Rurais 
(agricultural bonds) popularised in Brazil.3 
Further information on typology of Types A, B and C is provided respectively in 
Section 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1 of this Volume and in Annex 3 of Volume III of this report.
The authors also refer to non-focus types, which include financing: (1) with a 
third party carrying out stock monitoring on lender’s behalf (stock monitoring 
agreements or SMAs); and (2) with the lender who may carry out its own 
2 While this negates the public aspect of the public warehouse, the authors include it in Type C 
rather than Type B because the stock is not under the permanent control of an independent 
collateral manager. An agribusiness operating such a warehouse needs to enjoy a very high 
level of confidence with its financiers, who are also likely to trust it to handle the stock of 
third parties. 
3 See Rutten, 2012, Annex 10.
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surveillance without employing a stock monitor. These types are of importance 
in commodity-collateralised financing, but they are normally carried out in 
conditions of relative security, where the borrower enjoys considerable trust 
with the financier, or where the financier has 
strong non-legal means of enforcing its rights 
over the borrower. These situations do not 
normally call for novel institutional devices or 
legal reform, and for this reason the study does 
not focus on them. However, the reader should 
note that stock monitoring is closely allied to 
Type B financing (private warehouses), since 
the monitors are normally the same inspection companies that act as CMs 
in Type B financing arrangements above. Indeed, CMs sometimes provide 
clients with a mixture of stock monitoring and collateral management services 
within the same value chain (e.g., monitoring stocks of agricultural inputs, raw 
commodities and primary processing in up-country locations, and collaterally 
managing export-ready products in the ports).
Fieldwork and report preparation
Annex 2 shows the composition of the study team. 
The lead author, J. Coulter, commissioned local technical consultants to 
prepare technical country reports, or to assist in the preparation of same, in 
the nine subject countries. The main challenge was to produce a report that 
answered the terms of reference while seeing the wood from the trees, (i.e., 
focusing on important issues within the TOR). For this reason, the author of 
each country study was first asked to do deskwork to identify the main types 
practiced and/or of relevance in his/her country, and then focus on these in 
preparing the study in line with the TOR. The named authors are individually 
responsible for the content of the respective country studies.
J Coulter mentored local technical consultants as they went about their 
work, drawing upon his prior working experience in eight of the nine subject 
countries. In the case of Madagascar, he carried out fieldwork in the capital 
and central highlands and led the process of report preparation. He also 
carried out fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, building on the prior work of 
technical consultants in those countries. 
S&W contracted legal consultants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, 
Mozambique and Madagascar. The Madagascar-based firm has expertise 
If properly 
implemented, 
WR/CM can contribute 
greatly to the 
development of efficient 
agricultural value chains
32 W A R E H O U S E  F I N A N C I N G  S T U D Y  -  V O L U M E  I
across the OHADA region, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Nigera and Senegal.
The technical country reports contain brief summaries of the legal consultants’ 
relevant findings, after which the technical authors add their own comments 
in relation to the local legal systems. The reader should refer to the country 
reports in Volume III, Section B (legal country reports), and this report for the 
legal analysis as approved by the local legal consultants. 
This report is a synthesis of the technical country studies, key findings of the 
interim report and further inputs by the legal team which consisted of S&W 
and an addition legal consultant they hired in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Structure of the report
The main contents of the three volumes are as follows:
(a) Volume I: overall findings, conclusions and recommendations, which 
draw on and references the findings in Volume II and III
(b) Volume II: technical country reports on each of the nine subject 
countries 
(c) Volume III: a review of applicable laws and regulations, containing: 
Section A, an overview including a matrix summarising the legal findings 
in each of the subject countries; Section B, containing legal country 
reports on each of the nine subject countries; and Section C, which 
includes further information on typology (Annex 2) and an overview of 
legal concepts (Annex 3). Readers unfamiliar with the legal concepts and 
distinctions discussed in this report might find that Annex 3 provides a 
useful reference point.
Volume l starts with an outline of the distribution of different types of 
warehousing and collateral management between countries. This information is 
followed by four sections dealing respectively with Types A (community inventory 
credit), B (private warehouses), C (public warehouses) and D (lending against 
the security of current or future production). Section 7 provides conclusions. 
Section 8 offers recommendations. This is followed by a bibliography, the terms 
of reference (Annex 1), a legal annex (Annex 2), details of authors and consultants 
(Annex 3) and a discussion of mutual guarantee schemes (Annex 4).
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1.3 The place of warehouse receipts and collateral 
management (WR/CM) in the development of 
agricultural value chains
WR/CM is not a panacea or a magic ingredient. They are tools that can be used 
in the development of agricultural value chains, alongside or in combination 
with a range of other tools, such as:
(a) improving farmers’ access to inputs, equipment, or advisory services to 
increase agricultural productivity
(b) developing transport infrastructure and improvement in transport 
efficiency
(c) better trade policies and better enforcement of those that exist
(d) investing in storage and crop handling infrastructure
(e) improving crop forecasting and market information systems
(f) cooperative (bottom-up) development
(g) vertical (top-down) integration by marketers and processors, often 
multinationals, including contract farming
(h) development of commodity standardisation, including grading systems
(i) commodity exchanges (including auctions and simple online trading 
platforms with clearing and settlement systems).
In some cases, farmers stand to gain much more from programmes to increase 
agricultural productivity than by tinkering with markets that operate tolerably 
well and can easily absorb production increases. Improvements in transport 
infrastructure often have the highest pay-off, opening up entire regions to 
commercially-oriented production. Effective contract farming can sometimes 
be a key driver of rural development (see Section 4.6.2, with regard to West 
African cocoa and Section 5.3.1 with regard to maize in Ghana). However, one 
attraction of WR/CM is that it is often complementary with the other tools and 
increases their effectiveness, as shown in the following examples. 
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(a) Investments in storage infrastructure are more profitable if the 
stock held there can easily be collateralised for financing and if a 
remote buyer can be assured of the quality of the product it can 
source sight unseen.
(b) Professional warehouse operators can facilitate commodity 
standardisation. Governments often try to institute grading systems 
for basic food commodities, but they find that the grades sit on the 
shelf because there are no expert parties willing and equipped to 
apply them in practice. 
(c) A professional warehouse operator can help smallholder producer 
organisations (POs)/coops improve the marketability of their crops by 
cleaning, grading, packaging, storing and collaterally managing them, 
and helping them connect with buyers. 
(d) A processing company or an exporter may find warehouse receipts 
a useful device for developing its up-country supply chain. If the 
company can count on trusted collateral managers, it will find it easy 
to collateralise its stocks and thereby finance further procurement. 
Alternatively, the company may pay its suppliers against the transfer 
of warehouse receipts that provide them with good title to the goods. 
(e) Public sector buyers (like food reserves or food relief agencies) or price 
support agencies can outsource their cleaning, grading and storage 
operations to warehouses certified for this purpose and thereby: (1) 
reduce their up-front investment in food storage and handling; and 
(2) achieve higher levels of logistical efficiency by avoiding the cost 
of shipping the goods in and out of their own storage facilities. Public 
sector agencies make use of warehouse receipt systems in many 
various countries, including the United States, Brazil and India.
(f) Commodity exchanges require registered warehouses which can act as 
delivery locations (i.e., places where sellers can deliver goods against 
contractual specifications). These warehouse are vital in the context 
of smallholder production and the relatively atomised marketing 
structures which prevail in most of sub-Saharan Africa. In order 
to manage performance risk (i.e., the risk that sellers, particularly 
smallholder farmers, will default on contracts), a collateral manager/
warehouse operator will normally need to act as a guarantor, holding 
the stock while it is under offer through the exchange. The absence 
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of such arrangements largely explains why various past exchange 
initiatives in Zambia, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria have failed.
Despite these benefits, the different types of WR/CM vary greatly in the degree 
to which they complement the other tools. Being largely concerned with local 
self-sufficiency, Type A operations are less integrated with other parts of the 
value-chain than Type B and Type C operations. 
In summary, WR/CM is not a panacea and, as shown later in this report, 
implementation sometimes proves challenging, but if properly implemented 
WR/CM can contribute greatly to the development of efficient agricultural 
value chains. 
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Type B (private warehouses) can be found in all countries except Madagascar. 
It is concentrated in coastal countries, particularly around the ports of Dakar 
(Senegal), Abidjan and San Pedro (Côte d’Ivoire), Accra/Tema and Takoradi 
(Ghana), Douala (Cameroon), Maputo/Matola, Beira and Nacala (Mozambique). 
However, there is a significant level of service provision in up-country areas of 
the same countries and landlocked countries. 
In Madagascar, banks have opted to carry 
out the surveillance themselves rather than 
employing CMs and they occasionally employ 
stock monitors. There was however an official 
attempt to introduce Type B to the country 
with the aim of reactivating the collection and 
storage of agricultural products in 2002, after a 
political crisis had left the domestic rice market 
in disarray. Government, acting with the support of USAID, established the 
Fund for the Marketing of Agricultural Products (FCPA) and sought to get 
banks involved in financing rural aggregators. However, the scheme eventually 
got politicised and mismanaged; the overall impact was small and it was closed 
down in 2009. 
Type C (public warehouses) is at an incipient stage of development. Both 
Uganda and Ghana have attempted to establish regulated systems of public 
warehousing for grains, while Côte d’Ivoire and Mozambique are seeking 
to establish such a system. The leading sub-Saharan examples of public 
warehousing in Africa are in the Republic of South Africa (for maize, wheat, 
soybeans and sunflower), Ethiopia (where warehouses serve mainly as 
delivery locations for the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange – ECX), and Tanzania 
(principally cashew and coffee). None of these are subject countries.
The leading sub- 
Saharan examples of 
public warehousing in 
Africa are in the Republic 
of South Africa, Ethiopia, 
and Tanzania
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Type A (community-based inventory credit) has gone furthest in Madagascar, 
where it is used overwhelmingly for storage of paddy rice; but it has also made 
considerable progress in Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal where it is used with 
a wider variety of crops.
Type D (lending against the security of current or future production) products 
like the Brazilian agricultural bonds are unknown in the subject countries. 
However, banks were found to lend against the security of rubber crops in 
Côte d’Ivoire. 
It is important to note that the typology is inexact and there are cases of 
overlap. One can envisage various variants on conventional Type A financing, 
such as:
(a) transition to Type B, where a lender holding stock jointly with a PO 
(i.e., a cooperative, farmer association or other kind of registered or 
unregistered farmer group) under a dual padlock arrangement starts 
employing a CM which takes full control of, and responsibility for, the 
warehoused goods
(b) transition to Type C, where the PO starts running the warehouse on its 
own without the involvement of the financier or a CM and takes deposits 
from the public.
One can also envisage variants on Type C. For example, a microfinance 
institution (MFI) or a PO runs a warehouse and opens it up to deposits by its 
members but not to the public at large. Operators of Type C warehouses may 
or may not trade the commodities they store, there being a classic dichotomy 
between agricultural warehouse operators in the USA and Canada, which 
provide crop handling and storage services to third parties as an adjunct to 
their trading activities and general warehousing companies in Latin America, 
which are generally barred from trading in the type of commodities they store. 
One may also find cases where the operator of the warehouse is the only party 
depositing in the warehouse; this is currently the case with the Ghana Grains 
Council (GGC) scheme described in Section 5.3.1, though it is envisaged that 
they will open up to the public in the future. 
3
39P A R T  B  –  C H A P T E R  3
3 Community inventory credit (Type A)
3.1 Introduction
Type A is a highly decentralised type of financing, practised primarily in 
Madagascar, under the name of Greniers Communautaires Villageois (GCVs) 
and in a few countries of francophone West Africa, under the name of 
warrantage communautaire (warrantage c.), which the authors translate as 
community inventory credit. As currently practised, this type of financing 
allows farmers to hold back their crop to meet lean season food requirements 
and to sell surplus food at higher prices, and thereby avoid overselling their 
crop at harvest time.
Type A is usually supported by MFIs that are capable of penetrating rural 
areas and working with smallholder farmers on a local basis. In this model, 
a producer organisation (PO) or a group of smallholder farmers stores the 
members’ commodity in a domestic building or a small warehouse under 
the control of the organisation or group. The product of different farmers is 
normally not mixed, but it is identity-preserved and marked with the name 
of each individual owner. While the product is serving as loan collateral, it is 
secured by way of a double-padlock arrangement: the PO or group holds the 
key to one lock and the MFI to the other. In practice, however, the MFI may 
sometimes hand its key to a third-party agent (e.g., a federation of POs).
An analysis of this type of arrangement suggests that the practical elements 
are of far greater significance than the legal framework. The financier may 
not have any security interest over the commodity in this scenario, but 
instead relies on the fact that access to the warehouse can only (lawfully) be 
gained when both the financier (or its agent) and the borrower are present 
to unlock the padlocks. The financier may have contractual rights which it 
could enforce over the commodity, but, in reality, the cost of enforcement is 
likely to be prohibitive.
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The success of Type A appears to rely on: (1) seasonal price patterns that allow 
farmers to realise financial gains in most years; (2) the implementation of 
procedures that are effective and well understood by the parties involved; and 
(3) trust and peer pressure between the borrowers whose individual assets 
are directly at stake and who wish to maintain a good credit record with the 
financing MFI. As such, implementing a legal regime might not be high priority 
when encouraging this type of financing.
3.2 Seasonal price patterns for food crops in subject 
countries
Table 2 shows information the country authors have presented on seasonal 
price variability.
Table 2: Evidence of seasonal price increases
Country Crop Average 
increase (%)
Observations
Burkina Faso Maize 30–43 SONAGESS producer prices, av. 









Niger Millet 24–38 SIMA prices, av. 2003/04 to 




Ghana – Techiman Maize 22 ESOKO prices, av. increase from 
September to June for 3 years to 
2012/13. Indicates massive fall in 
price variability since 1990s when 
average increase was circa 100%.
Ghana – Tamale Maize 31 Av. ESOKO prices, av. increase from 
November to June for 3 years to 
2012/13.
41P A R T  B  –  C H A P T E R  3





Paddy rice 44 Bouquet et al., 2009: average 
realisation of 188 GCVs, approx. 6 
months storage 2003–2007.
Milled rice – 
urban
25 Jenn-Treyer, O., 2008.
Milled rice – 
Tana
19 Carimantrand, 2011; av. for 1992-
2009.
Mozambique Maize 85–90 Tschirley et al., 2013: SIMA data, 
av. 2001-2011 for major markets in 
production areas




< 20 Tschirley et al. (2013).
These figures need to be considered with care, because:
(a) They apply to crops that are not standardised in terms of characteristics, 
moisture, defects, foreign matter, etc. This is notably the case with maize 
produced in zones relatively close to the equator (e.g., Uganda, southern 
half of Ghana), much of which is traded with moisture content 5% or 
more above the level at which it is safe for seasonal storage. 
(b) Prices are for urban locations, except for paddy in Madagascar, where 
detailed research was carried out into the actual price increased realised 
by farmers, using GCVs. In the absence of empirical data elsewhere, one 
may speculate that percentage seasonal price increases are higher at 
farm level than at urban level.4 
(c) Figures are not altogether comparable, as they refer to different storage 
periods, different numbers of years, different types of urban markets 
(some closer to farmers than others), etc. Some prices (notably for 
Burkina Faso and Niger) are averages of a set of markets, which causes 
some smoothing such that figures for seasonal price increases are less 
than in many locations. 
(d) The figures do not show the large year-to-year variability in seasonal 
price increases. As exemplified in Table 10 of the Burkina Faso country 
4 The reasoning for this conclusion is as follows: (a) in the equation Incr. % = 100 x (lean 
season price-harvest price)/(harvest price), the denominator is generally lower in rural areas; 
and (b) some surplus producing rural areas run short in the lean season, leading to reversal 
of the price gradient between rural and urban areas.
42 W A R E H O U S E  F I N A N C I N G  S T U D Y  -  V O L U M E  I
report (Volume II), prices occasionally fall rather than rise, while in other 
years prices may rise two or more times the average. 
(e) The figures are in current prices, but this does not take account of 
inflation that has been relatively high outside of the West African Franc 
zone and the Republic of South Africa. 
(f) The reader should also note the leveraging effect of borrowing. If a farmer 
borrows 70% of the value of the crop at harvest time, he/she is only 
investing 30% of his/her own funds in the stored commodity, and this 
greatly amplifies year-to-year variation in return on capital employed.
(g) Notwithstanding all these qualifications, one can make some interesting 
observations on the basis of these figures:
(h) The Republic of South Africa, with average seasonal increases in spot 
price not more than 20% for maize, can be taken as a good practice 
example. The country has a very strong marketing system, with excellent 
market infrastructure, crop forecasting, market information, WRS and a 
futures exchange which players use to hedge their positions.
(i) Neighbouring Mozambique, by contrast, has been exhibiting an exceptionally 
high seasonal price increase for maize, averaging 85%–90% over an 
11–year period.
(j) Limited (3–year) data from Ghana show that seasonal price increases 
for maize have greatly moderated in this country since the 1990s, 
which demonstrates that situations like that in Mozambique can change 
radically over time.
(k) Seasonal price increases for millet, a major staple in Sahelian countries, 
are relatively moderate, in the range of 14% to 38%, probably reflecting 
high levels of on-farm storage. Unlike the case with maize, un-threshed 
millet and sorghum are not highly pest-susceptible and can be stored for 
several years. Notwithstanding estimated interest charges and handling 
costs in the range of 14% to 22%5, millet is one of the main commodities 
stored with warrantage c. in Niger and it suggests that motivations other 
5 These calculations assume a storage period of 6 months, interest rates between 1.1% and 
2.5% per month + credit arrangement fee 1% + monthly storage charge FCFA 100 per 100 
kg bag (est. 1% of product value at time of storage) per month. As we shall see later, some 
groups in Burkina Faso pay collateral managers to store at FCFA 200 per bag. 
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than price speculation are at play in attracting farmers to this product. 
The report returns to this theme later in Section 3.4.5. 
(l) Seasonal price increases for cowpeas in Sahelian countries are much 
higher than for cereals. This increase likely reflects cowpeas’s high 
susceptibility to storage pests (beetles), but it also offers major returns 
to farmers who employ effective pest-control techniques. Groundnuts 
are one of the leading crops stored in Niger, but given the surprisingly 
divergent figures for Burkina Faso and Niger, it is difficult to draw clear 
conclusions about the profitability of storage.
(m) Seasonal price variations for milled rice are moderate, and this reflects 
the importance of international (as opposed to domestic) market forces 
in the formation of prices for this crop of which all African countries are 
net importers. Notwithstanding, seasonal price variability for paddy rice 
in Madagascar has been sufficiently high at farm level to make the GCV 
product highly attractive to farmers. 
3.3 The GCV system in Madagascar
The GCVs are Madagascar’s singular achievement in commodity-collateralised 
lending. It is a microfinance-linked product that allows farmers and others to 
store crops (overwhelmingly paddy rice) locally, both for home consumption 
and for sale. The GVC system was originally promoted as the main product of 
the CECAM mutual microfinance networks, but it has been such a success that 
a range of other mutual and non-mutual networks have taken it up. 
The GVC system was conceived as a means of getting product held in PO 
stores, but in practice, the dominant arrangement has been home storage. 
There are tens of thousands of home-based GCVs, each holding the stock 
of a few depositors, often from the same family, with an average of 1–2 t per 
depositor, under a dual padlock arrangement. Assisted by an AFD guarantee, 
the commercial banks refinance the MFIs for about 60 bn Ariary (approximately 
 18.5 million) per annum.
There is currently a move towards the establishment of more centralised 
purpose-built and rented stores. This movement is prompted by: (1) concern 
over the security of loan collateral held in home stores; (2) the time and 
expense in overseeing large numbers of small household stores; and (3) the 
willingness of donors to fund the construction of grain stores. 
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There are no consolidated statistics on GCVs, but available information 
suggests that deposits are between 100,000 and 120,000 t per annum and on 
a strongly upward trend. Over 90% of the tonnage is paddy rice; much of the 
rest is milled rice, while cloves and coffee are also significant in value terms. 
There have been attempts to diversify the products stored to include vanilla, 
maize, groundnuts, beans, cloves, coffee and cinnamon. However, there have 
been some significant failures, notably with vanilla (it proved difficult to handle 
the product correctly and forecast price movements) and maize (due to lack 
of knowledge about post-harvest handling and pest control). Repayment rates 
are around 99%, although up to 5% of repayments are being made beyond 
their due date.
The success of the GCV approach is evident in terms of: (1) food security; (2) 
enhanced livelihoods of rural people; (3) a dynamic effect on the development 
of MFI services; and (4) seasonal price stability for rice. The success can in large 
measure be attributed to two Malagasy mutual microfinance networks which have 
a strong rural presence and have built themselves up around the GCV product 
which represents over 40% of their lending portfolio. GCVs represent 25% of 
the portfolio of another leading more urban-based network. At the same time, 
the ease of home storage and relatively predictable price variations of paddy 
rice (vis-à-vis other crops) has made it relatively easy to roll out the product. The 
system is highly decentralised which minimises costs of transporting grain and 
contributes to local food security. It encourages members to invest in their home 
stores and to take responsibility for managing stocks under the supervision of the 
MFIs. There are, however, some difficulties, including: (1) rigidity of the product 
which does not always meet borrowers’ needs; (2) limited storage capacity and 
physical insecurity in farmers’ homes; and (3) borrowers sometimes being poorly 
informed or using borrowed funds poorly.
In addition to these drawbacks, high dependency on the GCV product makes 
some MFIs vulnerable to (1) unforeseen upsets in market fundamentals and 
(2) competition from other providers. The quest for market share seems to 
induce risky behaviour, most notably with one network providing 100% loan-to-
value on commodities with highly volatile prices. In August 2014, the authors 
learned that this network had become bankrupt as a result of its investment 
in a company dealing in these commodities. Risks have been compounded by 
the fact that the government regulator responsible for risk assessment (CSBF) 
is underfunded and is only assessing the MFIs as institutions and not their 
flagship GCV product. 
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Government intervention in the rice market, as a means of regulation and/or 
political manipulation, represents a significant threat to the GCV product and 
MFIs dependent on it. It has sometimes upset market fundamentals and caused 
borrowers to lose money, but to date it has not caused serious damage to the 
system. The threats of physical insecurity and fraud are mainly associated with 
home-based GCVs; however experience from 
the African Continent and with the Malagasy 
government/donor-promoted FCPA suggest that 
such risks may increase as more products are 
held in central locations. The threat of fraud will 
require MFIs to develop in-house skills in store 
management and pest control, the capability 
to commingle and grade products of different 
depositors, clearer lines of authority and responsibility, greater transparency 
and equity in pricing of services, and the ability to transfer titles to buyers 
(using transferable warehouse receipts).
The achievements with GCV lending suggest that MFIs have two major 
opportunities. The first is to greatly increase financing of storage of commodities 
other than paddy rice (notably maize, pulses, potatoes and dried cassava); but 
doing so will require MFIs to overcome technical storage issues which they 
have hitherto largely left to the borrower/depositors. The second opportunity 
involves building on the trend toward more centralised storage and developing 
a national warehousing profession, with an appropriate regulatory structure. 
With their track record to date, the MFIs could be prime movers in establishing 
such a system, but they will need to reach out to government, banks and other 
value-chain players. Any regulatory structure should be able to sustain itself 
through levies on licensed warehouse systems and internalise the cost of 
all due diligence and risk assessment, so as not to depend on government 
budgetary allocations.
MFIs and agricultural sector players will also need strong advocacy in rice 
marketing policy so as to prevent sudden changes in import policies that cause 
producers using GCVs to lose money, as happened in 2013. Coupled with the 
development of regulatory, risk management and advocacy functions, AFD 
should seek to gradually phase out its portfolio guarantees. 
Government 
intervention in the 
rice market represents a 
significant threat to the 
GCV product and MFIs 
dependent on it
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3.4 Community inventory credit (warrantage c.) in 
francophone West Africa
3.4.1 Outline of the model
Community inventory credit was initially developed in Niger under the auspices 
of two FAO projects (Projet Intrants and Projet IARBIC6), in the decade starting 
1998/99. The model has since been introduced in other West African countries, 
including Burkina Faso and Senegal. Producers have been encouraged to use 
the technique with non-perishable crops, including grains, oilseeds, legumes 
and in some cases, dehydrated horticultural products like paprika and hibiscus, 
taking advantage of seasonal price variations, as this allows them to realise 
a profit in most years. Farmers have also experimented with onions, a more 
perishable crop, of which Niger produces several hundred thousand tons for 
export throughout West Africa and which exhibits very large and regular 
seasonal price increases averaging over 100% of harvest prices. 
At the risk of some simplification, the system works as follows. A PO, which 
usually has upward of 20 members and is in possession of a warehouse, stores 
agricultural products under a double padlock system, and pledges them to 
a financial institution, normally an MFI, in 
exchange for a loan which is granted at a loan-
to-value rate usually between 70% and 80%, 
based on the current market price. The MFI can 
use local market information systems to check 
price levels. The grain bags are normally marked 
with the name of each PO member, and there is 
a committee responsible for store hygiene and 
operations, including quality and pest control. 
The PO and the MFI have keys for separate locks, 
such that the store cannot be opened without 
their both being present. Regular (typically monthly) checks are carried out to 
control for pests and risks of theft, fire and other hazards.
The PO is responsible for distributing the loan proceeds among the depositing 
members who are encouraged to invest the proceeds in off-season income-
generating activities, such as livestock rearing or fattening, horticulture, or 
petty trade. The storage period is typically 5–7 months, at the end of which 
the committee collects individual farmers’ repayments on behalf of the MFI, 




to use the technique 
with non-perishable 
crops, taking advantage 
of seasonal price 
variations, as this allows 
them to realise a profit 
in most years
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the dénouement du crédit after which each farmer takes the grain either 
for his/her household consumption, for sale on the open market, or for 
other purposes (e.g., gifts, barter, in-kind payment for labour). The farmers 
sometimes market their products collectively, but they normal opt to sell 
individually at their own convenience.
A key disadvantage of this form of warehouse lending is its inflexibility. Loans 
can only be advanced when the MFI has certified that the producers have 
constituted their stock; this may take many weeks during which some of them 
are getting impatient. There is no warehouse operator or CM (which would 
prove very costly), and once a loan has been advanced against the stock, 
the store is only opened a few times a year for the purpose of monitoring 
product quality and destocking after repayment. POs and MFIs have sought 
to make the product more flexible (e.g., by using guarantee funds to allow 
advances unsecured by stocks, and by increasing the number of pledging and 
unpledging/destocking events), but security considerations and cost factors 
constrain the scope for such innovation.
The warehouses used in this activity typically have capacity in the range of 
10 to 80 t. POs have usually acquired them through some past and present 
project assistance (e.g., in the establishment of cereal banks or input stores, 
or projects promoting warrantage c.), sometimes making an in-kind or cash 
contribution to the work. Sometimes they rent private stores as well. A further 
constraint on the development of this activity is the dependence on donors 
continuing to build warehouses.
Two basic models of warrantage c. can be identified, both a decentralised 
model, where the financial institution finances an individual PO along the 
lines set out above, and a centralised model, where a second or higher tier 
organisation (a union or a federation) coordinates several grassroot POs 
and represents them vis-à-vis the financial institutions. In this case the MFI 
delegates much of its supervisory role to the union or federation and it holds 
the second key on its behalf.
3.4.2 Progress in Niger
The latest figures for the overall level of lending date from 2009, showing that 
it had increased from FCFA 2 million in 1998/99 to nearly FCFA 600 million in 
2008/09. There was a hiatus in 2003/04 when lending halved from the previous 
year to reach a trough of FCFA 120 millions, after which the value increased 
approximately five-fold. The 2008/09 figure was equivalent to about 5,000 
t of commodities which, while significant, only represented 0.1% of relevant 
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national production and only a small proportion of what farmers (particularly 
larger producers) would store at home. About 125 POs were involved, some of 
these being unions or federations representing larger numbers of grassroot 
POs and there were 12,500 pratiquants (i.e., individual depositors).
Men tended to dominate the activity, but women took a leading role with some 
crops, notably groundnuts and bambara beans. Notwithstanding considerable 
efforts to include women in the activity, land ownership and traditional gender 
roles limit women’s involvement in the activity. However, the leading producer 
federation (Fédération Mooriben) found that women outnumbered men as 
depositors (62% women to 38% men).
There were about 10 lenders, of which three direct credit MFIs came to 
dominate the scene, given the generally dismal performance of mutual MFIs 
(savings and loans cooperatives) established in Niger since the 1990s. The rural 
microfinance sector is clearly quite weak in Niger and the rural population is 
overwhelmingly unbanked. 
The development of direct credit MFIs enabled the activity to recover from the 
hiatus of 2003/04. They carry out a range of lending in rural areas, refinancing 
their operations with the commercial banks at about 1% interest per month, on 
lending at 2.25 to 2.50% per month. The effective interest rate was somewhat 
higher as borrowers were required to put up a security deposit, typically 10% 
of the loan value, and there was an administration charge of 1%. The level of 
reimbursement was near to 100%.
Since 2009, there has been no attempt to consolidate information on deposits 
or financing, and only one of the three leading financiers has provided up-to-
date disaggregated information. However, information obtained from various 
sources suggests that values have stagnated since 2008/09. This stagnation 
can be attributed to a combination of factors: poor harvests; the financial crisis 
of one of the direct credit MFIs (Taanadi); the inflexibility of the double padlock 
system; the leading producer organisation (Mooriben Federation) adopting a 
new financing model; the end of the FAO support with its promotional, capacity-
building and trouble-shooting activities; and a shortage of warehouses. 
Two of the three direct credit MFIs (Asusu S.A. and Coopec-Kokari) have 
maintained or slightly increased their level of funding. Asusu is represented 
in all the regions of Niger, and it lends to both individual decentralised POs 
and centralised structures. It is seeking to introduce new products, including 
a storage credit facility for large traders. Coopec-Kokari is not only providing 
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warrantage c., but it advances up to 50% of the same, which the borrower 
uses to constitute stocks under the dual key arrangement to serve as collateral 
for the lending. 
The Mooriben Federation is the leading PO in Niger. It is composed of 27 unions 
representing 1,500 grassroot POs with 62,584 members, of which 61.3% are 
women. In 2009, it was (along with the Cigaba Union of Konkorido, and the 
Fédération Sa) a prime exponent of the centralised approach to warrantage 
c., and it accounted for about 20% of borrowing. Since then it has entered 
into a special arrangement with a new government-owned agricultural bank 
(BAGRI) which provides seasonal production credit and post-harvest marketing 
credit on the basis of Mooriben’s track record and guarantee funds that 
Mooriben has deposited with BAGRI. Consequently, Mooriben has had little 
need for warrantage c. facilities, and its members can get credit as soon as 
they have deposited their stock in the warehouse. This situation suggests a 
level of market maturity that allows Mooriben to deal with the banks on more 
flexible terms than are available under the warrantage c. model. Its success 
will depend on the strength of this complex and multi-tiered organisation’s 
governance and management. 
One of the stars of Nigerian warrantage c. in 2009 was the Cigaba Union 
of Konkorido, whose value of loans peaked at FCFA 85 million (  130,000) 
in 2005/06 and FCFA 81 million in 2008/09 (  123,000). Cigaba Union had 
incorporated some strong practices, notably: 
(a) the rental of many privately owned warehouses – as opposed to waiting 
on support from a development project
(b) fixing a low loan-to-value rate for credits (e.g., 50%) in years of high 
harvest-time prices – an eminently sensible approach to risk management. 
Since 2009, stored volumes have greatly diminished in part as a result of 
internal splits within the Union, poor weather, and to problems with the 
financing MFI (Taanadi). However, the latest information suggests this 
organisation is recovering. 
There have been various attempts to introduce warrantage c. with onions, but 
these have so far failed, due to the high risks involved with this perishable 
product. It is possible to store the product successfully if certain preconditions 
are met regarding production and post-production techniques (including quasi-
organic production and moderate watering), storage facilities, management 
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and the presence of financial institutions willing to carry out regular quality 
monitoring under the dual-key arrangement. However, these preconditions have 
so far eluded promoters and practitioners, particularly the monitoring part.
3.4.3 Progress in Burkina Faso
Key initiatives to introduce warrantage c. into the south-western region of 
Burkina Faso date from around 2004/05, and over the last 3 years, the country 
has seen considerable growth in this activity. Yameogo (2013) reports that in 
2012/2013 133 grassroot POs practiced warrantage c., involving 4,021 producers 
in 28 out of 45 provinces. Loans had been provided for FCFA 216 millions 
(  330,000), mainly by FCPB, against the security of 3,429 t of grain (mainly 
maize but also sorghum, millet, rice and fonio), 705 t of oilseeds (groundnuts, 
sesame and soybeans) and 238 t of legumes (cowpeas and bambara nuts).7 
Warrantage c. is mainly financed by the single dominant MFI, the Fédération 
des Caisses Populaires du Burkina (FCPB), and Coris Bank, which started 
financing in 2014. FCPB’s resources come from member savings, rather than 
bank refinancing, and its interest rates are remarkably cheap (10-15%) by 
standards of rural financing in Africa, including neighbouring Niger, which like 
Burkina Faso enjoys the monetary stability of the Franc zone. 
The centralised model can presently be seen in the Tentièta Union of Dissin 
and COPSA-C of Founzan. The decentralised model has mainly been promoted 
under two large projects, PICOFA and PAPSA, implemented by government 
with the support respectively of IFAD and the World Bank. 
One of Burkina’s three collateral management companies also got involved 
in warrantage c., working at about 15 storage sites round the country, in 
partnership with POs and two different MFIs. The company delivers warehouse 
receipts to the depositing individuals or groups so that they can obtain credit 
from the MFI, while it also supplies inputs and searches for markets. However, 
recent information from one of this company’s sites suggests it is taking on 
too many roles and there is some lack of clarity over responsibilities. 
The first experiences in Burkina Faso have had a strong food security orientation 
and the stored products are normally kept for household consumption or to 
be sold individually. In contrast, the FEPA-B organisation has adopted a more 
commercial approach, promoting collective marketing of stored products and 
7 A workshop in July of the same year gave slightly different but generally compatible figures: 
117 POs representing 5,868 people (about 75% men), depositing 35,417 bags of commodities, 
and borrowing FCFA 262 million. 
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it seeks to establish a national public warehousing system under the control 
of producer federations. However, the volume of commodities it is pledging is 
at present quite limited (about 5% of the national total in July 2013), and it is 
not clear how it will marshal the resources to undertake such a venture. 
3.4.4 Experience in Senegal
The Senegal technical country report discusses two inventory credit schemes. 
The first was organised in the late 1990s by the Crédit Mutuel du Sénégal 
(CMS), a large MFI with nationwide representation. CMS acted as both financier 
and warehouse operator; and CMS members were encouraged to deposit in 
the warehouses. However, the activity was carried out without due regard to 
the elemental precautions for success and it failed due to poor warehouse 
management and security, a low level of repayment, and lack of a sense of 
appropriation by the producers who spent most of their time dreaming up 
ways of circumventing the system. This disappointing experience is somewhat 
surprising, given the considerable success CMS and other mutual MFIs have had 
in the provision of relatively unsecured production credit (crédit de campagne).
Inspired by the Nigerian experience, a pilot was implemented with maize and 
millet in Kaolack region (central Senegal), within the framework of an EU 
project. The participating farmers achieved average net margins of 24%, but 
the scheme stopped functioning at the end of the project. The unwillingness 
of the MFI to continue providing finance without continued project funding for 
logistical support raises a question about the sustainability of this initiative. 
The volume of grain handled was very small (30 t in three villages), and the 
investment of project funds in promoting could only be justified if it could be 
greatly scaled up – but there is no sign that this is going to happen. 
3.4.5 Motivational factors
The popularity of warrantage c. can be attributed to the multiple functions the 
activity fulfils at the level of rural households. It allows farmers to save their 
harvests, put them beyond social pressures, to obtain off-season credit, and 
to market their crops at a higher price. 
Farmers use warrantage c. primarily to improve the way they manage their 
agricultural products, and thereby improve their cash flow. It prevents them 
selling off much of their products at harvest time when prices are lowest, while 
the inventory loans allow them to meet their social and financial commitments 
and engage in revenue-generating activities. After repayment of the credit, 
they can sell the stock or hold it back for family consumption during the lean 
season when prices are relatively high. If a member cannot repay his/her loan, 
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the PO can sell the bags concerned, in agreement with the MFI, in order to 
reimburse the debt. Other advantages include: a reduction in indebtedness in 
the lean season; an increase in the ability to finance production in the following 
season (as a result of generating off-season revenue and revenue from selling 
redeemed stock in the lean season); the role of the activity in strengthening 
POs; and diversification of the rural portfolio of the MFIs that are financing 
the activity.
One of the most notable findings is the importance farmers in Niger and 
Burkina Faso place upon the forced savings aspect. While warrantage c. is a 
somewhat inflexible product, it does allow farmers to put their stock beyond 
the reach of family, friends and other pressures to contribute to all sorts of 
social events. This removal makes the product more robust. As noted in Section 
3.2, average seasonal price rises for staple grains in Sahelian countries are not 
particularly high by African standards and they are extremely variable from 
year to year. Flat or falling prices (sometimes resulting from the distribution 
of food aid or sales à prix modéré) are clearly a demotivating factor. However, 
farmers may still find benefit in the savings aspect and the ability to hold stock 
until it is most needed later in the year, and this makes them less likely to stop 
using warrantage c.
3.4.6 Pros and cons
The Burkina Faso technical country report finds that the centralised model is 
generally preferable to the decentralised model, as it simplifies relationships with 
the financial institutions, reduces costs of credit (as the financial institutions 
discount their rates when the federative organisation takes over monitoring 
activities), and increases the chances of institutional viability. The grassroot POs 
promoted under the PICOFA and PAPSA projects lack higher level structures 
which would help them sort out problems after the end of project assistance 
(e.g., delays on the MFI side, failure to obtain suitable grain bags).
The Burkina country report goes on to suggest that the centralised model could 
gradually evolve into a national system that offers producers storage services, 
input supplies and collective marketing. Notwithstanding, centralisation can 
have its downsides, and it may work well where the MFI (such as Asusu SA in 
Niger) is proactive in reaching out to grassroot POs. 
The main strengths of warrantage c., both centralised and decentralised, are 
the strong local demand; the versatility of the product (savings, credit and 
marketing); its simplicity and adaptability to the local environment; the diverse 
forms of motivation (including the forced-savings aspect which makes it more 
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robust in the face of market uncertainty); and its success in terms of credit 
repayment (100%). The main weaknesses of warrantage c. are: its dependency 
on donors for storage infrastructure; poor storage practices – (e.g., overfilling 
stores and misuse of phosphine-based fumigants, particularly noted in Burkina 
Faso); and a rather thin microfinance sector (particularly in the case of Niger). 
The approach of the Fédération des Caisses Populaires du Burkina (FCPB), 
which dominates microfinance in rural Burkina and is represented in all but 
one department, can be seen as both a source of strength and weakness. On 
the positive side, its local branches are the main financiers of warrantage c. 
in Burkina Faso. However, it could be argued that unlike the situation with the 
mutual MFIs in Madagascar, its approach to community inventory credit has 
been somewhat passive, largely one of responding to approaches from projects 
and NGOs, and that it might be missing an opportunity to proactively use it 
as a tool in developing its rural clientele. The product represents a very small 
part (about 1%) of its agricultural lending portfolio, very low compared to rates 
of 40% or more of the total lending portfolio in some Malagasy institutions. 
However, the underlying differences in crops, 
price variability, and other factors may explain 
a large part of this difference. At the same time 
FCPB’s perspective on things is quite different 
from that of the Malagasy MFIs8.
The main opportunities with warrantage c. lie in the favourable consensus 
among relevant players (government, POs, financial institutions, donors/
IFIs, and NGOs), and the appearance of new financiers (MFIs and banks). The 
main threats are price risks (given irregular seasonal price rises) and market 
interventions by the parastatal institutions (e.g., SONAGESS in Burkina Faso) 
that can affect the profitability, and even the existence, of the product. Coulter 
(2012) noted a trend towards increasing interventionism in Burkina, and this 
was confirmed by Yameogo (2013), who surveyed 101 POs while studying this 
subject. Among other things, Yameogo found indications that intervention 
was lowering the profitability of warrantage c. and detected specific cases of 
farmers miss-selling as a consequence of official selling à prix social. 
8 The country report makes the following observations: FCPB increasingly wants to orient its 
activities towards the centralised model, finding community inventory credit too onerous 
a product to manage without a reliable PO federation which can monitor storage and 
destocking operations, and the monthly situation in the warehouses. There is also a problem 
of motivating branch staff, given that credit officers are remunerated in part on the basis of 
the number of credit applications. Abandoning their post in favour of a monitoring tour in 
the villages represents a financial loss for them apart from the inconvenience of having to go 
there by motorcycle.
The centralised 
model is generally 
preferable to the 
decentralised model
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3.4.7 Conclusions
While particularly noted in Senegal, sustainability is an issue in all the subject 
countries. There are clearly strengths and weaknesses in this area.
Warrantage c. has some strong elements of sustainability, including: local 
appropriation; strong peer pressures (with members providing, explicitly 
or implicitly, a mutual guarantee of repayment); a strong relationship of 
accountability with the lender; the forced savings aspect which makes it easier 
to handle widely varying seasonal price movements; decentralised management 
which does not depend on legal frameworks or regulatory institutions (which 
often do not work); and not requiring costly CMs or insurance cover (most 
risks can be covered by mutual guarantees among members, or between POs 
belonging to the same federal structure).
On the other hand, certain features detract from the sustainability of warrantage 
c., notably: the inflexibility of the product (a largely fixed calendar for depositing, 
borrowing and reimbursement); the absence of effective mutual MFIs present in 
the area where the farmers live (especially in the case of Niger; although not so 
in Madagascar); dependency on outside support to build warehouses; the need 
for continuous and sustained educational inputs; government actions that upset 
market fundamentals and cause depositors to lose money (a repeated problem); 
and the limited ability of small producers to play the market.
However, the approach has some significant positive externalities, including 
allowing farmers to hold stocks back in rural areas and making the population 
more resilient in face of crises. In this regard, warrantage c. has outperformed 
the cereal banks, a rural institution promoted since the 1970s, but with more 
serious sustainability challenges, have tended to decapitalise over time. The 
cases of the Mooriben Federation and FEPA-B also suggest that warrantage 
c. might serve as a stepping stone towards more market-oriented forms of 
organisation, including marketing cooperatives, the involvement of CMs and 
public warehousing systems. It is in the light of these factors that it may be 
possible to justify further external support for warrantage c. However, the 
Senegalese pilot in Kaolack region highlights an important risk with the Type 
A model: that it may be implemented in order to produce a short-term success 
story, but without due regard to long-term sustainability. 
Warrantage c. initiatives absorb a large amount of project resources on 
promotion, training and mentoring participants, monitoring uptake and 
building warehouse infrastructure. For example, in the case of Niger, Coulter 
and Mahamadou (2009) estimated that FAO and collaborating organisations 
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had spent around US$ 4.7 million on it under the auspices of the Projet 
Intrants, which is equivalent to about US$ 1,000 per ton of product stored per 
annum as of 2008/09. Continued expenditure of this kind can only be justified 
when there are prospects for very large scale and sustained adoption of the 
tool. A key advantage of Type A compared to Type B and C financing is that it is 
less scale-dependent: groups of farmers with warehouses of 20 t capacity can 
use it profitably, whereas with Type B and C financing, the minimum economic 
scale is, arguably, in the thousands of tons per site (see Section 4.3.6 and Box 
1). However, scale economies are important to the socio-economic case for 
spending public and project resources on the development of warrantage c. 
and other Type A approaches.
3.5 Scope for community inventory credit in Mozambique?
Mozambique is a difficult environment in which to establish smallholder 
oriented inventory credit, but this study has nonetheless led to the formation 
of a working group that is planning to pilot a scheme with a few groups. 
The levels of seasonal price variability for maize are extraordinarily high by 
Southern African standards; but there are some serious constraints, notably: 
the poor state of microfinance provision and the lack of MFIs willing to engage 
in WRF; the comparatively poor levels of producer group management capacity 
(despite many years of NGO focus on farmer group development); and the 
high rates of interest. A further constraint affecting commercially-oriented 
smallholder marketing schemes are the poor quality (in terms of dirt and grain 
size differentiation) of delivered maize (Mozambique being considered as one 
of the worst of all countries involved in the P4P programme in this regard). 
Additionally, there is uncertainty about the availability of sufficient small and 
suitable community-based warehouses. 
The WFP in Mozambique had adopted a system for evaluating PO preparedness 
using six principal variables (including governance, types of assets owned, 
financial controls) which was developed by the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture for the P4P programme in Honduras. All 20 POs 
surveyed scored low.9 This adverse finding was reinforced by a 2011 evaluation 
of certain producer associations in Niassa province. 
Given the key role inventory credit has played in Mozambique, Niger and Burkina 
Faso, the study looked carefully at the potential contribution of the microfinance 
9 All 20 received a score of less than 3 (a score higher than 3 would be considered good).
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sector. Despite the rapidly expanding presence of commercial banks and MFIs 
in rural areas, access to agricultural finance has been declining. An important 
factor has been the polluting effect on farmer credit mentality of government 
subsidised loans which impose no sanctions on defaulters. Meanwhile, a variety 
of donor-funded guarantee funds have so far had little impact.
Government publicity emphasises the significant inroads made through 
the Central Bank’s bancarização policy of promoting rural outreach of the 
commercial banks and the rapid growth of rural-based microfinance institutions 
supported by the IFAD and AfDB-funded Rural 
Finance and Support Programme (PAFIR). 
Bancarização has led to an impressive expansion 
of the commercial banking network, but its 
primary objective has been the mobilisation 
of rural savings to serve urban clients, with 
credit being limited mainly to salaried clients. 
The concept of establishing a broad network of 
subsidised rural microfinance institutions was 
poorly conceived, and most of the institutions established by PAFIR have 
either gone bankrupt or are likely to do so (due to inexperienced management 
or unsustainable operations).
AFD promoted a microfinance initiative to target smallholders through an 
entity now called CCOM in Cabo Delegado province in the late 1990s. It worked 
on establishing remote associations of solidarity groups lending mainly for 
the production of food crops (maize) and repaid by cash obtained from cotton 
sales. The initiative was replicated by the SDC-financed RCRN in Nampula 
province. There have been other initiatives targeting smallholders, but 
all have withered except for the CCOM which is cross subsidised by urban 
operations. What were once promising initiatives to provide financial services 
to smallholder clients are found to be now falling victim to rationalisation and 
sustainability concerns. The only true positive development in microfinance 
has been the rapid growth of community-based savings and credit groups 
(CBSGs) which are now being promoted by around 30 organisations.
At this stage, Banco Opportunidade (BOM) is the only microfinance operator 
or non-MFI commercial bank that is willing to become engaged in warehouse 
receipt financing in a serious way. Since 2010, BOM has been providing credit 
with considerable success to selected associations and second-tier forums; it 
has enthusiastically embraced bulking loans due to the minimal risk arising 
from the off-taker arrangements (mainly with WFP and a few agri-businesses 
Despite the 
rapidly expanding 
presence of commercial 
banks and MFIs in 
rural areas, access to 
agricultural finance has 
been declining
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with contract farming arrangements). So far, virtually all loans have been 
recovered and the portfolio has been increasing substantially. BOM has been 
enthusiastic about this arrangement; it now believes that some of the POs are 
ready to enter into warehouse receipt financing (WRF). 
In the light of this finding, the author of the technical country study initiated 
discussions with BOM and other players, under the auspices of this study. This 
resulted in a working group on WRF involving IFAD and EU-financed Programme 
for the Promotion of Agricultural Marketing (PROMER), WFP, the Dutch NGO 
SNV and BOM. It is hoped that a pilot can be initiated with one or two well-
functioning producer groups before the start of the next growing season. One 
lesson learned from two failed pilots was the need for a temporary buffer fund 
which would cushion (the few) years in which prices fell in order for farmers to 
become accustomed to the benefits of WRF.
3.6 Cameroon
There have been some inventory credit initiatives in Cameroon including:
(a) a scheme for grains and agricultural inputs in the north of the country 
involving members of the Cotton Producers Association (APCC), the 
MFI Crédit du Sahel, the cotton parastatal SODECOTON and the Islamic 
Development Bank (as financier)
(b) the government and IFAD-backed PADMIR project which is specifically 
concerned with microfinance.
The first of these schemes is described as having worked more or less with 
success for cereals and agricultural inputs. The author proposes promoting 
warehouse receipting in the zones covered by the PADMIR project, particularly 
in the northern areas which are suitable for cereals and onions, in order to 
use it as a learning platform for the microfinance sector. Such a project should 
be preceded by a national inventory of warehouses and silos, and the effort 
should be accompanied by technical studies.
3.7 Legal and regulatory considerations with Type A 
financing
When practised on a small decentralised scale, the legal regime for Type A 
financing appears to be of limited relevance. Of course, the POs and MFIs 
involved will need to document their transactions and some guidance on this 
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and other matters relevant to Type A financing can be obtained from the Guide 
to Good Practices with Community Inventory Credit produced by the Projet 
Intrants in Niger. In cases where participants take a more market-oriented 
approach using larger central storage facilities, Type A financing takes on 
characteristics of Type B and Type C financing, and the legal considerations 
for these types become more relevant. Table 3 sets out some of the potential 
legal issues in more detail.
Table 3: Legal issues relevant to developing Type C financing
Relevant 
legal issues 







If the scheme is expanded to include storage in centralised facilities, the 
identity of the owner of that facility becomes relevant. The warehouse 
might be owned by the financier or by third parties. Where third parties are 
involved, this raises some legal considerations. In particular, the warehouse 
operator’s obligations to, and rights against, the depositor and financier 
must be documented (or set out in a regulatory regime). This documentation 
needs to include setting out the circumstances when the warehouse 
operator will release the stored goods and to whom. The extent of legal 
recourse to the warehouse operator in cases where the stored commodity is 
damaged or lost must also be established. 
There are also certain non-legal matters to consider, such as the cost of 
upkeep and management of larger storage facilities, which would usually be 
covered by charging storage fees passed onto the farmer. Certain Malagasy 
MFIs charge storage fees at far less than economic cost, and this seems to 




Generally speaking, it is possible for POs in the subject countries to take on 
the status of a legal entity (such as a cooperative). In some cases, POs may 
be more informal and not have legal personality. In any case, it is important 
to understand what legal person or entity has title to the underlying 





The potential loss of the crop used as collateral will always be a practical 
risk. As volumes grow, protecting against this risk becomes of greater 
concern. However, any regulation in this respect needs to be proportional, so 
as not to adversely affect the access of smallholder farmers to finance.
One measure that (fortunately) is not strictly applied is the OHADA 
Securities Act requirement that stocks in all warehouses are insured, 
ignoring the possibility for some producer organisations in receipt of 
inventory credit to mutualise their risks. For example, it is quite possible 
for a union of 20 producer organisations, each with its own village store, to 
mutualise its fire and theft risks, since it is unlikely that more than one store 




Addressing the legal issues
Taking 
security
Where there are larger volumes of crop being stored and financed, the 
financier may want legal security rather than relying on practical security 
alone. In this case, the various difficulties in the subject countries of taking 
security over stored goods become relevant. Where farmers are represented 
by a PO, it is important that the party who has title to the commodity is the 
person granting security over it. 
Identity of 
participants
As currently practiced, Type A financing generally involves small groups of 
farmers from the same community who are well-known to each other. When 
practiced on a larger scale, legal systems to assist financiers in properly 




The authors have not been able to obtain a great deal of information 
regarding the dispute resolution process for Type A financing. However, it 
typically involves local committees and general meetings of members where 
such matters can be discussed. Where Type A financing is practiced on a 
larger scale, more formal dispute resolution procedures may be needed. The 
appropriate forum for different types of disputes may vary. 
 
At present, there is not much regulatory scrutiny of Type A financing in the 
subject countries. However, as indicated in Section 3.3, there is a pressing 
need for some in Madagascar, given that the scale of GCV lending and its 
importance in the lending portfolio of several major MFI networks. At the 
same time, the transition towards more centralised forms of warehousing 
gradually strengthens the case for a regulatory regime. Significantly, the 
Government of Burkina Faso has commissioned a study to propose legal and 
regulatory reforms with a view to developing community inventory credit, CM 
and inspection services. Regulatory initiatives with Type A financing will need 
to tread a fine line between the need to better manage risks and the avoidance 
of undue administrative burdens and costs on the players involved. 
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4.1 Introduction
A private warehouse is one that is not open to deposits by the public, but only 
available on a contractually agreed basis. It may be owned and/or operated by a 
third party, such as a collateral manager (CM), or it may belong to the borrower 
but be leased to a CM (which is referred to as field warehousing). In either case, 
the warehouse may also be used to store commodity that is not subject to the 
same financing arrangement and/or commodity owned by other parties.
The normal contractual framework for private warehousing is a collateral 
management agreement (CMA), typically a tripartite arrangement among: 
(1) a lender, providing financing against goods under a warehouse receipt; (2) 
a borrower who owns the stock being used as security for the loan; and (3) 
a CM, who takes control of the underlying security for the loan in the form 
of the commodity stock. Sometimes an importer or exporter is also party to 
the agreement. The CMA sets out the rights and obligations of the parties in 
relation to the secured goods. Given the importance of the role played by the 
CM, the financier usually has the last word as to whom to appoint to this role. 
The CM will issue to the lender warehouse receipts in relation to any particular 
goods that the lender deposits in the warehouse and thereby tells the lender 
that he is holding the goods as loan collateral. Unlike the situation with public 
warehouses (see Section 5), the normal practice of private warehouses in 
Africa is to issue the warehouse receipt to the lender, not to the borrower.
Field warehousing involves some special practical and legal issues (see 
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.7, respectively). 
The same CMs who engage in this activity may alternatively be employed by 
the banks to carry out stock monitoring, under stock monitoring agreements 
(SMAs). Indeed, a single company may assist banks with different risk mitigants 
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(e.g., CMAs, SMAs and/or management of receivables) at different levels of the 
value chain. Further information about the mechanics of private warehousing 
can be found in Section 4.3.
With some exceptions (notably in Burkina Faso and Uganda), smallholder 
farmers do not make much use of private warehousing services. This is because 
cooperatives and organisations representing smallholder farmers tend to lack 
the means to hire a CM and/or they do not enjoy the confidence of financiers. 
Additionally, the remote location of producers and their organisations poses a 
challenge to financiers and CMs. The main relevance of CMAs (including field 
warehousing) to this study is that it is an important element in the supply chain 
for agricultural commodities. As such, if it works well and is cost-efficient, 
smallholder farmers tend to benefit through knock-on effects.
4.2 Distribution of the activity in subject countries
In the wake of the market and financial sector liberalisation of the 1980s and 
1990s, international inspection companies and logistics companies increasingly 
began providing stock monitoring and collateral management services in 
support of financing of imports and exports. It was a time when many new 
players entered the import and export trade and the banks increasingly used 
these services to mitigate the risks involved. During the new millennium, 
local companies have moved into the business, either independently or in 
association with international players. 
A wide range of imported commodities (notably rice, sugar, fertiliser, frozen 
fish and cement, as well as a range of consumer goods such as wine, cigarettes 
and canned sardines and items such as spare parts and reinforcing rods) are 
collaterally managed in and around the ports; this service assists importers in 
financing stocks prior to distribution or sale within the countries concerned. In 
the case of Senegal, it is estimated that 80% of imported cereals are financed 
in this way (i.e., over 800,000 t of rice and 100,000 t of maize). Such deals have 
proved a relatively safe and remunerative way for banks to place their funds.
Many exported commodities are similarly handled, normally as part 
of structured financing deals. The level of involvement with exported 
commodities depends on: (1) the volume and value of exports; (2) whether 
the countries concerned have liberalised the trade in such commodities; and 
(3) the involvement of local exporters, as opposed to multinationals. Each of 
these points will be discussed in turn, referring to comparative export figures 
for 2011 in Tables 4 and 5; durable commodities that are exported to the World 
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market are also listed, although these exclude perishables and commodities 
which are overwhelmingly for regional trade (and therefore are not likely to 
be collaterally managed).
Volume and value of exports 
Among subject countries, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana dominate in terms of 
exports, accounting for 43% and 23% respectively by volume and 50% and 
24% by value. The very low figures for Niger show that some of this country’s 
exports are not officially recorded, notably exports of tiger nuts and paprika 
passing through Nigeria. As regards commodities, cocoa beans and cocoa 
products together account for 46% of the total volume and 59% of the value. 
The other main commodities, in order of value, are natural rubber, cotton lint, 
coffee, cashews, palm oil, sugar, tobacco, spices and essential oils, sesame 
seed, groundnut oil and tea.
The impact of liberalisation/non-liberalisation
Some countries that have not liberalised tend not to use CMs. This is the case 
with the Ghanaian COCOBOD, though it employs an inspection company to 
monitor operations in the port of Takoradi and banks employ CMs at local 
processing facilities. This means Ghana’s main export (cocoa beans) is not 
available to be collaterally managed, unlike those of the other two main 
producers, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. This situation further increases the 
relative importance of collateral management business in Côte d’Ivoire among 
the subject countries. 
The partially liberalised francophone cotton sector makes considerable use 
of inspection companies; in Côte d’Ivoire the policy has been to employ them 
for monitoring and risk mitigation in up-country locations and to have them 
collaterally manage the bales of cotton lint in the ports. 
The involvement of local exporters 
It is believed that less than half the exported commodities are collaterally 
managed. Indeed, Madagascar makes no use of CMs. The service is primarily 
made available to local exporters that do not belong to international groups 
and therefore cannot access low-cost funds in the international market-place. 
However, this is not a hard and fast rule; multinationals often make use of both 
collateral management and monitoring services in mitigating risks though the 
supply chain. 
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Cotton 159 - 14 -  70 - 56  16  26  341 
Cashews 84 - - 145  280  1 -  39 -  549 
Cocoa 
beans
- - - 697  1,073  8  190 -  18  1,986 
Cocoa 
products
- - - 51  224 - 24 - -  299 
Coffee & 
extracts
- - - 1  38  4 31 -  186  260 
Tea 1 - - - - - 1  56  58 
Palm oil & 
kernel oil
- - - 50  272  1  5 -  31  359 
Groundnut 
oil
- - 58 - - - - - -  58 
Natural 
rubber
- - - 15  259 - 32 - -  306 
Sugar 16 16 4 225  5  20  4 162  105  557 
Sesame 
seed
59 1 - 5 - - -  26  15  106 
Spices + 
ess. oils
- - - - -  30 - -  2  32 
Tobacco - - 2 - - - -  53  18  73 
Total  318  18 78 1,189  2,221  64  342 297  457  4,984 
Note: perishable products and products mostly for regional trade not included
10 Source: FAOSTAT.
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Cotton  265 -  24 -  138 -  114 40  86  667 
Cashews  62 - -  170  273  1 - 68 -  574 
Cocoa 
beans
- - -  2,207  3,029  17  512 -  45  5,810 
Cocoa 
products
- - -  205  875 -  92 - -  1,172 
Coffee & 
extracts
- - - -  116  7  72 -  460  655 
Tea -  1 - -  1 - -  2  72  76 
Palm oil & 
kernel oil
- - -  50  292  1  10 -  43  396 
Groundnut 
oil
- -  79 - - - - - -  79 
Natural 
rubber
- - -  63  1,132 -  131 - -  1,327 
Sugar -  7  3  120  5  15  4  106  80  340 
Sesame 
seed
 57  0 - - - - - 31  17  105 
Spices & 
ess. oils
- - - - -  264 - -  9  273 
Tobacco - -  19 - - -  1  217  46  283 
Total  384  8  125 2,815  5,861  305  936  463  853 11,756 
Note: perishable products and products mostly for regional trade are not included
The funds involved in collaterally managed products can be quite large. 
Estimates vary, but it is believed that approximately 40% of Ivorian exports 
are collaterally managed in and around the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro; 
additionally, an estimated 90% of supplies from landlocked Mali and Burkina 
Faso are also collaterally managed. If one accepts these figures and allows 
for relevant Malian exports of US$ 241 million, the banks in Côte d’Ivoire 
would have needed to mobilise about US$ 2.6 billion to finance collaterally 
managed commodities going for export in 2011, in addition to a large volume 
of imported commodities. This funding level is very significant, particularly for 
local and regional banks which are the ones that provide most of the finance 
under CMAs. So it is not surprising that one bank to whom the authors spoke 
11 Ibid.
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strongly favoured the introduction of negotiable warehouse receipts on the 
grounds that this would better manage its liquidity, enabling it to refinance its 
WR loan portfolio on the interbank market. 
The scale of collateral management in landlocked countries is relatively small. 
For example, in Uganda, an estimated US$ 500,00 was spent on CM in 2007, 
suggesting that companies engaging in it would need other sources of income, 
for example inspection, capacity building and consulting activities in order to 
survive. One explanation for this is that multinationals dominate the export of 
the leading commodity (coffee) and are not in need of CM services. However, it 
is believed there has been significant growth in that market since 2007. 
4.3 How the system works
4.3.1 Contractual and security framework
Collateral management agreements (CMAs - French Conventions de tierce 
détention) are largely standardised throughout the African continent. Some 
CMs are logistics companies that own or hold long leases on the warehouse in 
which they provide the service. In other cases, they are inspection companies 
or credit management specialists that do not own warehouses but must rent 
them so they can provide the service. Depending on the circumstances, the 
CM will either find the warehouse, or will take over the borrower’s warehouse 
under a rental agreement that provides for the CM to pay a small rent.
This latter arrangement, known as field warehousing, often makes logistical 
sense, particularly when the product is being processed on the same site. It 
gives the borrower the benefits of inventory financing and the lender effective 
security, without the borrower needing to move the goods to the warehouse 
of a third party. In a typical field warehousing arrangement, the CM has staff 
on site at the field warehouse during working hours and locks the warehouse 
(often placing seals) for non-work hours, during which there is external 
security. The CM puts his own staff into supervisory positions, so that they 
can supervise the depositor’s staff as they carry out the physical operations 
of handling intake, cleaning and drying, primary processing, bagging (if 
appropriate), storage and handling outtake. Alternatively, the CM may take 
over the labour contracts of these staff and bond them, with a view toward 
ensuring their loyalty, or it may bring in its own staff to replace them. 
While these practices provide the CM with formal control over the store, risks 
of theft and malpractice are higher with field warehousing than when the 
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borrower brings the stocks to the CM’s own warehouse, given the need to 
coordinate with borrower’s on-site staff, and the fact that it is usually the 
borrower and not the CM that provides the external security. The relevant legal 
issues are discussed in Section 4.7.4.
Once the borrower’s loan has been repaid, the financier issues a release 
warrant to the CM authorising the latter to release the stock to the borrower 
or a nominated buyer. In some cases, the financier issues a trust receipt 
authorising the borrower to withdraw the commodity without repayment for 
the purpose of sale, but during such time the borrower holds such commodity 
and its proceeds on trust for the financier. 
4.3.2 The stock monitoring alternative
With stock monitoring the goods are stored in a warehouse (owned by the 
borrower or a third party) and monitored by a stock monitoring company (or 
by the financier itself). Stock monitoring arrangements differ from collateral 
management in the following key ways:
(a) A CM is responsible for the commodity 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. By 
contrast, a stock monitor will inspect the goods at agreed intervals and 
report to the financier.
(b) A CM has full responsibility for the delivery of the commodity back to the 
depositor (the out-turn guarantee) and for any loss of the commodity in 
its control. The CM must be fully insured to this effect. A stock monitor’s 
liability for any loss of the monitored commodity will be limited to losses 
directly related to its own negligent and/or fraudulent acts.
(c) A CM will have possession of the commodity, meaning possessory security 
over that commodity can be perfected by the CM taking possession of the 
commodity on behalf of the financier (this is constructive possession). 
A stock monitor does not have possession of the goods, meaning that 
possessory security will not be an option for the financier. In the OHADA 
region, for example, this would mean that a possessory pledge would 
not be possible and any security over the commodity would need to be 
registered with the official collateral registry (RCCM).
From a legal perspective, stock monitoring arrangements are documented 
similarly to collateral management arrangements. If the warehouse operator 
is a third party, their role and responsibilities will also need to be documented. 
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4.3.3 Insurance cover
When operating under a CMA, the CM will ideally provide all risks insurance 
covering fire, floods, earthquake, employee fidelity and burglary for the 
warehouse and its contents and professional indemnity insurance in excess 
of the value of the loan to cover its professional obligations and sanctity of 
the security against which the loan is being made. International CMs often 
cover their risks through global policies that 
apply to all their operations around the world. 
In the case of Ghana, the combined costs of 
insurance policies typically range from 0.7% to 
as high as 1.5% of the insured value, depending 
of the assessment of the risks by the insurance 
industry. There is no indication that banks 
require life policy of key managers or owners of 
the borrowing company.
In practice this is a complex area where banks must look at the small print, 
the level of cover and exclusions. Due to the worldwide incidence of fraud in 
this industry, by far the most expensive component of the insurance premiums 
is fidelity and professional liability cover. Hence, one way of reducing costs is 
to lower the insurance requirements in this area. The author encountered a 
Nigerian CM who did not provide cover for these latter items, but who sold 
his company on the strength of its internal organisation and supervisory 
capabilities. In the case of Uganda, fire and burglary cover is considered 
mandatory, while all risk insurance is widely used, but is not always required 
by the banks. However, in Burkina Faso, most CMs claimed to take out all risks 
insurance and professional indemnity cover. 
4.3.4 Valuation methods and managing market risks 
If the stock of commodities has a history of high price volatility and/or 
if there is a limited or no immediate market for the stock, there is a high 
probability that, if there is a default on the loan, the underlying commodity 
may not fetch enough forced sale value to meet the loan repayment, including 
accrued interest and other charges. In this instance, two risk management 
tools are used by lenders: (1) a deep discount (haircut) on the market value of 
the commodity stock at the initiation of the loan contract, to provide buffer 
against price fall, and (2) a secondary security in the form of fixed asset or 
liquid financial instrument with value in excess of the loan, in addition to the 
pledge of the warehouse receipt to the lender.
A stock monitor’s 
liability for any loss 
of the monitored 
commodity will be 
limited to losses 
directly related to its 
own negligent and/or 
fraudulent acts
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Methods used for the valuation of agricultural products under storage in a 
warehouse vary depending on the underlying off-take contracts, price volatility 
of the underlying commodity stock and the marketability of the underlying stock. 
For example, in Ghana most banks financing local commodities through inventory 
credit use the market price (Esoko reference, Kintampo) as the benchmark; they 
discount these prices from between 70% to as low as 50% in determining the 
value for lending. However, if there is an off-take contract for the maize, then 
the contract price is used as a reference and discounted on the basis of an 
assessment of the risk of the off-take contract and the payment instruments.
4.3.5 Out-turn guarantees and quality management
The CM will be responsible for redelivery of the stored commodity to the 
depositor and this is termed as the out-turn guarantee. In practice, CMs take 
a very different approach to quality management and grading than what one 
typically finds in public grain warehousing (Type C) as it has developed in 
North America, South Africa and elsewhere – or indeed for export commodities 
stored in warehouses of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX). In these 
cases, the warehouse operator normally has laboratory and testing facilities 
on site, sufficiently sophisticated to be able to take samples and grade the 
commodity on the spot (for example as US No. 1 or US No. 2 yellow corn) and 
they guarantee full out-turn in terms of quantity12 and grade at the moment of 
delivery, as long as the commodity is within its agreed shelf-life. 
In contrast, the practice of CMs working in Africa is often only to guarantee to 
the borrower, or his nominee, the same number of containers (e.g., bags, boxes) 
that it received into storage. Sometimes they provide a full out-turn guarantee 
(FOG) for the tonnage of the commodity stored and more occasionally they will 
provide an additional full out-turn of quality (FOQ) guarantee – though the fees 
will be correspondingly higher. Often they have no laboratory testing facilities 
on site, but will take samples and have them analysed locally or overseas at a 
qualified or accredited laboratory. 
Some higher value commodities are prone to lose quality and value within 
a few months (notably the case with cocoa), so there may be good reasons 
why the CM will not wish to guarantee a particular quality or grade. Re-
absorption of moisture can be a hazard with grains in very humid parts of 
Africa. Notwithstanding, there are many areas of the continent, particularly 
inland and higher locations, where it is possible to guarantee quantity and 
grade of grains within periods upwards of 6 months. Indeed, this is vital if the 
12 The warehouse operator may charge a standard shrinkage allowance (e.g., 1 or 2%), but this 
needs to be known in advance.
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product is to be commingled with those of other depositors and the warehouse 
receipts are to be transferable. Otherwise the depositor or the subsequent 
holder of the warehouse receipt will not know what quality he/she is getting. 
Hence if CMs wish to provide public warehousing services to farmers and 
others in up-country areas of the African continent, they will need to review 
their approaches and traditional caveats and bring them more into line with 
the North American/South African model. 
4.3.6 Service charges
CMs normally charge a fixed fee per site per month; this charge can vary 
according to the job and the type of company (i.e., whether it is a European-
based company, an African subsidiary of a European company, or a local African 
company). European-based companies will typically be the most expensive as 
the parent company takes full corporate responsibility and charges can range 
up to US$ 10,000 (about  7,400) per site per month. Local African companies 
are cheaper and can cost as little as US$ 1,000 (about  750). Many port-based 
contracts cost around US$ 3,500 (about  2,600). This excludes the cost of 
store management, physical goods handling and operational expenses. The 
CM charges additionally for the insurance cover (discussed above) and for 
fumigation (if required). 
The fixed nature of the CM’s costs and charging structure is a barrier to their 
use by smaller depositors. For example, if a CM takes over a 50 t farmer group 
warehouse and charges US$ 1,000 per month, the cost per ton per month is 
upwards of US$ 20, a rate that is unthinkable for cereal products worth around 
US$ 200 (about  150) per ton. In some cases, however, CMs charge on a per 
ton basis, which makes the service more accessible to small depositors. This is 
the case with the CMs handling coffee, cashews, et cetera in Côte d’Ivoire. One 
of them charges  2.50–3.00 per ton per month for storing cocoa or cashews, 
inclusive of insurance cover when storing in the ports. When storing in up-
country locations it charges an additional fixed fee of  700–800 per site per 
month. Another CM in Burkina Faso charges FCFA 200–250 per 100 kg bag 
(  3.00–3.80 per ton-month) for collaterally managing cereals and another 
collaterally managing rice (seed, paddy, milled and parboiled) charges between 
1.5% and 3% of the value of the financing agreed by the bank.
On whatever basis collateral managers or warehouse operators charge, 
their operation is very scale-dependent and, if they handle low volumes of 
commodity, they will struggle to break-even – see Box 1.
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BOX 1: SCALE ECONOMIES IN TYPE B AND C OPERATIONS
There are major scale economies both in the operation of warehouses 
and in the regulation them (where such regulatory regimes exist). 
Each of these are discussed in turn. 
At the level of warehouse operation 
In the case of Type B operations, scale economies are a function of 
the collateral manager’s high fixed costs per site. In the case of Type C 
operations, Onumah et al. (2013), using information from the Tanzanian 
Warehouse Licensing Board (TWLB), estimate that a grain warehouse in 
Tanzania charging US$ 13.20 per ton for a six-month season need to hold 
at least 1,435 t in order to achieve break-even. The break-even revenue is 
US$ 18,942 for the warehouses, i.e., US$ 3,157 per month of storage. The 
latter figure is as much as three times collateral management charges 
in rural Tanzania and it includes the cost of renting warehouses. In 
reality, however, many warehouses in rural Tanzania have lain idle since 
international agencies funded construction programmes in the 80s and 
early 90s and they do not cost their users very much. In practice, the 
storage capacity of most grain warehouses licensed by TWLB averages 
about 392 t, which is far below the break-even level indicated above. 
Another technical specialist with experience in Tanzania estimated that 
the minimum economic scale for a Type B maize warehouses was of the 
order of 3,000–5,000 t (Allan McNeil, pers. comm.).
Warehouse operators can mitigate the economies of scale problem by 
carrying out additional activities at the same site such as processing, 
brokerage, sale of inputs or even trading in the outputs. In doing so, 
they can generate a range of revenue streams with which to cover 
the fixed costs. Indeed, this is how Type C public warehouse operators 
work, notably in North America and South Africa. However, a company 
operating in this way can have conflicts of interest between its trading 
and service functions and thus lose the confidence of depositors, 
which is one reason why public warehouses are sometimes very 
strictly regulated (notably in the USA). It also explains why inspection 
and logistics companies doing collateral management have strict 
rules against trading in the commodities they store for third parties. 
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Table 6 summarises what the authors learned about collateral management 
companies operating in the subject countries. All companies that provide 
CM services also provide SM services, but some companies only do stock 
monitoring.
At the regulatory level
The economics of regulation is only challenging when the value of 
commodities handled is limited and/or financial resources are limited. 
These do not appear to be constraining factors in the one country, 
Côte d’Ivoire, that regulates Type B warehousing, since the relevant 
organisations are funded through export levies on the four export 
commodities that are regulated and for which the combined export 
value was US$ 4.4 billion in 2011.
Funding is likely to be most constraining with Type C warehouses 
regulating storage of domestic staples. One cannot rely on export 
levies; the most acceptable way of generating income is by charging 
user fees on licensed warehouses. However, fees have to be kept 
modest in order to deter participation in the scheme. There is very 
limited experience on the cost of regulating Type C operations in 
Africa. In 2001, the UK Natural Resources Institute (NRI) working in 
Zambia, estimated that in order for the regulator to break-even, the 
regulated warehouses would need to handle 100,000 t of maize per 
annum, with six months storage. Theoretically speaking, a regulatory 
agency could be permanently funded from the government budget, 
but in practice this would be undesirable as it would render it 
vulnerable to reductions in public funding and political influence in 
professional/managerial areas.
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Table 6: Collateral managers and related service providers in study countries
Country
International companies & 
affiliates


























































Note: DCL = Drum Commodities Ltd. provides all services from its UK offices
Collateral management has been largely dominated by the local subsidiaries 
of international inspection and credit management companies (including SGS, 
Bureau Veritas, Cotecna, ACE and Baltic Control), normally working through 
local subsidiaries. Some of these companies have been badly affected by 
warehousing frauds, which typically affects stocks of high value commodities 
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entering international trade, notably coffee, as well some lower value 
commodities such as rice and wheat. This fraud has driven up the cost of 
professional indemnity insurance, making it difficult to do business. Some 
companies have reacted by ceasing to use their local subsidiaries and handling 
all their CM business from their European headquarters, but more often they 
have ended up completely withdrawing from the business and concentrating 
on less risky inspection and stock monitoring. Recently, the international 
inspection company SGS has taken the latter road. At the same time a 
relatively newcomer, the UK-based Drum Commodities Ltd. (DCL), has taken 
a leading position in the industry and it is promoting its services vigorously 
around the world.
In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, three large international logistics companies now 
dominate collateral management of exported commodities, Bolloré Logistics, 
Katoen Natie and CWT. These are players with very strong balance sheets and 
international reputations to defend, which gives considerable comfort to the 
banks. Moreover, Bolloré owns much of the warehousing capacity in the ports. 
Bolloré is mainly involved with cotton and cashew, whereas Katoen, CWT and 
ACE work in coffee, cocoa, sugar, rice, palm oil, fertiliser, wheat and other 
agricultural commodities. ACE also does a lot of monitoring activity on behalf 
of the State, particularly in support of input subsidies and price support, while 
DCL is only involved with imported sugar and rice.
Until recently, most of the Ivorian-based CMs (with the exception of ACE) have 
been exclusively active in port cities; but now that the security situation is 
getting back to normal, they are increasingly locating inland, particularly in 
the town of Bouaké so that they can do cashew and cotton. Parties interviewed 
attribute the reluctance to operate inland to other factors as well, including the 
lack of adequate warehouses, power, internet and insufficient bank branches 
in the interior of the country.
The situation is somewhat different in neighbouring Ghana, where local 
companies increasingly dominate the scene. The Ghana technical country 
report names three Ghanaian companies (Ecosafe, DMT and Mondial) which 
have joint ventures or other reciprocal arrangements with European companies. 
Albeit on a much smaller scale, the landlocked countries of West Africa have 
in recent years seen considerable development in the collateral management 
field. At least three new collateral management companies are now active, 
apart from the Bolloré Group, a logistics and freight forwarding giant well 
established throughout the region. Auxigages SA is a subregional company 
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with its headquarters in Mali and with additional presence in Guinée Conakry, 
Senegal, Niger and, since the end of 2012, in Burkina Faso. It works in partnership 
with Ecobank, Atlantic Bank and BSIC. Expertis S.A. was established in 2009 
by Coris Bank and Banque Régionale de Solidarité in Burkina Faso. SEGAS-BF 
is a collateral management company established in 2010 by a former Central 
Bank employee, Leonard Ouedraogo, also in Burkina Faso. 
In Cameroon, there are half a dozen CMs based at the port city of Douala, 
using rented warehouses or carrying out field warehousing on borrowers’ 
sites. By and large, they are not involved with commodities which are locally 
produced and consumed, and few of them (except Certispec Services) will work 
outside Doula. The reputation of the industry has been somewhat tarnished by 
bad experiences involving the financing of fictitious stocks, poor controls and 
deficient insurance coverage. 
Uganda’s collateral management has had a very difficult history, with two 
serious fraud cases between 2000 and 2007, each costing tens of millions of 
dollars (a large multiple of fees annually billed for CM services in Uganda), 
involving European-owned CMs and international banks and sending shock 
waves through the financial and insurance sectors. One international provider 
(ACE Global Uganda Ltd.) remained in the business in Uganda, but it was soon 
joined by a local competitor, Coronet. The UK-based DCL is also doing CMAs 
in Kampala. Given events up to 2007 and lesser cases since, banks remain 
apprehensive about the performance of CMs in Uganda.
4.4 The financiers
Most of the banks finance against CMAs and SMAs in the countries where 
they are practiced, but they are overwhelmingly in support of the import 
and export business, and to a lesser extent field-warehousing operations in 
support of processing of commodities for export (cocoa products, shea nuts, 
cashews, etc.) and for the domestic market (notably feed milling, wheat and 
maize flour milling, rice milling and soybean processing). Bankers’ perceptions 
of the performance of CMs vary widely between countries, mainly because 
of experience with fraud and malpractice which has been a major problem 
in some countries but not in others. Notwithstanding misgivings about 
collateral managers, banks are generally comfortable with the transactional 
and legal aspects. They know their customers and usually the commodity off-
takers. Prices tend to be tied up in structured transactions with invoices and 
letters of credit, and there is access to accurate market information for most 
commodities. Notwithstanding this, they get occasional problems resulting 
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from management and moral failings of their clients, poorly performing trade 
counterparties and illiquid markets. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, it is the local Ivorian and regional banks (players like BNI, 
Ecobank, Diamond Bank, BOA) that mainly do warehouse financing. The 
international banks are more reluctant and tend to finance the big players 
(ADM, Cargill, Cocoa Barry, etc.) that usually have overseas headquarters. 
Ivorian banks say they have the information they need at all levels of the 
market chain with all the major export commodities except in the case of 
cashew, which is mainly exported for processing in India and Vietnam, and for 
which there is a lack of market transparency, and they often know little about 
the buyers. They are able to obtain bid and offer prices through publications 
such as commodities.com and Cashew Week, but there is a lack of accurate 
information on the prices at which cashews are actually traded. 
Outside the Republic of South Africa, the banks of the sub-Saharan African 
countries have very limited exposure to agriculture. So their approach to 
commodity financing is conditioned by what they normally do (i.e., finance 
structured market chains), and there is consequently much insistence on 
value chain lending where the financing is self-
liquidating through off-taker agreements. Other 
types of borrowing for seasonal storage tend to 
be written off as speculation. However, given the 
informality of markets for domestic staples, it 
is hardly realistic to expect a predominance of 
structured trading relationships. For example, in 
the case of the Ghana maize, it is unlikely that 
more than 10–15% of the market is accounted for by buyers who are looking 
for grain where they can trace the origin. To put it another way, if farmers and 
traders did not engage in speculative seasonal storage of these commodities, 
there would be mass starvation while those who could afford it would consume 
commodities imported thanks to structured financing transactions involving 
millions of tons of non-African commodities, notably rice, arranged by the banks.
If banks wish to develop clientele in domestic supply chains, they need to 
develop new, internal capabilities with a view toward managing their risks in 
potentially volatile markets, notably analysing historical price trends, variable 
haircutting, monitoring domestic market price movements, marking-to-market 
and margin calls as set out in the IFC Guide for Financial Institutions (IFC 
Advisory Services, 2013). However, very few banks are set up to do this; it is a 
classic chicken-and-egg scenario, where the lack of involvement with domestic 
There is consequently 
much insistence on 
value chain lending where 




trade leads to little investment in the development of market monitoring and 
financing skills. Indeed, the Ghanaian technical country study notes that only 
one bank (Stanbic) had the necessary capabilities. Stanbic comes from South 
Africa, a country with a large and thriving commercial agriculture, and it 
clearly has a head-start in this area.13 To date, banks have made little provision 
for appropriate in-house training or capacity building, but would nonetheless 
welcome external support in this area in the form of training and short courses 
for key staff. 
Ivorian banks, accustomed to financing massive trade through the ports, seem 
particularly unprepared for lending against domestic staples. An informant 
from the cashew and cotton regulatory organisation (CCA) expressed this 
situation in the following terms: Les banques ne bougent pas. Ils attendent que 
vous organisiez la filière (the banks will not move; they are waiting for you to 
organise the value-chain).
Other factors add to bankers’ reluctance to get involved in supply chains 
involving domestic staples and feed ingredients, notably the lack of accurate 
market information (see Box 2 below), lack of trust in up-country warehousing 
operations; apprehension over possible difficulties of enforcing pledges and 
quickly liquidating the collateral of defaulting debtors; reluctance to get 
involved in the nitty-gritty of trading (as might be necessary if they had to 
foreclose); and government actions that upset market fundamentals and 
expected price movements. Some of these fears are based on genuine risks, 
but they also reflect banks’ lack of familiarity and engagement with the 
domestic trade and scale factors (i.e., limited profit potential on transactions 
that are relatively small-scale compared to those at and around the ports). 
13 Another player, Ecobank, indicated a willingness to build the necessary capabilities saying 
that it would design a product programme if the product took off.
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Ghanaian banks seeking to lend in situations where the borrower cannot get 
off-taker agreements will tend to insist on other collateral, including personal 
guarantees and mortgages on property. However, there is some flexibility: there 
are occasions when they give loans without off-taker agreements but taking 
a deep (40%) haircut. They said they would loosen up their requirements 
and increase their lending if the regulatory arrangements introduced by the 
Ghana Grains Council (GGC) and planned under new legislation gave them 
more comfort about the integrity of the system and provided for trading of 
the WRs. These arrangements are discussed in Section 5.3.1. In the case of 
financing smallholder farmers, two banks stated that they would prefer to deal 
with apex bodies with a structure and governance that they can review.
In Burkina Faso, the collateral management instrument has attracted the 
interest of several banks, notably Ecobank, which seeks to finance storage of 
BOX 2: MANAGING PRICE RISKS WHEN FINANCING MAIZE 
STORAGE 
With a few exceptions, most countries have web-based systems for 
reporting wholesale and retail prices in major markets and historical 
monthly price series going back a decade or more. However, the 
figures supplied do not refer to a standard quality or grade. The 
problem is not so serious with crops from savannah areas with 
unimodal rainfall patterns, as in those regions they are normally 
field-dried to moisture levels of 12–14% where they are relatively 
shelf-stable. The problem is most difficult in wet equatorial areas like 
Uganda and the forest (sub-Savannah) zone of West Africa, where the 
crop can be harvested twice a year. It is difficult to field-dry crops in 
such areas, and farmers and traders will often try to sell them quickly 
so as to avoid storage problems. Consequently, maize arriving on 
public markets in Uganda exhibit very wide variations in moisture 
content, up to 19–20%, depending on time of year and when and in 
what condition it was harvested; and there is also wide variability in 
other quality parameters, such as grain defects and foreign matter. 
Accra-based feed millers are moreover apprehensive of higher levels 
of aflatoxin in grain from these areas. In reality, banks wishing to 
finance transactions can provide for the resulting risk by improving 
their market intelligence and taking a deeper haircut, but it requires 
a lot of procedures and work that they would prefer to avoid.
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agricultural products, and Coris Bank, which expects to extend operations with 
the rice value chain in Bagré to other areas of the country and to explore the 
potential for similar operations with other commodities. 
In Cameroon, all the commercial banks use or have used CMAs, either using 
their own funds or in partnership with international financiers. In the case of 
Uganda, nine domestic banks are reported to be lending against collaterally 
managed stocks. Interest rates are typically 23% per annum for local currency 
loans and 11% when loans are in hard currencies and the loan-to-value ratio is 
in the range of 65% to 80%.
4.5 Experiences with financing of storage of products 
in up-country locations and landlocked countries
Apart from previously mentioned factors, the biggest constraint on up-country 
financing with local staples and feed ingredient under CMAs and SMAs is the 
atomisation of production and lack of scale economies, which tend to make the 
employment of a specialist service provider quite onerous. Notwithstanding, 
there have been many attempts to use these techniques in the construction of 
efficient value chains both for commodities going for export and as for those 
going for domestic and regional consumption. The following sections discuss 
some of them.
4.5.1 Cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon
Côte d’Ivoire (CI) experience
In CI and Cameroon, government and international organisations have 
attempted to use collateral management to assist up-country cooperatives 
and SMEs to become more directly involved in the marketing of cocoa, but so 
far none have proved successful.
The Côte d’Ivoire technical country report discusses four different initiatives14, 
showing that the performance of the assisted cooperatives posed a serious 
problem, being poorly managed and over-indebted, while some of them 
were fake organisations. The banks’ experience with these initiatives often 
made them unwilling to lend, even under CM arrangements and the problem 
14 These include a three-country project supported by CFC and ICCO to improve cocoa 
marketing (1999-2007), the Guarantee Fund for Coffee and Cocoa Cooperatives (FGCCC, from 
2002), the Fund for the Regulation of Coffee and Cocoa (FRC, 2003/04) and the Cotton Input 
Finance scheme which started in 2008.
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was compounded by a political factors (i.e., official reluctance to disqualify 
non-performing cooperatives from participation in schemes). Various other 
problems were noted: two schemes had obvious design flaws – there was 
conflict of interest with cocoa traders; and a poor bank network outside 
major urban centers. In one scheme (FRC) cooperative and SME exporters 
were unable to secure sales contracts. As a consequence of these problems, 
collateral management services are largely restricted to established exporters 
of cocoa, coffee, cotton, cashew and other agricultural products. Banks 
hardly finance up-country cooperatives and SMEs in this way. Such collateral 
management as does occur up-country normally involves stocks that the 
exporter has already purchased making use of its local supply network. 
Government is now seeking to improve the performance of cooperatives 
through new legislation, a system of licensing, better accounts and other 
improvements, notably improving the ability of cooperatives to identify their 
location and the plantations on which they depend. 
Cameroon experience
In the case of Cameroon, Coulter and Etoa (2010) reviewed the state of cocoa 
value chains. They concluded that, as currently organised, the value chains 
insufficiently rewarded farmers for the production of good quality product, and 
it failed to play its full role in productivity enhancement. Much of the difficulty 
resided in producers’ lack of financial wherewithal, causing them to invest 
insufficiently in inputs, labour, replanting and fixed assets for production, and 
to sell prematurely. They could do much to tackle these problems by organising 
high performing POs, to source inputs and bulk outputs for the market, at the 
same time linking their operations closely with MFIs and banks. Hence, strong 
POs would be an anchor for financial service provision. 
The pre-liberalisation cooperative structures had largely collapsed, but some 
apparently healthy structures had since appeared, notably the new generation 
of common interest groups (GICs). GICs had achieved impressive results in 
terms of bulking and marketing of cocoa, particularly in central and southern 
region and parts of Littoral; they had formed themselves into unions and 
federations for the purpose of marketing and access to inputs.15 Marketing was 
mainly coordinated at the level of the federations and in the 2009/10 harvest, 
15 In Central Region there were some 18,000 farmers organised in about 600 GICs, formed 
into 150 unions and 31 federations and an apex organisation CONAPROCAM which has the 
material and technical support of the French NGO, Agriculteurs Français et Développement 
International (AFDI). The AFDI website now says CONOPROCAM has 20,000 members 
organised into 26 Federations in the Central and Littoral regions.
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those in the Central Region marketed a total of 7,000 t of cocoa beans and this 
was allowing farmers to get a better price than they could get from private 
dealers, as well as assisting with the supply of inputs for the new season. 
There was widespread support for POs to take the lead in the bulking of cocoa and 
coffee for the market, not only from producers and government officials, but also 
from some traders. However, it was noted that 
POs in Cameroon, as elsewhere, were inherently 
fragile entities, subject to free-rider problems 
and prone to politicisation and they frequently 
failed. Some GICs were fictitious entities, and 
genuine ones often experienced shortcomings 
in governance and management. Sometimes 
there was insufficient turnover in committee 
membership and cases were cited of leaders 
taking under-the-table commissions from buyers. Representatives of financial 
institutions expressed anxiety about the management and creditworthiness of 
POs. The solution for this problem lay in getting them to raise their game by 
rewarding excellence and providing sanctions for non-performance, and more 
generally by improving the capacity of value-chain players. 
Coulter and Etoa recommended a support initiative focused mainly on cocoa, 
and particularly in Central and Southern regions where there was major yield-
increasing potential. Collaborating MFIs and banks would first focus on the 
most secured transactions (e.g., short term pre-financing against stocks during 
procurement) and building of member savings. From there they could move 
on to financing production. The approach should particularly support the 
emergence of high-performing POs, taking account of some key guidelines 
set out in the report. One of these was for the POs to keep activities as simple 
as possible and focus mainly on areas of comparative advantage close to the 
grassroots (i.e., upstream near the farmers rather than downstream to the 
export market). 
It is only now in 2014 that some action has been taken with regard to this 
recommendation. The Coffee and Cocoa Board of Cameroon (ONCC) has 
recently negotiated with a private equity fund (Corporation Daniel Simon/
Hyperion Global) a revolving line of credit, initially for  30 million, to be 
channelled to MFIs and commercial banks with good rural networks to finance 
the marketing of cocoa and coffee using warehouse receipts. Funds will be 
used for importing agricultural inputs, supplying disease resistant plants, 
increasing the productivity of plantations, and for the collection and export 
The solution for 
this problem lay in 
getting them to raise 
their game by rewarding 
excellence and providing 
sanctions for non-
performance
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of products, with credit management services used as appropriate to mitigate 
risks between up-country locations and the ports. Top priority will be attached 
to ensuring the CMs/warehouse operators involved perform to the highest 
standards of quality management, security and indemnity. The ONCC is in the 
process of creating a joint venture with the above-mentioned private equity 
fund in order to implement the project.16
The counter-argument: to work with the multinational grain
Some parties question the emphasis that has been placed in public policy on 
getting cocoa cooperatives to develop as autonomous entities and to develop 
downstream marketing. Abbott (2013) finds that several sector programmes to 
offer credit to cooperatives in West Africa were failures, as default rates were 
extremely high and little discipline had been imposed when they defaulted. He 
found producer organisations had some scope for raising income of members, 
but that due to the lack of an effective rental market for transportation 
services, they had difficulty arranging transportation to the port. He went on 
to say that: 
(a) Wherever we encountered successful POs acting as traders and in fact 
whenever we encountered successful traders, those organisations 
and traders indicated that they had a partnership with one of the 
multinational exporting entities. Arrangements between multinationals 
and traders or POs yielded a number of benefits. Those entities realised 
higher prices and obtained marketing credit from the multinationals. In 
addition, controlling for quality was less stringent as long as the entity 
provided consistently high quality. Multinationals sought partnerships 
with traders and POs which could consistently provide both high volume 
and high quality. Only a minority of POs we encountered had achieved 
such relationships; they were found more often with successful traders.
Abbott ends by saying that based on experience in cocoa markets, the 
premiums achieved from extracting additional income along the value chain 
are likely to be relatively small. Strategies to raise productivity on the farm 
are likely to contribute more to increased smallholder farmer income than 
innovations along the supply chain. 




A leading Ivorian banker in the agricultural field17 expressed a similar view, 
saying that there is massive potential to raise productivity of export and staple 
crops; much of the solution resides in the development of stronger forms of 
contract-farming that link producers with input suppliers, international buyers 
and banks. 
These comments show there is a genuine debate around the overall strategy of 
assisting farmers in those cocoa producing countries that have liberalised their 
exports (Nigeria, Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire) and the role that cooperatives 
should play. Indeed, the debate is particularly relevant to Cameroon where 
ONCC has opted for an initiative that will empower POs to deliver directly to 
the port. In view of this development, it would be appropriate to monitor and 
learn from the ONCC initiative.
4.5.2 CMAs and SMAs in the cotton sector
Francophone countries account for most cotton production in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Their largely State-controlled marketing systems have gone through 
various types of reform and partial privatisation, sometimes opening up 
opportunities for CMs. The government of Côte d’Ivoire was in particular need 
of such services in 2008, following the civil war, so that the cotton ginners 
could re-establish lending and input supplies to farmers under contract farming 
arrangements and to manage inputs throughout the value chain, employing 
ACE as a CM, stock monitor and in a general risk-mitigation role. It seems to 
have been a highly effective scheme that made it possible to distribute inputs 
on credit to a large proportion of Ivorian cotton farmers and it lead to a major 
improvement in reimbursement. The case is discussed in the Côte d’Ivoire 
technical country report.
In Burkina Faso, SNTB, a company belonging to the Bolloré group, started 
doing collateral management of cotton for the parastatal ginning company 
SOFITEX, having previously handled its freight forwarding. Given that Burkina 
Faso is the leading cotton producer in sub-Saharan Africa, this is probably a 
large account, linked with Bolloré’s operations in the ports of West Africa. 
Collateral management is also being used in the cotton producing area of 
northern Cameroon. The Cameroon technical country study refers to a scheme 
for grains and agricultural inputs in northern Cameroon involving members of 
the cotton producers association (APCC), the MFI Crédit du Sahel, the cotton 
parastatal SODECOTON and the Islamic Development Bank (as financier).
17 Augustin N’dri, Commodities Trade Finance & Agribusiness, SGBCI.
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4.5.3 Recent initiatives in Senegal 
In Senegal there have been two recent schemes involving CMAs and/or SMAs. 
The first sought to structure a supply chain for maize, linking farmers from 
central Senegal to feed compounders and other users in Dakar, with a view to 
substituting for imports of approximately 100,000 t. It involved a commercially-
oriented producer federation (FEPROMAS) with 10 producer networks and 882 
members (102 of them women), the State-owned agricultural bank (CNCAS), 
Bolloré logistics as CM, SGS Senegal and the USAID Projet de Croissance 
Économique (PCE) which developed the model, provided technical support 
and covered much of the costs of hiring the services of Bolloré and SGS. 
While the scheme was successful in allowing FEPROMAS to start building a 
credit history and organise collective marketing, there were some serious 
malfunctions. Most of these errors were on the 
side of the bank, which lacked familiarity with 
warehouse receipting and dealt directly with 
FEPROMAS without making proper use of the 
intended risk mitigants: CNCAS did not contact 
Bolloré, no CMA was signed up and pledging was 
not formalised. Its approach to risk management 
seems to have been solely based on the 
credibility of leaders of FEPROMAS and stocks were released without CNCAS 
issuing the release orders. International maize prices plummeted during the 
marketing season – far below the prices farmers were expecting18; only 300 t 
were sold to the target market (Dakar-based feed-millers), though some 800 
t were commercialised overall, with new institutional buyers like WFP seeking 
to contract with FEPROMAS. 
The case also raises the question as to whether the Senegalese producers 
could compete with imports except at times of unusually high prices. All over 
Africa, coastal cities like Dakar tend to procure maize on the world market, 
taking advantage of low ocean freight rates that contrast with high freight 
charges within Africa. The farmers’ ability to play the market posed a further 
problem. The representatives of FEPROMAS, influenced by Chicago future 
prices, demanded high prices that were out of line with those at which domestic 
feed millers were buying from the sub-region and they ended up being obliged 
to sell at prices far below their expectations.
18 FCFA 125/kg against a minimum price of FCFA 200/kg (about US$ 400 per ton) delivered to 
Dakar which FEPROMAS expected based on market forecasts.
All over Africa, 
coastal cities tend to 
procure maize on the 
world market, taking 
advantage of low ocean 
freight rates
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The second case was implemented with local rice in the Senegal River Valley. 
It was part of the attempt to increase local supply in the face of Senegal’s 
crushing dependency on Asian rice which meets around 70% of consumer 
requirements.19 It is an unsubsidised B2B initiative that uses a value chain 
approach. At the centre of the operation is a local rice miller seeking to ensure 
regular supplies of paddy, working in tandem with producer organisations 
(POs) that deliver the paddy to their union warehouses, where stocks are 
monitored and thereby reimburse the production credit they have obtained 
from the CNCAS. This innovation is of the greatest importance as it allows 
farmers to take out new loans and engage 
in dry-season production. The miller in turn 
obtains credit from another bank (BRM) against 
stocks of paddy and finished product which are 
collaterally managed on its own site. 
The volume of paddy marketed in this way has 
grown from 2,830 t in the rainy season of 2011 
to 29,510 t with financing of US $7.4 million in 
the dry season of 2013, and has allowed 6,800 
producing families to enter into this contractual arrangement that allows them 
to improve their revenue. It has also resulted in an increase in the rate of 
repayment to the CNCAS from 80% to 95%. 
There remain some important challenges to make this system truly efficient and 
sustainable, notably problems with Vital’s cash flow and ability to pay farmers 
in timely fashion, in quality management, and its ability to minimise its financial 
charges (including collateral management and related insurance) and remain 
competitive. The initiative has certainly brought about an improvement in quality, 
but the miller has still found it difficult to achieve a continuous supply of uniform 
quality rice. At the same time, Senegal continues to have difficulty competing with 
very low-priced exports of broken grain rice from India which are a by-product 
of the vast Indian rice milling industry and which enjoy subsidy mechanisms. 
Vital’s cash flow difficulties are preventing further growth in volumes processed 
for the moment, and the author of the technical country report (Idiakhoumpa, 
pers. comm.) believes it would help if the banks could provide marketing finance 
more closely tailored to Vital’s trading cycle. Notwithstanding these challenges, 
solid progress has been made and there are opportunities to replicate the model 
with other rice mills. 
19 This estimate is based on FAO statistics for domestic production and imports.
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Over and above the purely technical aspects involved, a crucial component of 
the achievement with this model has been the collaboration between different 
members of the value chain, including the miller, the Irrigation Authority 
(SAED), the producer organisations (Unions Hydrauliques), the banks (CNCAS 
and BRM) and the rice distributors.
4.5.4 Developments in Burkina Faso 
In Burkina Faso, there is now a national consensus around the importance of 
community inventory credit and collateral management for food security and 
the development of local value chains. During 2013, the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and KFW launched 
several initiatives, respectively, to propose necessary legal reform (final report 
awaited), to develop a national strategy and to promote the activity. At the 
same time, there has been significant entrepreneurial activity in this field. 
Collateral management is carried out with the imported and exported 
products. Imported products include fertiliser and rice, while exports include 
cotton, sesame, raw cashews, cashew kernels, hibiscus and maize. Financing 
is provided by five leading banks in partnership with the Bolloré group (SNTB 
and SDV), SEGAS-BF, Expertis SA and Auxigages SA handling the collateral 
management. 
There have been several processing experiences, notably with rice milling and 
parboiling (in Bagré), the processing (both crushing and toasting) of soybean, 
and the crushing (oil extraction) of cotton seed. These experiences had the 
involvement of two CMs, SEGAS-BF and Expertis SA and financing from BCB 
and Coris Bank. In the case of rice parboiling, SEGAS-BF is working with a union 
of women’s groups that has its own parboiling facility. The charges for services 
seem reasonable (e.g., rice millers pay Expertis SA between 1.5% to 3% of the 
value of the financing provided by the bank). The service has also been used 
in support of poultry farming. The demand for these services suggests that 
they are well adapted to the reality of African players who cannot provide 
collateral in the form of real estate, but who are ready to pay for the collateral 
management of their stocks and the supervision of their activities so as to 
access finance. 
The collateral management of rice being practiced in Bagré is contributing to 
the organisation of the local value chain. It is providing benefits to producers 
of paddy and seeds and to women involved in parboiling and small-scale 
processors. The author of the technical country report believes there is 
considerable potential for further development and that the model could be 
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introduced into other zones of the country, like Bama, Banzon and Sourou, and 
with other commodities, including maize, cowpeas and soybeans. 
The country report indicates that all CMs operating in Burkina Faso have 
insurance cover for fire, water damage and theft, and most have professional 
indemnity insurance covering fraud, errors and omissions. They are contractually 
responsible for the quantity of products delivered but not the quality.
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, one of Burkina’s three collateral management 
companies (SEGAS-BF) has also gotten involved in community inventory credit 
(Type A financing), working at about 15 storage sites around the country, 
in partnership with several grassroot POs and federations and with two 
different MFIs (FCPB and URC.COM). The company’s approach has been highly 
innovative and beneficial, so there is much at stake in its continued success. 
However, it is not without its risks – one of the first recommendations of this 
study is that the company is offered special assistance in the form of a review 
of its activities and ongoing mentoring by appropriately experienced people. 
Expertis SA and Auxigages SA are also young companies and deserve the offer 
of technical assistance.
BOX 3: SEGAS-BF BREAKING THE MOULD IN COLLATERAL 
MANAGEMENT
SEGAS-BF’s contractual relationship with the MFI and the producers 
includes three components: (1) a partnership agreement between 
SEGAS-BF and the MFI; (2) the warehouse receipt it issues to the 
producers and which becomes an integral part of the partnership 
agreement; and (3) the credit agreement between the MFI and the 
producers. The company receives goods from individuals and groups 
who deposit at the storage sites, weighs and reconditions them, treats 
them with insecticide or has them treated by the relevant government 
authorities (DGPV or SONAGESS), and delivers them warehouse 
receipts so they can obtain credit from the MFI. It also supplies them 
with inputs and searches for markets.
The ambition of the founder, Mr. Leonard Ouedraogo, is to build up 
a branch network around the country. He has taken a great deal 
of initiative and departed from the classic mould of the collateral 
management business. Instead of simply focusing on the high volume/
value accounts in the export-import trade and agricultural processing, 
he has sought to build a strong clientele with the POs, giving them 
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joined-up assistance to develop their livelihoods. It is some tribute 
to his achievement that farmers are willing to pay SEGAS-BF 
twice the level of handling fees that they pay when the collateral 
management service is handled by their own POs under the double 
padlock arrangement. He appears to be adding value to this system by 
ensuring quality, through greater flexibility and the additional services 
he is providing – input supply and search for markets and revealing a 
greater level of demand for collateral management services than was 
previously apparent. In certain cases, he has effectively instituted 
public warehouses, opening up his warehouses for deposits by the 
public on a first-come-first-served basis. The customers have been 
large producers and traders. 
While this looks impressive, there also appear to be significant 
risks. On the one hand, a business model of this kind risks becoming 
uneconomic because of the high costs of staffing and supervising 
many small (e.g., 50 t) warehouses around the country, and the 
travel, subsistence and communications costs involved. The technical 
country report comments that the scale of collateral management 
operations is still very low in relation to the potential and probably 
also from the profitability standpoint. On the other hand, information 
from one of the company’s sites suggests SEGAS-BF may be taking 
on too many roles; there is some lack of clarity over responsibilities. 
Under such circumstances, the company may be at risk of losing the 
confidence of farmers and financiers.
The technical country report also highlights other important problems: 
the lack of adequate storage structures available for community inventory 
credit and collaterally managed marketing and processing initiatives, and the 
small scale of the collateral management operations. With regard to the first 
problem, it is noted for example that after the rainy season harvest, most rice 
millers at Bagré are obliged to store the milled rice in producers’ houses and 
after the offseason harvest they store it under tarpaulins by their mills which 
is possible given that there is no rain, but is seen as insecure by the banks 
and the insurers. Consequently, Expertis SA cites the lack of proper storage 
infrastructure as a limitation on the extension of its activities. 
The country report also highlights price risks and the risk of government 
intervention (notably sub-regional trade bans) as threats.
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4.5.5 Uganda
Two locally-based companies have until recently been active in Uganda’s 
collateral management field: ACE Global Uganda Ltd. and Coronet, with the 
market reportedly split 70%/30% between them. However, some new players, 
including DCL, have recently entered the market. 
ACE works with agricultural commodities, most notably cotton ginners and 
coffee exporters, with imported commodities like rice, sugar and petroleum. 
Coronet has a rather different client mix, including a significant number of 
producer organisations and the collateral management of in-bond stocks 
of general merchandise (including sportswear, stationery, tyres, building 
materials, textiles, sugar and others). 
Coronet’s MD, Chris Baine, previously worked in the banking sector; he also 
worked with government and the Common Fund for Commodities on the 
development of the warehouse receipt system, which has been quite innovative. 
Since starting in 2008, Coronet has worked with 102 borrowers, focusing on 
the financing of agribusiness and structured trade, while assisting SMEs in 
all sectors that wish to access affordable credit from financial institutions 
including agriculture. In the agriculture sector, Coronet has served NUCAFE 
and other cooperatives to secure finance for coffee exports. In the cereals 
sub-sector, it has helped cooperatives to secure production credit for inputs, 
labour and other pre-harvest operations. It also does pre-inspection, quality 
testing, capacity building, and it consults on value-chain development, though 
it has to subcontract quality testing involving complex laboratory facilities 
(e.g., testing for aflatoxin) with specialist operators.
Nine domestic banks are reported to be lending against collaterally managed 
stocks. Defaults on loans for domestic and imported agricultural commodities 
are reportedly very low. Significantly, it is the collateral management of in-
bond stocks that results in the highest level of loan default, with banks seizing 
goods from importers who have difficulty in competing with imports from 
China, India, or domestic production. 
The two CMs have similar modes of operation. As regards insurance, two policies 
are in wide use, including: fire and burglary cover, which is considered mandatory; 
and all risk insurance, which financial institutions often do not require.
According to Baine, the main hindrance to the roll-out of collateral 
management to more rural clients (apart from the cost of the service) is a 
lack of understanding on the part of the banks (and often CMs too) of the 
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transactional risks at that level. For this reason, he suggests training programs 
aimed at banks, rural-based clients and exporters – in the latter case to develop 
and/or extend their supply chains to the rural suppliers which the banks can 
then support through CMs. 
4.5.6 Mozambique 
There has been a mixture of CMAs and SMAs in Mozambique, involving four 
banks financing stocks of imported wheat, domestically-produced sugar, 
cashews and a range of other exported products. These products were 
produced in a pilot operation in the Corredor Agro involving contract farming 
with commercial farmers and smallholders both for the local market and export. 
Banco Terra, which focuses on SME agricultural finance, financed the later 
scheme. Although the pilot was considered successful and worth following up 
with similar clients, the arrival of the grain and oilseeds giant Cargill is causing 
Banco Terra to reconsider its warehouse financing strategy. Cargill is expected 
to make a lot of trader advances mainly based on good faith, thus avoiding 
the administrative complexities of warehouse receipt financing. Significantly, 
Mozambique already has a high level of market concentration at the level 
of grain trading, since a large regional company, Export Trading Company, 
already dominates the marketing of grain and oilseeds in the northern part of 
the country. 
The largest bank BIM has not engaged in commodity trade finance and it has 
no short-term plans to do so. One of the constraints raised by the banks is 
the difficulty of many traders (Asians in particular) to accept the concept of 
warehoused commodities as collateral instead of traditional forms such as real 
estate and equipment. At the same time, there is also some speculation that, 
with the imminent arrival of Standard Chartered Bank with a reputed core 
business in trade commodity finance, one could foresee a growth in financing 
against stored commodities.
4.6 Legal and regulatory considerations with Type B 
warehouses framework
4.6.1 Financing using CMAs
Where a CM is used in a financing arrangement, that party will usually be 
appointed under the terms of a tripartite CMA. The CMA will set out the 
contractual rights and obligations of each party in relation to the secured 
goods and will give the financier direct contractual recourse to the CM in the 
case of a failure by the CM to perform.
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The CM will be responsible for redelivery of the stored commodity to the 
depositor (the out-turn guarantee). In an unregulated system, this will be a 
contractual obligation of the CM as set out in the CMA.
Where the warehouse receipt is issued by a CM, it may state that the CM is 
holding the goods on behalf of the financier. However, generally speaking, such 
warehouse receipt will not be a negotiable instrument. Therefore, if the goods 
are transferred to a third party while in storage, the warehouse receipt alone 
will not be sufficient to obtain release of the goods from the CM. In addition, 
the holder of a warehouse receipt may not obtain any direct contractual rights 
against the CM unless it enters into an independent contract with that CM.
In this scenario, the delivery of a warehouse receipt will not in itself create a 
legal security over the stored goods. As such, the financier and the borrower 
will need to enter into a legal security agreement (such as a pledge) over the 
goods. This security agreement may be subject to local formalities, such as 
liability to pay stamp duty and/or registration.
4.6.2 Taking possessory pledge under standard CMAs
Taking a possessory security such as a pledge requires the financier, as the 
secured party, to take possession of the pledged goods (meaning that the 
borrower, as pledgee, is dispossessed of those goods while they are subject 
to the pledge). In a standard CMA arrangement, the CM will take possession 
and control of the goods under the terms of the CMA. Where the local law 
recognises constructive possession, it is possible for the financier to perfect 
its pledge by taking possession through a CM as its agent. This is the case in 
each of the subject countries. As noted above, the pledge would also need 
to satisfy all other local law requirements (which typically require pledges to 
be created through written documents) and formalities (such as payment of 
stamp duty and/or registration). As also noted above, the CM would typically 
issue warehouse receipts confirming that it is holding the pledged goods to 
the order of the financier. 
4.6.3 Taking possessory pledge under field warehousing  
arrangements
Field warehousing can be a source of special practical and legal issues, given 
that the financier is financing against goods stored on the borrower’s own 
premises. Key practical considerations include trusting the borrower not to 
fraudulently remove the goods, ensuring that there are appropriate agents on 
the ground to perform the control and monitoring functions. The latter can be 
difficult if the borrower is located remotely. 
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The key legal question is what further steps should be taken to establish a 
possessory pledge. While field warehousing happens in nearly all the subject 
countries, the legal due diligence revealed little 
in the way of specific guidance on the actions to 
be performed to ensure effective dispossession 
of the pledgor to create a possessory pledge. 
However, a legal advisor would probably suggest 
that certain practical steps be taken in addition 
to the usual requirements for taking a pledge 
(see Section 4.7.2), for example: (1) taking a 
lease of the warehouse (to give the right to 
access the warehouse to the exclusion of others, 
including the borrower); (2) creating physical 
boundaries around the leased area and controlling who has access to it; and 
(3) labelling the stored goods with details of the borrower and the financier. 
Specific guidance would need to be sought on a case-by-case basis.
4.6.4 Improving the legal framework
The two key areas where the legal regime could be improved are: (1) regulation 
of the activity of collateral management; and (2) removal of barriers to taking 
possessory security over commodity held by CMs.
Regulation of collateral managers
Regulation of CMs could evolve as part of a more general WRS program or 
specifically for the activity of collateral management. The key legal issues to 
address are: 
(a) ensuring the financial, operational and technical capability of CMs and 
the provision of suitable insurance cover, through a licensing regime. 
This allows financiers and depositors to rely on the fact that a CM holds 
a licence and it reduces the need to do extensive due diligence on CMs 
and to provide for these protections in contractual documentation. 
(b) a regulated system could make ensuring effective out turn guarantees a 
legal requirement subject to sanctions for failure to perform.
(c) providing for recourse outside of the courts. In an unregulated system, 
a depositor or financier’s recourse against a collateral manger would 
be the pursuit of a contractual claim through a notoriously slow court 
Field warehousing 
can be a source of 
special practical and 
legal issues, given 
that the financier is 
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processes. A regulated system could provide alternatives, such as 
systems of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and indemnity funds.
(d) providing for effective remedies in the event that CMs put at risk the 
commodities they are holding on behalf of depositors and financiers or 
otherwise fail to perform.
In addition, allowing CMs to issue negotiable/tradable warehouse receipts 
could allow collateral management to flourish as part of a WRS regime. 
Improving the security regime
Financiers in Africa traditionally prefer taking security over real estate and 
fixed assets to taking security over commodity. This preference places an 
onerous burden on potential borrowers, which could be greatly relieved if 
stock-in-trade was more widely used as security. However, certain factors are 
discouraging this, in particular:
(a) The requirement to pay ad valorem stamp duty on security documents 
creating possessory security was a common theme in the subject 
countries (except Uganda, where only nominal duty is payable on 
possessory pledges). This requirement is onerous and it discourages 
secured financing.
(b) In all of the subject countries, the registration of security interests is 
problematic. In the OHADA countries, there are long delays reported 
when registering security at the local registry (RCCM) and uncertainty 
over the amount of registration fees. Additionally, the RCCM registers are 
only searchable through submission of a request to the RCCM. In Uganda 
and Ghana, it was reported that the security registers are not always 
reliable. In Mozambique, there is no security register at all, meaning 
there is no way to effectively monitor competing security interests.
(c) In Mozambique in particular, there are onerous additional formalities 
required to take a security interest, including the requirement to notarise 
security documents and the requirement to execute further security 
each time new deliveries are made into the storage facility.
(d) There is lack of clarity in relation to competing security interests, 
particularly in the OHADA countries, where a pledge over commodity 
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can be perfected either by registration or taking possession. Being able 
to take a pledge without possession is useful in some circumstances 
(for example, in a stock monitoring arrangement); however, the two-tier 
system could lead to competing interests between creditors.
4.6.5 Practical attempts to regulate collateral managers
Uniquely in sub-Saharan Africa, CI has already established a regulatory 
framework for collateral management. This is not altogether surprising in view 
of the large volume of commodities and finance at risk in CMAs in that country. 
Collateral management operates under the OHADA legal framework regarding 
the Droits des Sûretés, apart from which the Central Bank of West Africa 
(BCEAO) requires the separation of warehouse control from the trader or the 
bank. Uniquely among the subject countries, CI has developed a specific legal 
and regulatory framework for collateral management.
The Law of 199420 provides a general regulatory framework for all collateral 
management, and two decrees provide specific provisions for four commodities 
(coffee, cocoa, cotton and cashew).21 There are two regulatory organs, the 
Conseil du Café et du Cacao (CCC) and the Conseil du Coton et de l’Anacarde 
(CCA), dealing with two crops each, but not with other commodities. These are 
entities financed out of export taxes on the commodities concerned, and which 
are required to provide services of common interest (fonctions mutualisées), 
notably agricultural extension and research, regulating weight and quality and 
regulating CMs and other players in the sub-sector. 
So far only the CCC has licensed four companies which include the three 
leading operators (Bolloré, Katoen Natie and CWT) and SGS, which has since 
decided to withdraw from collateral management worldwide. CCA is in the 
process of getting organised and has not yet licensed any CMs; the decree 
establishing it was only passed in November 2013. 
Collateral managers must satisfy financial requirements, but these appear too 
lenient to deter some applicants who are unqualified or have fraudulent intent. 
Companies seeking to be licensed must have share capital (capital social) of 
FCFA 300 million for cocoa and coffee, FCFA 100 million for cotton and cashew 
20 Loi no. 94-620 du 18 novembre 1994 relative à la tierce détention en matière de produits 
agricoles.
21 The relevant decrees are nos. 2012-1013 of 17 October 2012 concerning coffee and cocoa and 
no 2013-8814 of 26 November 2013 concerning cotton and cashew.
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(  457,317 and  152,439 respectively), and put up a bank guarantee (caution 
bancaire) of FCFA 100 million for cocoa and coffee, FCFA 50 million for cotton 
and cashew (  152,439 and  72,220 respectively). 
While the legislators provided these requirements with the intention of ensuring 
that the parties practicing CM were real professionals with a strong financials, 
the technical country study argues that the 
levels they have set will have little practical 
effect. The share capital provision does not 
prevent practitioners from using the capital for 
other purposes or from emptying the company 
of funds the day after getting constituted. The 
bank guarantees are completely inadequate in 
view of the values of product at risk; based on 
estimated product values, they would only cover 
default up to the following derisory quantities of 
stock: cocoa 65 t, coffee 95 t, raw cashews 125 t, and cotton lint 55 t. The report 
suggests that the best way to address the second and third defects would be to 
make it mandatory for the CM to subscribe to a PI insurance (Errors & Omissions), 
as well as comprehensive fraud insurance. Notwithstanding, a representative 
of CCA claimed that requirement for these limited bank guarantees had been 
effective in deterring applicants without the necessary experience. 
It should also be noted that CI is planning to introduce a much broader 
regulatory framework for public warehousing, which will probably be piloted 
with cashews (see Section 5.4.1). It remains to be seen if (and when) this 
framework subsumes the existing regulatory framework for CMs. 
Uganda has enacted comprehensive WRS legislation, which purports to apply 
to private (Type B) warehousing arrangements, as well as public (Type C) 
warehouses. However, CMs in Uganda indicate that it is not currently being 
applied to private warehousing and financing of commodity stored in private 
warehouses is carried out under the traditional legal framework for collateral 
management. 
Cameroon has had some bad experience with collateral management, involving 
the financing of fictitious stocks, poor controls and deficient insurance 
coverage. A WRS workshop drew the government’s attention to this problem 
in 2010, and it proposed the drafting of WRS Laws, applicatory decrees and 
regulations. The technical country report indicates that the government will 
be acting on this later in 2014.
Côte d’Ivoire is 
planning to 
introduce a much 
broader regulatory 
framework for public 
warehousing, which will 
probably be piloted 
with cashews
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In this case, public warehouse refers to a commercial warehouse open to 
deposits by commodity producers and other customers. Any person who wants 
to store commodities meeting the criteria for storage must be permitted to 
do so. The warehouse may not only store commodities, but provide a range 
of other services including cleaning, drying and bagging, for which it charges 
the owner on the basis of a standard tariff that is prominently posted at the 
warehouse and published in the newspapers and/or on the internet. 
When a farmer or other player deposits goods for storage, the warehouse 
operator issues him/her a warehouse receipt which will be either a negotiable 
documents of title or non-negotiable. The aim is normally to make warehouse 
receipts negotiable by endorsement or delivery, because this facilitates their 
transfer to successive holders and it makes the whole system more liquid and 
attractive to buyers and financiers. It is by transferring the warehouse receipt 
to one or other of these parties that the depositor is able to either sell the 
commodity or raise short-term or seasonal finance against it.
This type of financing is only relevant in countries that have the intention of 
supporting the establishment of public warehouses, currently Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Senegal, Uganda and Mozambique. The same legal issues that apply to 
private warehousing will be relevant to public warehousing (see Section 4.7). 
However, the case for establishing a regulatory regime will generally be much 
stronger than for private warehousing because of the potential for involving a 
larger number of parties whose stocks and funds will be at risk. 
As with Type B warehouses, scale economies are very important to the viability 
of public warehouses. Available evidence suggests that in the case of food 
Public warehousing 
(Type C)5
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grains, the minimum economic capacity for warehouses not enjoying explicit 
or implicit subsidy is in the thousands of tons (see Box 1 in Section 4.6.4).
Public warehouses also serve as delivery locations for commodity exchanges, 
and for reasons outlined in Section 1.3, they have proved to be an indispensable 
prerequisite to the establishment of commodity exchanges in sub-Saharan 
Africa.22 Commodity exchanges also play an important role in ensuring the 
viability of public warehouses, helping depositors find buyers, providing a price 
discovery function which helps lenders value warehouse receipts providing a 
market in which they can dispose of stocks of defaulting debtors. Commodity 
exchanges are less indispensable to warehouse receipt systems than are 
warehouse receipt systems to the establishment of commodity exchanges. 
However, those promoting public warehouses will need to establish some 
system to help depositors sell their goods and ensure settlement of trades, 
whether it involves a fully-fledged exchange with brokers, a bulletin board to 
advertise products held, or a simple electronic trading platform providing for 
delivery of warehouse receipts versus payment (DVP).
South Africa is the main African country to have established a system of public 
warehousing. There is no express legislation in place, but the country has 
managed to develop a sophisticated warehouse financing structure around the 
use of public warehouses and the transferability and tradability of warehouse 
receipts (referred to as silo certificates or receipts). The impetus for developing 
a sustainable warehouse financing framework was provided by the ANC 
Government in the mid-1990s after it became the ruling political party. Although 
South Africa previously had legislation in place governing warehousing23
 (repealed in 1975 during the Apartheid regime), the legislative approach was not 
adopted again with the government instead relying on normal contractual rules 
and market practice to provide the new framework for warehouse financing.
A large part of the banks’ concerns about credit and crime risks (such as fraud 
or theft) posed by silo operators have been resolved by the involvement of the 
South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX, now a division of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange) which developed a standard form of SAFEX silo receipt that 
silo operators could issue instead of silo certificates issued in their own name. 
These could be more easily and freely traded, thereby providing for a wider 
range of potential buyers in the market. However, in order to be authorised by 
SAFEX and issue SAFEX silo receipts, a silo operator needed to meet certain 
22 See item (f) in the second list in Section 1.3: Commodity exchanges require registered 
warehouses which can act as delivery locations.
23 Agricultural Warehouse Act, No. 42 of 1930.
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minimum criteria: legal status, financial standing and net worth, expertise and 
the maintenance of appropriate insurance.
The final stage of the development of warehouse financing in South Africa 
to date was the creation of an electronic platform for the use of electronic 
silo certificates and this provided the basis and model for Uganda’s system of 
e-Receipts (see Box 4 in Section 5.2).
One issue with public warehouses is whether operators can store their own 
commodities in the same facilities, issue warehouse receipts in respect of 
those commodities, and trade those commodities. This situation can create a 
potential conflict of interest. However, the reality is that a regime that prevents 
this activity may not fully develop its potential, as a warehouse operator 
unable to trade in commodities may be unable to effectively use its storage 
facility capacity. Researchers at the University of São Paulo, Brazil found that 
licensed agricultural warehouses in Illinois, USA that were permitted to trade 
in grain were able to provide grain storage services at half the cost of those in 
Brazil.24 However, the potential conflict of interest between trading and service 
functions – and related to this the risk that warehouse operators experiencing 
financial difficulties on the trading side will place misappropriate depositors’ 
stocks – makes the job of a regulator particularly exacting.
5.2 Uganda case
Uganda produced a Warehouse Receipt System Act in 2006, and in 2007 the 
government appointed the Uganda Commodity Exchange (UCE) as regulatory 
authority under the Act. UCE had been trying unsuccessfully to establish a 
commodity trading floor since 1998, and it saw 
a reliable warehouse receipt system as the key 
to overcoming problems of performance failure25 
that had frustrated previous efforts to get the 
trading floor operational.
With its new powers and supported by an EU 
project that lasted from 2006 to 2010, UCE 
sought to implement a regulated system of 
public warehousing for grains (in practice overwhelmingly maize). A Chief 
Warehouse Examiner (CWE) was hired and trained to train warehouse staff; to 
24 See in Coulter et al., 1998.
25 Performance failure means sellers defaulting on contracts.
A warehouse 
operator unable to 
trade in commodities 
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carry out regular inspection to ascertain compliance with all aspects of the 
system, including grain quality; and to request remedial action. Considerable 
training was provided to farmers and farmer groups around the hinterland of 
licensed warehouses and a South African software company was contracted to 
install an electronic warehouse receipt system (eWRS) linked to South Africa 
that was being used to receipt millions of tons of grains per annum (see Box 
4). UCE took on the role of eWR administrator and became the registrar for 
warehouse receipts under the system; this moreover allowed it to fulfil a 
provision in the WRS Act that negotiations of WRs must be notified to the 
Authority.26 UCE also tried to re-establish its trading floor and the EU assisted 
with training brokers and establishing a settlement system.
26 Negotiable warehouse receipts provide good faith buyers with effective and immediate 
protection against third-party claims over the commodities they represent. However, this has 
not been tested in practice.
BOX 4: THE UGANDAN EWRS
The eWRS was closely linked to the South African system of electronic 
silo certificates used to receipt millions of tons of grain every year 
and to document grain deliveries against contracts of the SAFEX 
Division of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Control of the server 
was confided to PwC under an arrangement designed to ensure 
data confidentiality. The eWRS was a web-based system which only 
authorised parties could access and use, with their requisite user 
names, pin numbers and passwords. Authorised parties included 
the administrator (an employee of UCE), issuers (i.e., the warehouse 
operators) and users (i.e., the depositors, the financiers and buyers 
of e-Receipts). 
The process works as follows. The issuer issues the e-Receipt to the 
depositor (normally a farmer, a PO, or a trader), showing the location, 
quantity and grade of commodity stored at the warehouse and the 
warehouse operator’s lien (i.e., its accumulated charges against stock). 
The e-Receipt is a negotiable instrument evidencing title to the grain 
and the depositor can then transfer it to a financier, in encumbrance 
for a loan, or to a buyer, in fulfillment of a sales transaction. The 
buyer may then transfer it electronically to another buyer and so on, 
until such time as a holder wishes to take delivery of the commodity. 
The holder then transfers the e-Receipt back to the Issuer (i.e., the 
warehouse operator), paying accumulated charges, after which the 
101
The leading difficulty in establishing a WRS for maize in Uganda was the mainly 
informal and fragmented nature of the grain trade, for which reason there was 
limited private sector demand for dry, graded, shelf-stable grain, and market 
players generally focused on turning over their stock quickly. It was for this 
reason that UCE sought to enlist the dominant buyer (WFP), which at that 
time was procuring over 200,000 t of grain commodities per annum in Uganda 
(mainly maize), overwhelmingly by competitive tender, as a market maker. The 
idea – so the theory went – was for WFP to prime the pump, that is, to ensure 
there was strong demand for receipted grains in the early stages of the WRS, 
and unlock latent demand from other users who would buy dry/quality maize 
if they could reliably get it. By doing this, WFP could encourage prospective 
warehouse operators to get licensed, and help WFP ensure the quality of grain 
delivered to refugees and internally-displaced people in the zone. 
WFP finally came on board at the end of 2008, but only after 2 years of 
discussions, eventually committing itself to buy 150,000 t of commodities 
Issuer cancels the e-Receipt and releases the product to the holder. 
Each player can see the status of its holdings on the computer screen 
at any time. 
The administrator is the first point of contact for issuers and users 
signing up to the system, given that the system provides an audit trail 
of transactions that can be studied in the event of a dispute, and it 
is by virtue of this ability the registrar. The system has various other 
interesting features: 
·	 e-Receipts can be split into smaller lots; a holder can advertise its 
stock electronically to other participants
·	 a holder can transfer an e-Receipt to a broker pending the 
conclusion of a sale transaction 
·	 it can serve as an electronic delivery system for a commodity-
trading platform
·	 an on-line auction facility can be installed if required to facilitate 
competitive procurement by buyers
·	 the system can provide statistics, notably on overall stocks held in 
warehouses. 
In fact, UCE should at any time be able to obtain information on the 
volumes receipted, at a few touches of buttons.
P A R T  B  –  C H A P T E R  5
102 W A R E H O U S E  F I N A N C I N G  S T U D Y  -  V O L U M E  I
through the WRS, and making a series of investments in drying and storage 
facilities, market collection points, access roads and farmer capacity building. 
UCE licensed five warehouses, but the total deposits over the 5 years to the 
end of 2013 were only about 22,600 t, which was insufficient to ensure the 
financial viability of most warehouses, and a small fraction of what was needed 
to ensure the viability of the regulatory authority which needed to survive long 
term on the income from levies on licensed warehouses. With the end of the 
EU funding in 2010, UCE became fully dependent on government budgetary 
resources. As a result, services and compliance declined, and the regulatory 
system is not presently operational. Notwithstanding, at least two warehouses 
remain operational, and one reports that it is working with about 162 POs 
representing 10,000 farmers, and to be handling 8,000 t of maize per season 
including both outright purchases and storage for third parties.
The technical country study identifies the following underlying causes for the 
poor performance: 
(a) the feasibility of the regulated WRS was not thoroughly appraised at the 
outset
(b) the project sponsors (Ugandan players and the EU) were significantly at 
cross-purposes, the former stressing cooperative/bottom-up action and 
the latter stressing scale-economies and financial viability
(c) WFP-Uganda did not become a market maker as hoped
(d) the project sponsors were not able to deal with the problems as the 
project unfolded.
With regard to (b), it is worth noting two separate sources concur in the view 
that private sector warehouse operators that traded in the commodity while also 
storing it for third parties performed better (showing more initiative in seeking 
business) than cooperatively-owned warehouse operators licensed under this 
scheme (Onumah and Nakajjo, 2014; Richard Wangwe, ex-Stanbic, pers. comm.).
The experience demonstrates that innovative projects of this kind require 
decision-makers and funding agencies to have a shared understanding and 
a strong strategic vision before they get started. Moreover, for WFP-Uganda 
to become a market maker and achieve its 150,000 t target, it would need 
to share this strategic vision and develop a new approach to procurement 
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accordingly. In particular, it would need to: (1) induce some of its established 
tender suppliers (those with large-scale grain drying, cleaning and storage 
infrastructure) to become compliant with the WRS and get licensed as UCE-
licensed warehouses; (2) radically speed up its (very slow) procurement cycle, 
with procedures that would allow farmers and others to get paid upon delivery 
of a warehouse receipt; (3) use the UCE-licensed warehouses as its agents in 
ensuring quantity and quality of grains delivered, holding them accountable 
for any shortfalls; and (4) be prepared to pay premiums to achieve the high 
standards required. In practice, however, insufficient attention was given 
to these preconditions, in addition to which WFP did not apply its quality 
standards consistently, often prioritising procurement volume over and above 
strict compliance to grade specifications. 
The issue of quality came to a head in 2012; and in 2013 WFP-Uganda rejected 
most of the grain offered by its tender suppliers. This new policy might favour 
the development of the WRS, despite WFP’s gradual shift from distributing 
cash and vouchers instead of food; however, it is doubtful whether the UCE-
system is in a state to capitalise on this opportunity. 
5.3 Ghana case
5.3.1 Relevant initiatives
Various initiatives need to be considered in Ghana, including a commercial 
inventory credit pilot in the 1990s, the Ghana Grains Council (GGC) initiative 
starting in 2012, complementary outgrower schemes for maize, drafting of 
WRS and commodity exchange legislation and the Ghana Commodity Exchange 
(GCX) initiative. These are discussed in turn, focusing primarily on the GGC 
initiative which has made most progress to date:
(a) Commercial inventory credit pilot in the 1990s.
Between 1993 and 1997, an unregulated form of public warehousing was piloted 
with traders storing maize in central warehouses operated by the parastatal 
Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC), and a CM (SGS Ghana Ltd), with 
financing by the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and Barclays Bank 
Ghana Ltd. The longer term objective was to induce POs to deposit in the same 
storage facilities. Deposits and financing grew regularly, reaching 5,500 t in 
1995/96, but the pilot ended after problems in the following season, including 
mishandling of stocks by an ailing GFDC and the government’s unannounced 
and selective suspension of import duties which caused prices of maize to 
seriously slump below anticipated levels.
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(b) The GGC initiative, starting 2012.
Another initiative is now in progress with some official encouragement and 
considerable donor support at technical, operational and infrastructural levels. 
Once again the scheme is starting with maize, but this time under the auspices 
of a private sector body, GGC, a novel kind of membership organisation with 
60 corporate members and varying entitlements according to the class of 
member (platinum, gold and bronze). GGC is running a regulated WRS for its 
paid-up members.
GGC has so far certified seven warehouse operators with combined capacity 
of 36,600 t, and it has contracted an inspection company to carry out stock 
monitoring and authorise certified warehouse operators to issue warehouse 
receipts through GGC’s central depository. A single company, Weinco, accounts 
for 49% of the total certified warehousing capacity, while two warehouses in 
greater Accra account for 40%; the remaining four operators have warehouses 
of between 500 and 1,000 t each. GGC has also approved smaller community 
warehouses which are used to accumulate stocks for onward marketing27, 
subject to appropriate post-harvest training and their meeting basic standards 
with respect to store hygiene and equipment. 
Deposits started in December 2012; according to GGC, three warehouses have 
issued warehouse receipts for 29,500 t of maize, of which 6,900 t have been 
financed for GH¢ 2.88 million (an estimated  1 million).28 The warehouse 
operators may receipt deposits made by all GGC members, but have so far 
only issued receipts against their own stocks. 
Significantly, all of the funding to date originates from Stanbic Bank Ghana 
Ltd., and it has been channelled through an innovative CCH Repo scheme. 
The promoter of the CCH Repo scheme (who is coincidentally the author of 
the Ghana technical country report) ascribes this mainly to lower collateral 
requirements under the Repo scheme. The banks themselves view lending 
through CCH as an alternative to direct lending, in which they trade off cost 
(in the form of GGC’s margin) with the potential advantage of dealing through 
an intermediary who knows the borrowers much better than they do as well 
27 Unlike the Type A warehouses described in Section 3, these are not designed to store 
products for local consumption but for primary level aggregation of products destined for 
the market.
28 The technical country report shows higher figures (i.e.< 12,555 t have been financed with 
GHc4.98). It is believed that the difference is accounted for by the warehouse operator 
Weinco issuing new receipts against the same stock as the first ones had expired after their 
six-month term. 
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as how to mitigate risks. However, they do not emphasise the legal security of 
the Repo vis-à-vis a conventional pledge as an important reason for adopting 
using the Repo financing approach. 
CCH’s longer-term goal is to convert the commodity-backed Repo into a fixed 
interest money-market instrument that can be sold to private and fiduciary 
funds, in competition with treasury bills and other short-term investment 
instruments. There are precedents for this in Colombia and Venezuela where 
such Repos have been successfully sold on commodity exchanges, allowing 
farmers and traders to access loan finance at rates close to those payable on 
short-term money market instruments. 
However, the efficiency of the market is being hampered by problems of 
Ghanaian macro-economic management, leading to extraordinarily high 
interest rates which range from 20% to 48% per annum. 
(c) Outgrower schemes for maize.
(d) Weinco accounts for the overwhelming majority of deposits and 
borrowing to date under the GGC scheme. Weinco is a major agricultural 
inputs supplier, and starting in 2005 it organised a maize outgrower 
scheme with small farmers in northern Ghana, now coordinated by a 
company-affiliated producer organisation called Masara N’Arziki Farmers 
Association (MAFA).29 MAFA now works with around 9,000 farmers 
organised into solidarity groups of 5-10 farmers, who each must cultivate 
at least 2 ha as part of a single block of land. Groups are supplied with 
fertilisers, hybrid seeds, herbicides, insecticides, spraying equipment, 
innovative farm implements and technical advisory and training services 
on credit. They are also given a cost-of-production based minimum price 
guarantee in advance of production and they are paid a market-related 
price at harvesting time. 
(e) Farmers must deliver all their maize, save that required for home 
consumption, to MAFA; failure to do so results in tough sanctions which 
range from exclusion of the group from the scheme to court processes. 
Despite the group guarantee and the sanctions, the scheme is far 
from achieving full repayment of input loans. USAID (2012) reported 
repayment as 82% at the 2010 season and still counting; Wienco claims 
29 Both Weinco and YARA, the world’s leading producer and marketer of mineral fertilisers, have 
invested in MAFA, which has a board representing the two sponsoring companies and the 
farmers. Netherlands Cooperation is also reported to be supporting the organisation.
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that current levels of repayment is 90%, which is tolerable. Weinco’s 
scheme in Brong-Ahafo region has already collapsed due to a high 
default rate.
(f) Weinco reports that the outgrower scheme has resulted in a massive 
increase in productivity, from 1.2–1.8 tons to 4.0–4.3 t per ha, and that 
overall output is around 60,000 t30 per annum, about half of it yellow 
maize – reducing the poultry sector’s interest in importing this commodity. 
MAFA delivers the maize to Weinco which cleans and bags it, and markets it 
throughout the country – selling some 60–70% of output to compounders 
of poultry feed, some to a flour mill and the remainder to market traders.
(g) The government has also provided considerable technical support in 
raising maize productivity, as have other important outgrower initiatives 
involving varying degrees of donor support, including those of the 
Savannah Farmers’ Marketing Company, Gundaar (both of which operate 
GGC-certified warehouses) and the USAID/AGRA-supported nucleus 
farmers’ scheme (involving 18 community warehouses of 80 t capacity). 
The Weinco/YARA scheme is a major event in the development of the Ghanaian 
grain markets over recent years. It has apparently succeeded in containing the 
problems of side-selling and repayment default, which has caused most staple-
crop contract farming schemes to fail in sub-Saharan Africa. For this reason, 
Ghana has a major stake in the continuing success. However, the scheme is not 
without risk. It was developed on the premise that Ghana had a maize supply 
deficit and made up for the shortage through imports; but the combined effect 
of all the productivity-enhancing activity has been to make the country more 
self-sufficient and greatly reduce the degree of seasonal price volatility.31 This, 
coupled with the difficulty in predicting government interventions32 and their 
30 This number represents the average of two different figures of 50,000 t and 70,000 t 
provided by different Weinco representatives. 
31 An analysis of seasonal price swings from 1995/96 to 1998/99 showed wholesale prices in 
Techiman for June to average about 125% above those of the previous September in constant 
price terms (source: TechnoServe); Esoko data for the 3 years to 2012/13 show an average 
increase of 22% in current price terms. 
32 Discretionary import permits for poultry farmers and feed compounders to import yellow 
maize, discretionary export controls and interventions by the National Food Buffer-Stock 
Company (NAFCO). USAID (2012) states that the main concern of speculators and traders is 
the existing export licensing system, which is set up to allow for trade policy changes without 
warning in response to political or food security pressures. Traders are apprehensive, as they 
have been burned by sudden changes in trade policies in the past. In 2008, speculators were 
holding stocks in anticipation of the expected seasonal price increase, when a ban on imports 
was suddenly lifted, imports flooded the market, and prices plummeted.
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impact, makes seasonal storage a much more risky proposition than previously. 
The scheme has reportedly lost money over the last two seasons, facing a 
volatile end user market while committed to paying minimum guaranteed 
prices based on cost of production. Consequently, Weinco carried forward 
10,000 t of stocks from 2012/13 to 2013/14. Moreover, Yara and Wienco have 
seriously scaled back on their objective to support MAFA to improve the 
supply 200,000 t of locally produced maize to about 50,000 farmers by 2015, 
regarding it as too risky. 
(h) Legislation for the establishment of a commodity exchange and 
warehouse receipt system.
(i) In 2012, the Ministry of Trade & Industry (MOTI) formed a national task 
force for the development of a commodity exchange and its supportive 
warehouse receipt system. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 
formed another task force for the development of a credible warehouse 
receipt system. Both task forces had broad stakeholder representation 
from the public and private sectors, involving GGC among others. Their 
work has led to the drafting of two legislative instruments (LIs) that are 
to be enacted within the next few months. The Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is named as the regulatory organ for both commodity 
exchanges and the warehouse receipt system, though the SEC is able to 
delegate the warehouse regulatory role to other bodies.
(j) The Ghana Commodity Exchange (GCX) initiative.
(k) Working in parallel with the legislative process, MOTI plans to implement this 
exchange by 2015 and UNDP is funding a project office which is promoting 
the initiative. Technical support is being provided by a company called 
Eleni, led by Eleni Gabre-Madhin who promoted and managed the Ethiopia 
Commodity Exchange (ECX). Eleni seeks to establish turn-key commodity 
exchanges in Africa with ancillary supporting infrastructure, notably the 
warehouses that will serve as delivery locations. The project office has 
put together a group of founding investors, including two banks (Ecobank 
and UT Bank), two investment funds (Databank Agrifund and 8 Miles), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the government with a 10% 
share, with a total equity of US$ 15 million. A draft agreement was to be 
signed and the exchange should be in place within about 12 months.
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(l) GCX will initially trade maize and rice and, following the Ethiopian model, it 
will establish large exchange warehouses where these commodities will be 
deposited prior to spot trading through trading members who will carry out 
a brokerage function. The project office is currently receiving expressions 
of interest for investment in eight warehouse sites, each with grain cleaning 
and drying facilities and 10,000 t storage capacity, around the country. The 
authors sought information on financial feasibility, notably how the project 
office would motivate investors to build the warehouses, the break-even 
level and how the exchange would reach this (in the absence of a mandatory 
trading through the exchange floor which was key to the establishment of 
GCX), but such information was not forthcoming. Neither was it possible to 
establish the permitted storage period.33 However it was made clear that all 
receipted produce would be sold over the exchange floor, and none could 
be sold by private treaty outside of the exchange framework.
(m) The GGX promoters see GGC as a strategic partner, given its prior work 
on regulated grain storage, but the two parties have so far not been 
able to agree the nature of this partnership. A particular sticking point 
concerns the type of warehouse receipts that GGC may issue; GGC wants 
them to issue both GGC and GCX receipts, but the GCX model provides 
for the exclusive use of GCX warehouse receipts and that all must be 
traded through the exchange. 
5.3.2 SWOT analysis and conclusions
It is too early to forecast the ultimate success of GGC-inspired regulated public 
warehousing in Ghana, but it has various strengths:
(a) The nature of GGC itself, notably that: (1) it is a stakeholder-driven 
institution whose leading members have invested considerable time 
and resources in it; (2) it has a pragmatic approach, enlisting the 
entrepreneurial abilities of market intermediaries rather than just 
focusing on producer organisations/cooperatives; (3) it has a lot of 
experience and it has developed trust of farmers and others; and (4) it 
is able to learn from experience and address challenges as they occur.
(b) Long-term and flexible support from USAID, with considerable additional 
support from other donors. 
33 The ECX precedent is relevant here: as initially established (and probably still applicable) 
coffee could only be stored for 1 month prior to trading, sesame and pea beans 2 months, and 
maize 3 months. Warehouse receipting was ancillary to the trading operation; there was no 
provision for long-term storage such as can be carried out in GGC-certified warehouses.
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Stronger government support than existed with the 1990s pilot, particularly 
with enabling legislation.
The GGC scheme also faces some significant weaknesses/challenges:
(a) The limited scale of the formal market for agricultural commodities in 
Ghana. Presently the GGC scheme only handles maize, of which national 
production is around 1.8 million t. However, only a limited share of this 
is purchased by the sort of formal sector end users that demand quality 
ingredients and are likely to opt for produce from licensed warehouses. 
Food processors are mainly of a small scale nature, and the large scale 
roller mills one finds in East Africa are nearly absent in West Africa. The 
most quality-conscious buyers are (probably in descending order) (1) 
Nestlé, which buys a few hundred tons a year; (2) the brewers that may be 
buying as much as 20,000 t in maize grits; (3) NAFCO, which is reported 
to buy around 14,000 t of grain per annum for public institutions; and 
(4) the fast-growing animal feed sector (overwhelmingly poultry) which 
was buying about 410,000 t according to USAID.34 This means that the 
poultry sector is key to generating demand for the warehouse receipt 
system. However, poultry farmers vary widely in scale and technical 
sophistication; many buy most of their requirements from traditional 
market intermediaries and are likely to continue doing this. As such, 
they will not immediately see the advantage of buying through a highly-
formalised system like the WRS. The Greater Accra Poultry Association is 
one of the most quality-conscious buyers, buying all its maize from three 
or four suppliers it trusts (notably Weinco); but it does not require the 
maize to be graded according to the standards adopted by GGC. There 
is also potential demand for receipting of a range of other products, 
including paddy rice, sorghum, palm oil, cashew, shea nuts, frozen fish, 
cassava flour, ground nuts, cotton and soybeans; but the potential 
tonnage for all of these was lower than for maize.35 The dominant export 
commodity (cocoa) is already being managed under a highly-organised 
government scheme, which has some characteristics of a WRS but which 
is tied to a single-channel public sector export system; locally processed 
cocoa might be traded through the commodity exchange, but this is not 
part of GCX’s current plans.
34 Coulter and Aning (2012) estimated that total formal sector demand for maize (excluding 
purchases by bakers, confectioners and public sector buyers like schools and prisons) was 
about 170,000 t, with poultry feed accounting for about 95% of the total. 
35 See Table 5.4.c in the Ghana country annex in Volume II.
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(b) Stonger players like Weinco have financing alternatives. Weinco is a 
Ghanaian blue chip and its participation in the GGC financing owes more 
to its institutional commitment to GGC of which it is a leading members, 
rather than to necessity. Having found the grading and documentary 
requirements rather onerous36, it may seek other forms of financing that 
draw upon the strength of its balance sheet and its track record. 
(c) Flattening of the seasonal price curve for maize and the increased 
risks involved in seasonal storage, as discussed above.
(d) Some laxity within GGC, which has resulted in a borrower-member 
(Africa Connections) moving stock out of the warehouse where it was 
being stored and defaulting on repayment to CCH which (notwithstanding) 
has repaid the financing bank (Stanbic). The case affects about 12% 
of WRS lending to date, has gone to court and is still unresolved.37 
Hopefully, GGC can learn from this experience; an expert review is in 
progress, and this review should result in stronger corporate governance 
and compliance systems. 
Looking forward, there are various opportunities and threats of which GGC will 
need to take account. Apart from the laxity issue which calls for immediate 
action, one of the main threats is Ghana’s present monetary turmoil, involving 
obscenely high interest rates, which will make it difficult to persuade members 
to obtain WRS financing from the banking sector. However, there are 
opportunities to use the warehouse receipts in other ways, including: 
(a) as a means of securing the credit that buyers extend to their rural suppliers – 
this is an extension of traditional supply chain practices – if the supplier can 
pledge goods in his/her warehouse, the buyer can advance him/her more 
money, which in turn bids up farm-gate prices and benefits farmers
(b) to transfer title from suppliers to buyers, taking advantage of the 
transferability of the GGC warehouse receipts
(c) for larger warehouse operators, notably Weinco, to receipt the goods of 
its farmer suppliers and offer to sell them on a brokerage basis.
36 Wienco’s main source of concern was the requirement to have its grain re-graded once it 
had passed the five month shelf-life allowed under GGC rules. The rule prevents grain being 
handled on a first-in-first-out basis and involves significant additional expense.
37 The Chairman of GGC holds the donor (USAID) largely responsible for the problem, claiming 
that pressures to show results caused corners to be cut in signing up and financing the 
member concerned. 
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GGC members should explore the scope for expanding on approaches 1 and 2 
that are reported to have already occurred on a small scale. Approach 3 might 
provide a partial solution to difficulties that threaten the long-term viability of 
Weinco’s outgrower model. As suggested by the GGC Chairman (Tom Gambrah, 
pers. comm.), it might make sense for Weinco to move its farmer suppliers 
(through MAFA) to a risk-sharing arrangement so as to overcome its current 
predicament, whereby it finds itself caught between cost-plus pricing to its 
farmers and uncontrollable off-take prices. 
The GCX initiative represents both an opportunity and a threat. On the positive 
side, the establishment of an exchange trading mechanism would complement 
the WRS, making warehouse receipts more liquid and the bankers more willing 
to provide finance without having an off-taker agreement in place (a difficult 
requirement to meet in a market where there are a limited number of formal 
sector off-takers prepared to enter into forward contracts). On the negative 
side, GCX may prove to be GGC’s competitor for a limited pool of receiptable 
commodities, making it difficult for either of them to progress towards break-even.
The main difficulty with GCX, as presently conceived, is that it attempts to 
reproduce most of the organisational and operational characteristics of the 
Ethiopian exchange (ECX), but in a totally different environment, involving: 
(1) food crops instead of export cash crops; (2) a high level of informality at 
the buyer end; and (3) the impossibility of mandating trade along Ethiopian 
lines.38 Insufficient consideration appears to how GCX can reach break-even in 
the Ghanaian situation. It is to be hoped that the promoters will review their 
approach, consulting intensively with local stakeholders. A lighter structure 
is called for in the early stages, one which will allow the concept to be piloted 
in a few strategic locations. The trading floor can be a simple delivery versus 
payment system, with electronic matching of bids and offers, delivery in the 
form of warehouse receipts and settlement system whereby banks guarantee 
their clients’ payment up to a given limit. 
CCH has made an interesting start, so far accounting for the totality of WRS 
lending under the GGC scheme. However, this is partly related to the incipient 
nature of the scheme where only one bank has provided finance, so it is 
difficult to draw conclusions at this stage about longer-term attractions of 
Repo financing vis-à-vis direct lending by the banks. The real challenge for 
38 Government is likely to mandate purchases by public sector institutions, notably NAFCO, 
believed to buy around 14,000 t of commodities per year for distribution to schools and other 
entities, but it is not contemplating the mandating of regular private trade. Any attempt to 
do so could be expected to foster large-scale evasion and parallel trade. 
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CCH, and one to which the promoter is committed, is to develop the Repo 
into a short-term financial instrument which can radically reduce the cost of 
warehouse financing in Ghana. 
The main conclusion from the above is that GGC is an interesting scheme that 
can help Ghana become a major surplus producer of field crops within the 
West African region, working in coordination with contract farming initiatives 
and a new commodity exchange. However, it has a number of challenges to 
overcome; it will need long-term external support and mentoring to help 
it develop and fulfil its potential. It is important to find ways of simplifying 
documentary requirements and ensuring that quality management procedures 
and documentation are in line with market requirements and that they do not 
create an undue administrative burden. 
5.4 Other actual or potential initiatives 
5.4.1 Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire is planning a regulated WRS and it intends to pilot the system 
with a single crop, probably cashews. The government wants to substantially 
increase local processing of raw commodities, and it sees public warehousing 
accessible to farmers and cooperatives as playing an important role in this 
plan. The cashew sector has developed very fast such that national production 
of raw nuts reached 450,000 t in 2012, and Côte d’Ivoire is now the second 
producer in the world after India. However, only 5% of production is locally 
processed; processing is inhibited by stakeholders’ difficulties in accessing 
storage and financing. For this reason, the government wants to pilot the 
regulated public warehousing system with cashews. 
The IFC and industry stakeholders have been working with the government 
to draft a Warehouse Receipts Bill which will provide for regulated public 
warehousing. Banks, insurance companies, producers, cooperatives, processors, 
CMs and Ministries of Trade, Industry and Finance have all reviewed the Bill 
and contributed to its drafting. The Act will provide for a Regulatory Council39 
to certify warehouse managers/CMs that will take deposits from the public and 
if required issue negotiable and non-negotiable warehouse receipts against 
them. These may be electronic or paper documents. The Bill also provides 
for a central registry. The Council will be responsible for ensuring compliance 
with the rules and for enforcing commodity standards. It was first proposed 
that the use of the warehouse receipt system would be voluntary, but after 
39 Conseil du Système de Récépissés d’Entreposage et à des Fins Connexes.
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discussions with the stakeholders it was agreed that farmers, processors and 
other sector players would only be allowed to store the commodity (cashew) 
in approved warehouses.
There is still some uncertainty as to whether Côte d’Ivoire will start with cashew 
or another commodity, but if the country opts for the former, implementation 
could start at the earliest with the next cashew crop, in February-March 2015. 
After the establishment of the regulated WRS, it is envisaged that the country 
will establish a physical commodity exchange. 
Some factors bode well for the success of this initiative in Côte d’Ivoire, for 
example:
(a) Scale and liquidity: Côte d’Ivoire produces large volumes of internationally 
traded commodities and it markets them through private channels
(b) Unlike other countries studied it has some prior experience in regulation 
of CMs
(c) The process is partly driven by private stakeholders who understand the 
sector and the challenges it faces 
(d) The scale of financing of commodities under CMAs is so large (estimated at 
 2.6 billion just for export crops) that some banks will welcome negotiable 
instruments that allow them to refinance their debt on the local money 
market and thereby overcome liquidity constraints on their lending 
(e) It has the technical support of an international institution (IFC) with a 
long-term commitment to the development of WRS around Africa.
Some of the stakeholders have, however, expressed concern that the banks 
have not been sufficiently involved in designing the WRS. According to this 
view, there is a general lack of experience with negotiable instruments in 
CI, and changing this and introducing other features of the WRS will require 
considerable leadership from the banking sector that is not yet apparent. 
It is also important that WRS is not seen as a panacea to the failings of the 
value chain. One leading banker (M. N’dri Augustin, SGCBCI) believes there is 
massive potential to raise productivity of export and staple crops and much of 
the solution resides in the development of stronger forms of contract farming 
linking producers with input suppliers, international buyers and banks. 
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5.4.2 Mozambique
Influenced particularly by the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (visited by the 
Mozambican President) and probably by other examples in southern Africa, the 
government established the Mozambique Commodity Exchange (BMM) in 2012, 
and drafted a Warehouse Receipt Law. At the time of this publication, the BMM 
appears far from functional, but it is in the process of assuming responsibility 
for 39 new silos with a capacity of approximately 200,000 t of grain. Each silo 
is equipped with a quality control laboratory with the objective of being able 
to provide certified elevator type storage facilities. BMM representatives admit 
that they have not consulted private sector stakeholders and are only in the 
incipient phases of training lab technicians, while still not having developed a 
business model.
The approach is very much government-driven, in contrast to the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire where there have been incremental moves toward the establishment 
of public warehousing system and a commodity exchange, with much more 
consultation of relevant stakeholders. Under such circumstances, the prospects 
for this scheme do not look good. The technical country study argues for 
focusing BMM’s activities on the most productive agricultural areas in the 
north, while working in consortium with exchanges in Malawi which already 
has its agents working in northern Mozambique. 
Regardless of the prospects for BMM, the drafting of a new WRS law could 
provide the opportunity to engage the government seriously about the legal and 
institutional framework for different kinds of warehouse receipting in Mozambique, 
including CMAs and SMAs. This is referred to in the recommendations (see 
Section 8.2.6).
5.4.3 Burkina Faso
The technical country study on Burkina Faso notes that one of the CMs is 
providing public warehousing services to farmers and traders and that certain 
POs already involved in Type A activities (community inventory credit) wish 
to develop a national system of PO-managed warehouses where groups can 
deposit their goods under the coordination of the FEPA-B apex body. The 
Conféderation Paysanne du Faso (CPF) will advocate for the establishment of 
such a system with the government and donors. The technical country report 
goes on to recommend the drafting of a law to facilitate the development 
of public warehousing by the above mentioned players, to assist in the 
development of processing and give comfort to the banks. 
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5.4.4 Madagascar
The Madagascar technical country report also notes how MFIs which have 
developed the GCV (Type A) system are increasingly establishing central 
warehouses under their own management; it recommends to build on this trend 
and develop a national warehousing profession, 
with an appropriate regulatory structure. 
The Malagasy MFIs could be prime movers in 
establishing such a system; given their sterling 
achievement with the GCVs, Madagascar probably 
presents one of the strongest opportunities for 
public warehousing in the subject countries. 
However, to do this they will need to see beyond their trade and to reach out 
to government, banks and other value-chain players. It is recommended that 
any regulatory structure be able to sustain itself through levies on licensed 
warehouse systems and internalise the cost of all due diligence and risk 
assessment, rather than depending on government budgetary allocations.
5.5 Legal aspects of public warehouses
5.5.1 Which approach is most appropriate?
Introduction
The key legal elements of a regulated system of public warehouses include the 
authority to issue warehouse receipts, the status of those receipts, financing 
against the receipts, the warehouse operator’s out-turn commitments, commodity 
grading, the regulatory regime, licensing criteria, handling warehouse failure, 
and the recourse of those suffering losses due to warehouse failure or non-
performance. These and other points are discussed in Annex 3, Section 2. 
Those seeking to establish a regulated system face the choice of going for 
legislation (following the examples of Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia) or 
creating the system out of contractual arrangements between the relevant 
parties (following the examples of South Africa and the Ghana Grains Council). 
Annex 3, Section 3, analyses the pros and cons for these two options. The main 
conclusion from this is that both routes are likely to be difficult. 
The voluntary contractual route
The contractual route is difficult because it requires industry motivation, 
available finance and ongoing discipline from the participants. Moreover, it 
Madagascar probably 
presents one of the 
strongest opportunities 
for public warehousing in 
the subject countries
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requires an unusual level of stakeholder cohesion, something which existed in 
abundance in South Africa around 1994, when the system of silo certificates 
was established, but is not a characteristic of field crop commodity sectors 
(grains, pulses and oilseeds) in the remainder of continent. In South Africa, 
two companies controlled 70% of the silo capacity and provided a core around 
which consensus could be easily reached, and there were trade associations 
representing all sections of the relevant value chains. The limited number, 
the large scale, and the education level of the commercial farmers40 in that 
country meant that this group was more organised too. However, the opposite 
is generally the case in other African countries, due to the relative atomisation 
and informality of production, marketing and even processing functions and 
the absence of strong bodies representing stakeholder groups. 
Organising stakeholders is somewhat easier in Eastern and Southern Africa 
than in West Africa, because there are some large formal sector end-users, 
notably millers and traders who have an interest in making the supply chain 
more efficient and can serve as a focus for organisation. This may in part 
explain initial success in organising the Eastern African Grain Council (EAGC). 
However, the Kenyan State has not always acted in a way that facilitates this 
stakeholder-driven approach and the process of organising the regulated WRS 
seems to have languished. 
With the voluntary system there is also a risk of claims from third parties 
outside of the system, for example, if a depositor grants security over 
commodity covered by a warehouse receipt to a third party. In this scenario, 
the rules of the voluntary system would not be binding on the third-party 
creditor and the normally applicable rules of priority would apply. This could 
put a creditor who has financed on the back of a warehouse receipt at a 
disadvantage, as it may only have a contractual claim against the borrower 
rather than an effective security right. However, this risk has not prevented 
the unregulated South African system from getting firmly established. Further 
legal research would be justified to understand the South African experience, 
the residual risks associated with the non-regulated system in that country 
and the scope to reproduce the South African approach elsewhere in Africa. 
40 The official census of agricultural production for 2007 shows the total number of farming 
units (all crops) at 57,980 in 1993, falling to 37,982 in 2007. These are relatively small 
numbers compared to the numbers of producing households in each of the other countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa, numbering in the hundreds of thousands or millions.
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The legislative reform route
The legislative reform route is also difficult, as illustrated by the case of Uganda. 
The process was embarked on with project support of international aid donors, 
but the local and international project sponsors did not share a cohesive vision 
of what they were trying to achieve. Indeed, the local promoters seem to have 
been more concerned with resurrecting the cooperative movement, a laudable 
aim, but different from a warehouse receipt system. Tanzania, which passed 
its WRS Act in 2005, has been more successful, but it has challenges in the 
areas of governance, funding and staff numbers, which according to a recent 
review, call for urgent action (see Box 5).
BOX 5: REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN TANZANIA 
Tanzania has one the strongest public warehousing systems in sub-
Saharan Africa, and it is regulated by the Tanzanian Warehouse 
Licensing Board (TWLB), which operates under the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MOIT). TWLB has licensed 60 warehouses with a 
total storage capacity of 259,700 t, and the main commodities stored 
and financed are raw cashews and coffee destined for export. Thirty-
five of the warehouses hold paddy rice, maize and sunflower, but these 
are relatively small structures with average capacity of 392 t. 
According to a recent review, the system has experienced some 
losses in the form of non-delivery by licensed warehouse operators, 
particularly in the cashew subsector, that have been higher than the 
operators’ capital. In such cases, it can take a long time to settle claims 
and it sometimes involves court litigation. Indeed, it took over three 
years for the courts to determine liability in a case involving under-
delivery of receipted cashew. Such a long and usually costly process 
can significantly undermine confidence in the WRS and its effectiveness 
in assuring delivery against (planned) exchange-traded contracts.
The review found TWLB to be severely underfunded and understaffed. 
There was a shortage of available trained personnel able to undertake 
effective warehouse examinations, as well as inadequacies in both 
off-site analysis of reports submitted by the warehouse operators and 
in reports from collateral managers hired to carry out inspections on 
TWLB’s behalf. Apart from this, TWLB’s financial constraints mean 
it is unable to use the inspectors as often as required. The licensing 
fees it charges warehouse operators represent a very small fraction 
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In some countries, government stakeholders have at times conceived of the 
WRS as a basically government-managed system, in a way which makes it 
difficult to establish an operational framework that gains the trust of private 
stakeholders inspiring fear of inefficiencies or heavy-handed intervention. This 
has been evident at certain times in several African countries, including Zambia, 
Kenya and Nigeria, though it may not presently be the case in those countries. 
Governments tend to have short-term priorities, sometimes with an electoral 
focus, which prevent them from focusing patiently on the long-term institutional 
development projects which require more than a decade to achieve, and in such 
circumstances, they may not deliver effective legislative reform.
Another potential problem is that the legislative process in any country can be 
very long; its outcome is uncertain. In the case of Zambia, draft WRS legislation 
was under consideration for most of a decade before the Agricultural Credits 
Bill was passed in November 2010. Standards of public service can pose 
another problem, with a regulatory activity which in few words needs to be 
strict, fair or – best not at all.
A third option: the ECX route
Another option is the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX) route and variants 
on it which have been widely promoted around the continent. It is inspiring 
initiatives in Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania and Ghana. The promoters of this 
model seek to enlist wholehearted support of governments in the countries 
of its financing requirements and it is almost entirely dependent on 
government for funding.
Apart from not being able to set realistic user fees, part of TWLB’s 
problems lie in its governance. The Board is presently dominated by 
farmer representatives (four out of eight members); balance needs 
to be shifted in favour of representatives of banks, insurance and 
major exporters.
Difficulties of this kind increase the risks associated with the WRS, 
including physical losses, quality deterioration and fraud. However, the 
review states that as at now the incidents do not appear to be affecting 
confidence in the system, but that can change quickly if robust systems 
are not instituted to minimise the risk of much larger losses.
Source: Onumah et al., 2013
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concerned for a model that includes a (normally) 
open-outcry commodity trading floor with a 
series of delivery points (warehouse sites) in 
the main producing regions. Governments have 
varying levels of involvement in the ownership 
structure and governance. The warehouses 
are mainly established for trading purposes; 
all commodities deposited there must be sold 
through broker-members acting on the trading floor and warehouse receipt 
financing is subsidiary to this. In examples that the authors have seen to date, 
there is no prospect of selling by private treaty outside the exchange. 
By getting the governments enthusiastically involved and enlisting the large-
scale support of aid donors, international financial institutions, banks and 
investment funds, the promoters seek to create the critical mass whereby 
regulatory obstacles are quickly overcome, and the exchange and its 
linked public warehousing system takes off quickly with massive volumes 
of commodities. Indeed, this is what happened with ECX: by the third year 
of operations (FY 2010/11), the volume of commodities traded had reached 
509,000 t, of which 51% was coffee, 41% sesame, 7% pea beans, and 1% 
maize, the latter being the only non-mandated commodity.
There are, however, some potential snags with this model: 
(a) Above all, it is very difficult to translate conditions in Ethiopia to other 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The Ethiopian Government mandated 
all exports of the relevant crops through the commodity exchange; it 
could do this (despite considerable evasion/black market) because: 
(1) it focused on export crops that could be controlled at the point of 
export; and (2) the government’s writ is widely respected, indeed feared, 
because evasion can carry serious penalties such as 15-year jail terms.
(b) Most of the ECX lookalikes are focusing primarily on domestically 
consumed field crops like maize and soybeans, which cannot be 
effectively mandated in the Ethiopian way without causing a massive 
illegal parallel trade such as existed with parastatal grain monopolies in 
Eastern and Southern Africa during the pre-liberalisation. This situation 
lasted into the 1980s, and it can be observed today in massive illegal 
cross-border trade flows in rice and other commodities. Probably in the 
light of this problem, the promoters have generally stopped short of 
advocating for the mandating of crops through the commodity exchange, 
A model that 
includes a (normally) 
open-outcry commodity 
trading floor with a 
series of delivery points 
(warehouse sites) in the 
main producing regions
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but this leaves a situation like the one in Ghana (see Section 5.3.1) where 
they cannot explain how investors would be motivated to build the 
warehouses and bring the exchange to break-even.
(c) In practice, the approach risks appealing to the more interventionist 
and short-term political instincts of governments. There is evidence of 
this with Mozambique and Ghana, where there has been insufficient 
consultation with stakeholders on the ground and in Nigeria, where 
government supporters expected a revamped Abuja exchange to have 
transformative impact in advance of elections. 
(d) Large projects involving the prestige of governments, IFIs, investment 
funds and renowned international figures risk creating a situation like 
the one observed in Ethiopia, where there has been insufficient research 
into the pros and cons of ECX and insufficient local and international 
debate about its achievements (see Coulter, 2013).
Conclusion
The above observations support the authors’ conviction explained in 
Section 7.3, that the funding agencies need to take a long-term programme 
approach, one that will gradually empower 
local stakeholders seeking to improve the 
performance of value chains. Notwithstanding 
the various challenges faced by Ghana Grains 
Council, USAID’s approach in supporting GGC 
has some merit in this regard, notwithstanding 
the challenges this organisation faces. It has started by gaining experience 
with a contractually regulated WRS, but is at the same time advocating for a 
nationally regulated system. Its experience as a practitioner makes it a wiser 
advocate, with a strategic view and it may allow it to steer official processes 
towards a positive outcome. 
5.5.2 Legal reform in the OHADA region
In terms of the legislated approach, there is the possibility of achieving reform 
across the OHADA. S&W consulted with Ivorian firm Brizoua-Bi to gain a 
deeper understanding of the scope for this. Annex 3, Section 5 (Overview of 
key OHADA provisions) sets out some detail on the background to the OHADA 
legal regime and the existing OHADA laws applicable to commodity financing.
The funding 
agencies need to 
take a long-term 
programme approach
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The process of introducing new OHADA Acts is long, and it ultimately requires 
unanimity of the voting countries. Implementing WRS legislation across the 
whole OHADA region by introducing a Uniform Act would clearly be a difficult 
task. Brizoua-Bi, who have extensive experience of OHADA laws advise that it 
is, however, possible to encourage warehouse financing within the framework 
of existing OHADA laws. For example, the Securities Act provides that in the 
context of a non-possessory pledge over commodity, the RCCM may issue a 
bordereau de gage de stocks (a pledge form) which serves as confirmation 
that the relevant pledge agreement has been successfully registered with 
the RCCM. A pledge form can be endorsed by a secured creditor to a third 
party who will then obtain the rights of a secured creditor in relation to the 
pledged goods. The pledge form does not transfer ownership in the goods nor 
is it a document of title, but the endorsement mechanism is a useful way of 
transferring certain rights to underlying commodity.
However, the pledge form is only relevant in the case of non-possessory 
registered pledges. The legal and technical due diligence suggest that 
unregistered possessory pledges are the more common practice, meaning the 
pledge form is currently of limited practical use. 
There is nothing in the Securities Act opposing the passing, in the individual 
Member States, of specific legislation relating to the possibility of issuing a 
warehouse receipt-like instrument in the context of a possessory pledge over 
commodity. In other words, under current OHADA legislation, each OHADA 
country is given the discretion to legislate in respect of warehouse receipts as 
part of a possessory pledge over stocks arrangement. On the assumption that 
a warehouse receipt offers better security to a secured creditor (for instance, 
by providing, among other things, proof of ownership of commodities that are 
stored in a warehouse), Brizoua-Bi would encourage it in the OHADA countries, 
especially in Côte d’Ivoire.
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For a long time, there has been considerable lending under out-grower 
arrangements in the subject countries, but the primary tools in ensuring 
repayment are not the legal security over the crop, but the lender’s supervisory 
arrangements and, for some bulky crops (e.g., sugarcane) or high value-crops 
(like air-freighted vegetables), the absence of alternative buyers in the vicinity. 
With the Weinco/MAFA scheme discussed in Section 5.3.1, the lender is taking 
other drastic action, including the police and the courts, to ensure delivery 
of the crop under the contractual terms. In Côte d’Ivoire, banks are lending 
to producers on the security of the crop and in the event of default, they can 
easily send in a contractor to harvest the rubber under contractual provisions 
that provide for an assignment of receivables (cession de créances).
However, the funding agencies are principally concerned with identifying cases 
where there is scope for new financial instruments like the Brazilian agricultural 
bonds (cedulas de produtos rurais), forward contracts underwritten by a bank 
or other party which can financed or even traded on a commodity exchange. 
The authors’ soundings on this suggest that in most African countries it is not 
realistic to expect banks to take security over such paper, given that there 
are so many cases where they are unwilling to finance against the security of 
possessory collateral held in warehouses. The small scale of most agricultural 
producers compared to Brazil and the weakness of cooperatives also make this 
a challenging proposition.
However, the authors discussed the proposition with a leading Ivorian banker 
who thought it might be possible with the Ivorian rubber producers, many of 
whom have plantations of 50-100 ha. Key considerations would be the quality 
of the party underwriting the issue of the documents and the availability of 
suitable insurance for loss of harvests. If the funding agencies wish to pursue 
the idea of agricultural bonds, it is suggested they test it out with the Ivorian 
rubber sub-sector. 
Lending against the 
security of current 
or future production 
(Type D)
6
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7.1 Pros and cons of types
WR/CM is not a panacea or a magic ingredient, but tools that can be used in 
the development of agricultural value chains, alongside or in combination 
with a range of other tools. Table 7 outlines key pros and cons of the different 
approaches reviewed.
Table 7: Key pros and cons of types reviewed
Pro Con
Main subject 
countries using it 
to date
Type A
• Low scale, direct farmer 
involvement
• High accountability and 
repayment 
• Improved management 
of home economy/ 
forced savings
• Possible stepping stone 
to market-oriented 
approach
• Inflexible product with 
fixed calendar
• Dependency on project 
support, especially for 
warehouse construction
• Producers lack of market 
knowledge
• Madagascar
• Burkina Faso 
and Niger 
Type B 
• Important component 
of key value chains 
supporting millions of 
families
• Spontaneous activity, 
not dependent on 
governments or donors
• Economies of scale – 
high fixed costs per site/ 
inaccessible to most rural 
clients
• Vulnerable to fraud in 
some countries
• All countries 
except 
Madagascar
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Pro Con
Main subject 
countries using it 
to date
Type C
• Open, contestable 
system, allowing public 
access
• Facilitates price 
discovery, trading & 
development of 
commodity exchanges
• Requires regulation or 
self-regulation, either of 
which is difficult
• Economies of scale in 
operation & regulation of 
warehouses
• High initial cost of 
external support
• Uganda, Ghana
7.2 Key success factors
The authors have examined a heterogeneous set of initiatives in a widely varied 
set of countries. What can be said about the main ingredients for success? To 
answer this question, the nine cases set out in Table 8 are examined.
Table 8: Factors contribution to success or failure of initiatives
Country Initiative (type) Success factor
Source of failure 
(actual or potential)
Burkina Faso Collateral mgt. for 
farmers and processors 
(A/C)
• Stakeholder driven 
• Vision & leadership
• Risks stemming from 
inexperience 
• Interventionist trend 
at Government level
Niger Community inventory 
credit 1999-2009 (C)
• Product strengths: 
accountability, 
ownership





• Inflexibility of 
product
• Dependency on 
donors for warehouse 
construction
• Limited scale
Senegal Senegal River 




• Government and 
donor support
• Policy contradictions, 
calling for strong 
national leadership 
and strategic choices
Ghana Ghana Grains Council 
(B)
• Stakeholder-driven
• Long-term support of 
funding agencies
• Monetary turmoil
• GGC cohesion & 
governance
• Limited scale of 
formal markets
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Country Initiative (type) Success factor
Source of failure 
(actual or potential)





• Failure to involve 
relevant players
• Official reluctance 
to disqualify non-
performing coops




• Government & 
stakeholder- driven
• Scale factor
• As yet untested in 
practice
Madagascar GCV system (C) • Strong underlying 
demand
• Vision & leadership
• Long-term approach
• Weaknesses in quality 
and risk management 
Mozambique BMM exchange and 
warehousing system (B)
• 39 new silos, with 





• No business model or 
technical capacity
Uganda Regulated WRS for 
grains (B)
• Liberal government 
policy towards trade 
in staple foods
• Lack of scale 
economies 
• Promoters lack 
shared vision 
• Weak involvement of 
private stakeholders
Further country-by-country explanation is provided below:
(a) Madagascar: with the establishment of the GCVs, it can be seen that: 
(1) strong underlying demand, in terms of the enhancement of food 
security and livelihoods and the ability to smooth predictable seasonal 
price movements for the staple food; (2) a product that was quite simple 
and institutionally workable; (3) the strong vision and leadership of the 
promoters, including people who came from the French credit unions, 
producers’ representatives, public officials and bankers; and (4) long-
term commitment of funding agencies that continued supporting for 
about 18 years. This gave the players scope to adapt their approach in 
the light of experience; notably they learned by dint of trial and error 
that a single-minded focus on POs as key protagonists would not work 
in the Malagasy environment.
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(b) Burkina Faso: there has recently been growth of collateral management 
activities in support of (often small-scale) agro-processing and 
producer groups, contrasting markedly with the mainstream collateral 
management model that clusters around high volume international 
trade. Key ingredients of this (tentative) break-through are the vision, 
leadership and drive of some the key private stakeholders (notably 
CMs and banks), who are finding ways of working effectively with 
organisations of producers and small-scale processors. However, the 
rapid expansion of this activity and the limited experience of the players 
is a source of risk.
(c) Niger: the widespread adoption of community inventory credit owes 
much to the efforts and vision of key individuals who promoted the 
product under FAO auspices over the best part of 10 years and to the 
development of direct credit MFI which filled the gap left by failing 
mutual MFIs (credit unions). The product itself has both strengths and 
weaknesses. 
(d) Senegal: in the Senegal River Valley, significant success has been 
achieved in developing the irrigated rice sector with a value-chain 
approach that makes use of stock monitoring and collateral management 
at different levels of the chain. The initiative has made progress in 
overcoming historic difficulties in making Senegalese rice competitive 
with imports in terms of price and quality, but there are still unresolved 
issues in this area. Key success factors include scale economies (the 
operation involves tens of thousands of tons per harvest) and the 
stakeholder-driven nature of the initiative. The government has provided 
major support for local rice production through the irrigation authority 
(SAED), as have development partners, but more civil society leadership 
is needed to address underlying policy contradictions. 
(e) Côte d’Ivoire cocoa: this country witnessed various attempts to increase 
the role of cooperatives and SMEs in cocoa marketing, including the 
Coffee & Cocoa Coop Guarantee Fund (FGCCC), and making use of 
collateral management services. There has been little lasting impact due 
in large part to management shortcomings and an official reluctance to 
disqualify non-performing coops, some of which were fake entities (see 
Section 4.6.1). 
(f) Côte d’Ivoire public warehousing: the current initiative seems to have 
a fair chance of success, given the large potential scale of operations, 
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the involvement of a range of stakeholders with a lot of experience with 
CMAs and the support of IFC which has a long-term commitment.
(g) Ghana: with GGC, private stakeholders have set standards for warehouses, 
management and grains at the level of community and aggregator 
warehouses; they have established a regulated WRS for domestically 
staples. The scheme has significant challenges, but it should be able to 
make good and provide a sounding board and potential partner to new 
initiatives, like the establishment of a commodity exchange. 
(h) Mozambique: The government has established BMM, built a chain of 
silos, and caused a WR law to be drafted, but there is scant private sector 
involvement in this process, and BMM lacks a business model or technical 
capability. The country study expresses the situation as follows: Unless 
there is an effective scheme to cede silo space to highly competent 
private operators, plus the capability to effectively regulate their use, 
there is a major risk that the silos of the BMM will be poorly managed 
and underutilised. BMM and the proposed WRS seem to be part of push 
for greater official influence over markets for agricultural staples.
(i) Uganda: Progress is poor with the regulated public warehousing system 
for maize. One very favourable feature is the government’s liberal policy 
towards trade and exports of staple foods, in contrast with most countries 
of Eastern and Southern Africa which frequently intervene in markets in 
a way that sometimes discourages those engaged in seasonal storage. 
However, the initiative has suffered from a lack of scale economies, a 
lack of shared vision among domestic international promoters. and little 
involvement of larger-scale private stakeholders. 
In conclusion, scale factors are vital to the success of all kinds of WR/CM 
initiatives. In the case of Type B and C operations, it is because of the high 
fixed costs of operating/collaterally managing warehouses, added to which 
regulatory frameworks may result in additional costs. Type A warehouses have 
low overheads, and providing they can access a financier, can be run on a much 
smaller scale in rural communities. However, given the high expenditure on 
promoting the tool, its promotion can only be economically justified if there 
are prospects for sustained adoption by large numbers of communities.
(a) Economic factors, including both demand and scalability, are fundamental 
to the success of warehousing and collateral management initiatives. 
The promoter’s unwillingness or inability to deal with them up-front 
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sometimes leads to difficulties at later stages. This was the case with the 
regulated WRS in Uganda, where there was a lack of clarity at the project 
design stage. Economic factors also adversely affected the rice pilot 
in the Senegal River valley, where the government had to deal with a 
long-standing political hot-potato, (i.e., the trade-off between supporting 
domestic production and of ensuring low-cost rice to a nearly 50% urban 
population which has become accustomed to well-graded broken rice 
which is a by-product of Asia’s massive rice industries). 
Other key success factors are found to be: 
(a) the vision and leadership of promoters, be they private, governmental 
or foreign
(b) private sector involvement and initiative
(c) the scope to modify approaches in the light of experience
(d) the role of government, particularly whether it is supportive or otherwise. 
Addressing these latter factors is largely about process. When a project is first 
mooted, promoters may not share a coherent vision as to what it will achieve 
and how; there may be a lack of private sector involvement and drive; and 
government policies and actions may constrain the initiative. Under these 
circumstances, international funding and technical assistance agencies may 
need to provide patient long-term support, often for upwards of a decade, if 
they want to get results. 
One can already see elements of a programme approach with some agencies. 
For example, USAID and other players have provided long-term support to 
the Eastern African Grains Council. In the case of Ghana, USAID continued 
its support for grains market development under the Advance 1 project with 
an Advance 2 project (notwithstanding, there is sometimes discontinuity and 
memory loss when USAID tenders out new projects). In the case of the World 
Bank Group, both the World Bank and IFC now provide long-term thematic 
support for warehouse receipt systems and commodity exchanges around 
World. AFD’s long-term support for the CECAM network and the GCVs has also 
been alluded to above.
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7.3 Need to move to a programme approach/limitations 
of the project approach
Notwithstanding the trend towards a programme approach, donor activity is 
largely driven by the need to present results within the life of projects, which 
can sometimes be at the expense of long-term impact. IFAD reportedly has 
30 projects with warehouse receipts components, but there seems to be no 
thematic repository for this information upon which researchers and project 
planners can draw. The Senegal technical country study describes a Type A 
initiative, supported by Belgian-funded microfinance project and two NGOs, 
that was presented as a success story, but without evidence of sustainability 
beyond the end of the project.
The Burkina Faso case highlights the limitations of project-based approaches. 
Large donor-supported projects (PICOFA and PAPSA) have been helping 
grassroot POs implement community inventory credit using a decentralised 
approach, but without the support of higher level structures that would help 
them sort out problems (such as negotiation with MFIs, grain marketing, etc.) 
after the end of the project assistance. They have also been building and 
rehabilitating community warehouses, but only for the duration of the project. 
There is no arrangement whereby farmers can access funds to build such 
warehouses beyond the project horizon, and this makes the expansion of this 
activity dependent on donors and governments continuing to fund specific 
projects. 
7.4 Need for capacity building
The report has highlighted to build the capacity of stakeholders involved with 
WRS and collateral management in Africa – see Table 9. 









Banks already financing warehouse receipting and even 
establishing collateral management companies, but which 
still need to develop the sort of internal management and 
marketing monitoring framework they will need to grow their 
lending portfolio in this area.
4.4
4.5
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CNCAS in need of capacity building in warehouse receipt 
financing. Case of FEPROMAS underlines need for proper 




Asusu and Coopec-Kokari, which have stepped up to the 
opportunity of financing in remote rural villages, with the 




Nationwide mutual microfinance networks which could possibly 





Newly established collateral management companies doing 
innovative work in rural areas, developing the structure of 
value chains and improving the position of small producers and 
SMEs within them, but they will need expert mentoring to help 
them expand and manage the risks involved.
4.6.4
Uganda
Need for training programs to expose banks and rural based 
clients to WRS operations and to encourage exporters to 
develop and/or extend their supply chains to the rural suppliers 
which the banks can then support through CM-operated WRS.
4.6.5
Madagascar
An immediate need for training in commodity handling and for 
improvements in risk management. 
3.3
The approach of capacity building is discussed in the recommendations below. 
7.5 Sahelian countries are at a crossroads: Which way 
forward?
During recent decades, there have been many initiatives to develop markets 
from the bottom up through community-based and cooperative initiatives, 
often supported by mutual MFIs inspired by the European Raffeissen model, 
with results varying from success to abject failure. Opinions often vary as 
to the degree of success, for example with two of the best known peasant-
based agricultural marketing cooperatives, Faso Jigi in Mali and UGCPA-BM in 
Burkina Faso. Some hold them up as successes, but others, while recognising 
their achievements, question the cost-effectiveness of considerable donor 
funds invested in their development.41
41 Author’s comment based on multiple conversations with people involved with these 
initiatives.
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Burkina Faso presents an interesting case where three separate approaches 
can be observed:
(a) The warrantage c. model with small local warehouses and stocks held 
identity-preserved in the name of each farmer
(b) The development of service cooperatives (or other kinds of PO) including 
UGCPA and the FEPA-B, which have focused largely on procurement 
of inputs (sometimes involving barter for outputs) so as to intensify 
production, but are now seeking to develop a national marketing structure 
with warehouses that they will manage for the benefit of their members
(c) Recent innovation among banks and specialist service providers 
(collateral managers) seeking new lending opportunities in the 
development of agricultural value-chains.
Approaches (b) and (c) provide a transition from Type A financing to value 
chain financing which may involve Type B or Type C financing. Each has its 
respective strengths and weaknesses; there is considerable overlap between 
them; and it is by no means clear how far it is worth supporting one, as 
opposed to another. CMs are managing to provide services at a much lower 
scale in Burkina Faso than in other subject countries, but it remains to be seen 
how far this can be sustained. One could also consider the implementation 
of peer-based mutual guarantee schemes (MGS) which, building on French 
experience, would allow scheme members to access financing based on stock 
declarations. While one should not underestimate the challenges involved, 
the potential advantage of this approach is that, by doing away with the need 
for an independent collateral manager, it could work economically at a lower 
scale than Type B and C financing. MGS are discussed in Annex 4, suggesting 
that it might be implemented among service cooperatives and seed producers.
In such circumstances, the funding agencies should pursue a flexible learning-
based approach with a view towards identifying the best ways forward starting 
in Burkina Faso and this can inform their approach in other countries. Burkina 
Faso is a suitable place to do this given the generally favourable policy 
framework with respect to WR/CM and the consensus that has emerged 
between private stakeholders, government and certain donors (notably KFW) 
about the role of inventory credit and warehouse receipt systems in food 
security and development of agricultural value chains. This is taken up in the 
recommendations for Burkina Faso in Section 8.2.2.
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7.6 A caution against direct investments
Some donor and intergovernmental programmes have opted for investing 
directly in commodity exchanges and associated warehouse operations, but 
the authors would caution against this as it risks potential conflicts of interest 
with the last of the roles listed above (i.e., that of capitalising experiences and 
feeding them back into the public domain). We feel this has happened to some 
extent with the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) and warehouse receipt 
system model. It has been heavily promoted around Africa as a branded and 
replicable product and several governments are seeking to implement it or 
variations of it, including Mozambique (see technical country study), Ghana (see 
technical country study), Nigeria and Malawi. However, relatively little funds 
have been devoted to researching the experience and drawing out lessons 
from Ethiopia that could be useful to prospective adopters.42 In the case of 
the Ghana Commodity Exchange (GCX), more thought should be given to the 
specific needs of Ghana compared to Ethiopia where the model was conceived.
7.7 Key legal findings
The different legal ways of achieving a regulated system of public warehousing 
are discussed in detail in Section 5.5 of this report. Countries can follow a 
legislated approach, a voluntary approach, or what might be called a big 
bang approach, involving the establishment of a commodity exchange and 
linked warehouses based on the Ethiopia model. However, the authors would 
generally advocate a gradual approach led by local stakeholders seeking to 
improve the performance of the value chains in which they are involved, 
leading to proposals for legislation that take full account of the pros and cons. 
Countries should also be clear as to the scope of the legislation and the 
regulatory authority and they should avoid giving the authority a massive brief 
in terms of commodities and types of warehousing which it lacks the means 
to regulate. As was indicated in the legal study for Uganda (Volume III), such 
situations can place firms in a situation of legal ambiguity. 
Finding a competent and trusted regulatory authority may be not be an 
easy task and experience in from certain (non-subject) countries shows that 
the choice of the regulator can prove a subject of serious inter-ministerial 
infighting. While theoretically speaking, one would want to appoint the 
regulator shortly after legislating, it may in practice make more sense to 
42 The subject is discussed by Coulter (2013).
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initially pass the legislation providing for rights and obligations of parties and 
then subsequently appoint a regulator or regulators with a brief to regulate 
specific commodities. 
Where there is not the support or infrastructure for developing a regulated 
system, it is possible to consider making less drastic changes to the legal 
system to encourage commodity financing. Without legal intervention, it is 
not possible to provide for warehouse receipts to be recognised as negotiable 
documents of title. Therefore, the focus turns to the security regime and to 
taking steps to ensure creditors can easily take effective, enforceable security 
over stored commodity by other means. For example, removing financial 
impediments to taking security, such as stamp duty and registration fees, can 
encourage financiers to enter into secured financing arrangements.
It would be possible to further improve the security regime in many of the 
subject countries by improving the functionality of collateral registers. 
However, even if registers are operationally efficient, they are only useful if 
used in practice and if they serve as effective legal notice to all parties as to 
the existence of a security interest and give the holder the certainty of priority 
over any competing creditors. 
Alternatively, countries where registration of pledges is currently required 
could abolish this requirement by relying on the principle of pledge requiring 
possession of the secured goods. As only one party can have effective 
possession of goods at any one time, this should offer legal protection against 
third-party claims. This solution requires careful consideration of how to 
address the priority of competing security, including non-possessory security. 
Generally speaking, non-possessory security is subject to registration as the 
most effective method of evidencing security interests to third parties. A 
possessory (unregistered) pledge would need to remain subject to any pre-
existing registered non-possessory security. As such, the improvement of the 
functionality of registers remains an important consideration even where 
pledges do not require registration. The legal consultants in the OHADA region 
suggest that registration at the RCCM can take up to 60 days. Delays like this 
create an additional risk where competing security interests might be granted 
within a short period of time.
It would give greater confidence to financiers if this move went hand in hand with 
the effective regulation of warehouse operators and CMs, as a financier would 
need generally to rely on the constructive possession of those third parties.
P A R T  B  –  C H A P T E R  7
136 W A R E H O U S E  F I N A N C I N G  S T U D Y  -  V O L U M E  I
In the OHADA countries there are currently two methods of perfecting a 
pledge: taking possession or registration with the RCCM. In the latter case, 
registration gives access to a pledge form, a potentially useful tool for 
commodity financing. However, in practice, parties appear to avoid registration 
and opt for perfection through possession. 
As explained in Section 5.4.2, it may prove difficult to introduce legislation 
across the whole OHADA region since it requires unanimity. It might be best 
to start by introducing suitable national legislation in one or two individual 
countries and use this experience to frame legislation for the entire region. 
Given the economies of scale involved in regulating warehouses and the need 
to develop cross-border trade, a pan-regional approach makes sense in the 
long term. Given the existing scale of collateral management activity, the 
existing regulatory experience, the impetus to establish public warehousing, 
the positive approach of the government and broad stakeholder involvement, 
Côte d’Ivoire might be a good place to start. 
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We present the recommendation in three sections. Section 8.1 provides a 
strategic recommendation to the three client organisations, to establish a 
joint Agricultural Commodity Programme. Section 8.2 proposes near-term 
initiatives (low-hanging fruit) for immediate action. Section 8.3 proposes 
additional initiatives for the longer term. 
8.1 Establish an Agricultural Commodity Programme
The three funding agencies have worked together in commissioning this study. 
Our key recommendation is that they consider continuing this partnership 
through the establishment of a joint Agricultural Commodity Programme (the 
Programme), with a view to developing commodity-collateralised funding and 
related value-chain innovations in Africa. The functions of the Programme 
would be as follows:
(a) Independent analyses and backstopping for the funding agencies. It 
would interact thematically with each funding agency’s country offices 
and projects; it would provide independent analyses and backstopping for 
relevant project initiatives in the commodity marketing and financing area.
(b) Capacity building through training, mentoring, workshops and quality 
certification. The Programme would interact closely with the key players 
interested in warehouse receipt financing, notably banks and MFIs, CMs 
and POs, with the offer of workshops and training events – Table 9 shows 
some capacity-building initiatives suggested in other parts of this report. 
Readers seeking guidance and case study material for training banks 
should consult a manual which IFC commissioned for this purpose (see 
IFC Advisory Services, 2013).
Recommendations8
P A R T  B  –  C H A P T E R  8
138 W A R E H O U S E  F I N A N C I N G  S T U D Y  -  V O L U M E  I
(c) A challenge fund should be established to support initiatives in this area. 
Priorities should include building capacity of financial institutions and 
business development services to help some of the growing institutions 
develop management competencies and compliance structures in line 
with the roles to which they aspire. 
(d) Help collateral managers organise professionally, set standards and 
certify capacity. Fraud-related failures underline the need for an 
initiative along these lines. The Programme should be prepared to assist 
industry self-help in this regard, particularly CMs serving up-country and 
landlocked areas. 
(e) Develop and test a robust model, partially publically-funded, for 
supporting warehouse construction. The technical country reports 
repeatedly refer to the shortage of suitable warehouse infrastructure 
and grain handling equipment in the hands of POs, rural traders, CMs and 
professional warehouse operators. Given the shortage and often very 
high cost of term financing in Africa, this clearly poses a constraint to 
the development of agricultural markets. However, donors have a poor 
record in funding rural stores (and even large-scale silo facilities); they 
often remain idle or are grossly underutilised; it is simply not acceptable 
to go on repeating the same mistakes. Hence a priority should be the 
development and testing of a model (or models) designed to ensure a 
high level of utilisation, with a view to wider implementation. Findings 
suggest that Burkina Faso, Ghana, and/or Madagascar might be suitable 
test locations testing (see Box 6).
BOX 6: SUGGESTED FEATURES OF THE WAREHOUSE-FUNDING 
MODEL(S)
The process of developing the warehouse-funding model should 
involve a review of warehouse financing experiences (focusing on the 
more successful cases), consultation of relevant experts and a study 
of the situation on the ground in the countries where implementation 
is being considered. We cannot anticipate the outcome of this process, 
but want the following ideas to be considered.
We would like to see funds applied on a matching basis with mortgage 
financing from local banks, with the explicit objective of getting these 
more involved in terms of financing of such structures. Beneficiaries 
would be selected on the basis of simple criteria (e.g., the target 
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(f) Coordinate with international companies in the field. The Programme 
would reach out to important international players including banks, 
governments and trading companies, with a view toward identifying areas 
of common interest which can be advanced through new commodity 
financing and trading initiatives. Special attention should be paid to 
South African silo operators-cum-trading companies, such as AFGRI 
group, the experience of the promoter, internal management systems) 
and in a transparent manner. Some key principles would need to be 
established, for example that:
·	 the beneficiaries pay a substantial part of the capital and financing 
cost (e.g., 50%-60%), though this could be varied according to the 
purpose of the investment (e.g., local food security or marketing 
surplus production)
·	 the beneficiaries follow a set of public-interest oriented rules 
in using the warehouses, such as Ghana Grain Council (GGC) 
regulations for community and aggregator warehouses
·	 failure to repay or follow the agreed rules will carry a real penalty, 
including closure and/or sale of the facility
·	 upon fulfilment of the agreed terms, full title passes to the operator
·	 governance and management will be insulated from partisan 
political influence (government or opposition) in the countries 
concerned.
Establishing such a rigorous framework is no easy task, but it is a 
precondition to successful operation. Getting beneficiaries to pay a 
substantial part of the cost is a way of ensuring that the most serious 
and committed parties, capable of generating the necessary cash 
flow, receive the support. It also heeds the author of the Senegal 
technical country report in his caution against promoting dependency. 
With regard to the fourth bullet point, it is best to achieve clear 
ownership by a private individual or entity and to avoid the lack of 
clarity that sometimes occurs at the end of development projects, 
where ownership is vested in a governmental or local authority, 
but it is unclear who is entitled to operate it (circumstances where 
maintenance is likely to be neglected). IFAD-Madagascar informed 
the author of such cases where POs’ entitlement to continue using 
warehouses remained unclear.
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and SENWES, that are actively investing and trading in other African 
countries; and they have capabilities that the proposed programme 
and country governments should seek to leverage in order to get the 
WRS up and running (see Box 7). However, one has to ask whether such 
companies will be motivated to do this, or whether they will prefer to 
adopt a more proprietary business model than the one they provide to 
farmers in South Africa. In any case, host governments may be able to 
to arrive at a win-win arrangement favouring both the company and the 
country concerned through discussion and negotiation. 
BOX 7: REASONS FOR LEVERAGING THE SKILLS OF 
INTERNATIONAL GRAIN COMPANIES
AFGRI has, for example, been established for several years in Zambia 
and it has been working with others to establish the WRS and a Lusaka-
based SAFEX contract for maize. It has also been working with the 
international group AFEX to establish storage facilities and commodity 
exchanges in Rwanda and Nigeria. It has also formed a collateral 
management subsidiary, Collateral Management International (CMI) 
which has started to do business around Africa. International grain 
companies like AFGRI (or indeed Cargill) have much greater skills 
in grain handling than do conventional CMs and providing full out-
turn guarantees in terms of quantity and quality should not pose a 
challenge to them. They also have a lot of experience running pubic 
warehouses in their countries of origin. If companies of this kind 
invest in African countries, they can (if they wish) use their knowledge 
and resources to single-handedly pilot public warehousing on a large 
scale, demonstrating its virtues to the banks and other stakeholders.
(g) Coordinate with other international programmes. The programme should 
attract and coordinate with other international development programmes 
with a view to ensuring that the whole is more than the sum of the parts 
and achieves greater impact. One area of particular opportunity is that 
of enhancing coordination between two arms of donor support to African 
countries that is, agricultural market development activities such as 
those presented in this report and local and regional procurement (LRP) 
of food aid commodities. WFP annually buys many hundreds of thousands 
of tons of commodities across Africa; it has been trying to procure from 
POs and others using a range of novel devices (including warehouse 
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BOX 8: LRP AND WRS – SCOPE FOR A WIN-WIN RELATIONSHIP 
The aim should be to establish a delivery-versus-payment (DVP) 
system, whereby WFP pays a supplier, as soon as this party transfers to 
WFP a warehouse receipt issued by the licensed warehouse operator 
for the goods concerned. WFP can take delivery of the goods at a 
later time, and it will hold the warehouse operator (not the supplier) 
responsible for delivering goods of quantity and quality specified in 
the warehouse receipt.
Prospective gains for the WRS stakeholders: in countries where WFP 
purchases or seeks to purchase large quantities of food commodities, 
in the tens of thousands of tons, LRP can provide major demand and 
help kick-start the WRS as well as associated commodity exchanges, 
particularly in the early stages when these institutions are most 
fragile and in most need of support. Comments by farmers in an IFC-
sponsored WRS conference in Malawi in February 2014 showed that if 
WFP can assure suppliers get paid immediately, it will greatly motivate 
their participation in the WRS.
Prospective gains for WFP and the food aid system:
·	 Reduction in costly defaults on the part of suppliers, a problem 
WFP has encountered with all kinds of suppliers, and particularly 
when trying to procure directly from smallholders. Problems of this 
kind upset the food aid pipeline and increase overheads at WFP.
·	 Strict enforcement of WFP’s quality standards and reduction of 
quality control costs. The Uganda report (Section 5.2, in Volume II) 
shows that WFP has since 2013 been strictly enforcing its quality 
standards in East Africa. It is possible to achieve this if WFP relies 
receipts and commodity exchanges) in some 15 African countries under 
its Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot. In certain countries (Malawi and 
Zambia) there has been very fruitful collaboration between local WFP 
staff and local commodity exchange and WRS initiatives, but much more 
could be achieved through higher level strategic collaboration, and by 
harmonising operational procedures. As set out in Box 8, there is scope 
for a major win-win relationship in this field. There is an opportunity to 
pilot this in Malawi (not a study country); and the authors recommend 
accordingly in Section 8.2.7. There may be scope in other countries 
including Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, pending thorough reform of the 
regulated WRS in the case of latter country.
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(h) Support specific country initiatives. See Sections 8.2 and 8.3 below. 
(i) To capitalise experiences and to feed them back into the public domain. 
The aim would be to accelerate learning about what works best in 
practice and about the pros and cons of different approaches.
The Programme should have its own governance, staff, budget and a set of 
rules and operating procedures that will allow it to focus on the subject area 
long-term, with the ability to launch, review and curtail initiatives. These 
features should allow it to assist and monitor local initiatives around the 
continent, flexibly and as opportunity presents, without the constraints of 
project funding.
on an effective network of certified warehouses and holds them 
responsible for quality control. At the same time, WFP can save 
on costs of superintendents, using them more sparingly on a spot 
checking basis rather than have them check every shipment.
·	 Increased logistical efficiency. With the DVP arrangement, 
WFP can hold commodities it has purchased in the supplying 
warehouses, paying storage charges up to the time of delivery, 
and ship them directly to final distribution points. In this way it 
can avoid roundabout routes through its own warehouses. Indeed, 
if a country can develop a robust regulated WRS, it can consider 
outsourcing its entire warehousing operations and save on 
unnecessary expenditure.
·	 Opening up procurement to a wider range of suppliers than is 
possible with conventional competitive tenders. Anyone, including a 
PO and small trader, may deposit in a certified public warehouse. 
·	 Development of an innovative and socially responsible procurement 
approach that can be replicated by other public sector bodies 
around Africa, notably food reserve agencies. Available storage 
facilities can be used much more efficiently if public and private 
sector stocks can be held side by side, or even commingled, in 
licensed warehouses.
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8.2 Near-term initiatives/low-hanging fruit
8.2.1 Madagascar
Madagascar’s achievements with the GCV model are impressive, but there 
is an urgent need to improve price risk management and ensure confidence 
among depositors and financiers. The funding agencies should approach the 
Malagasy MFIs and key banks involved in refinancing GCV lending, with a view 
to establishing a support programme involving: (1) improvements in price-
risk management; (2) development of a national warehousing profession and 
regulatory structure; (3) improving post-harvest handling and funding of 
commodities other than paddy and; (4) more supportive public policies with 
respect to rice marketing.
Given the prominence of the GCV product in the portfolios of leading MFIs, 
public financial oversight needs to focus on the product and the risks involved, 
not just on the lending institutions. With their track record to date, the MFIs 
could be prime movers in developing the warehousing profession and the 
regulatory structure, but to do this they will need to reach out to government, 
banks and other value-chain players. The regulatory structure should be 
designed to sustain itself through levies on licensed warehouse systems 
and internalise the cost of all due diligence and risk assessment so as not to 
depend on government budgetary allocations. 
Improvements to post-harvest handling should focus on commodities like 
maize, pulses, potatoes and dried cassava. The MFIs will need to come to grips 
with the post-harvest handling and storage issues which they have hitherto 
largely left to their borrower/depositors who lack the necessary technical 
knowledge. 
MFIs and agricultural sector players will also need strong advocacy with 
respect to rice marketing policy, so as to prevent sudden changes in import 
policies that cause producers using GGVs to lose money, as happened in 2013. 
Coupled to the development of regulatory, risk management, and advocacy 
functions, AFD should examine the scope for gradually phasing out its 
portfolio guarantees, as these should not be necessary with a low-risk and 
well-regulated lending product.
8.2.2 Burkina Faso 
Section 7.5 outlines the case for focusing on Burkina Faso with a learning-
based approach. This should start with an in-depth multi-disciplinary study to 
assess the potential, limits and complementarity of the two market-oriented 
P A R T  B  –  C H A P T E R  8
144 W A R E H O U S E  F I N A N C I N G  S T U D Y  -  V O L U M E  I
approaches (i.e., development of service coops and innovation led by banks 
and service providers), and to plan assistance accordingly. Questions of the 
following kind need to be answered:
(a) The performance of service coops (or similar POs), in terms of 
governance; management and accounts; accountability to members; and 
ability to market crops, generate profits and further motivate members.
(b) The operations and performance of collateral managers and associated 
financiers under Burkinabé conditions, covering services, management 
structures and financial viability with different types and scales of 
operation.
(c) The risks associated with (a) and (b) above and players’ ability to manage 
risks (e.g., by mutualisation of risks within cooperative structures), 
professional standards, compliance systems, insurance and other means. 
This should include an examination of the scope for peer-based mutual 
guarantee schemes (MGS) of the kind discussed in Annex 4.
The study should also examine the scope for improving grain storage and 
pest control practices, overcoming current misuse of insecticides as noted in 
Section 2.2 of the Burkina country report.
The study will involve deskwork, interviews with key informants and field visits 
during the storage period; and the output will be a set of recommendations 
which may include: technical assistance; expert mentoring of players; a 
challenge fund for capacity building/business development; schemes to 
develop and enforce professional standards; MGS; and a fund to support 
warehouse construction – see Section 8.1(g).
Taking account of the output of the forthcoming report commissioned by the 
Direction Générale des Impôts, consideration should also be given to new laws 
or legal amendments to support the development of inventory credit and 
collateral management and of inspection services in Burkina Faso. The funding 
agencies should seek a place at the table to discuss the propositions in the 
light of the work done in this study. The top priority should be to facilitate the 
emergence of a strong cadre of CMs, to minimise risks of non-performance, 
to provide for rapid sale of goods belonging to defaulting debtors by private 
treaty and rapid solution of disputes.
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8.2.3 Niger
Priority should be given to getting up-dated inventory of warrantage c. lending 
in Niger and more in-depth examination of selected cases (e.g., Taanadi and 
the Cigaba Union of Konkorido). The AP/SFD (the Association of Microfinance 
Institutions) and the ARSM (Microfinance Regulatory Agency) should be 
involved in the updating process and they should develop a simple monitoring 
tool that can be updated year after year. 
8.2.4 Ghana legal reform
As indicated in Section 7.7, it would give greater confidence to financiers if 
moves to abolish the requirement to register pledges of possessory collateral 
and/or to improve the functionality of collateral registers went hand-in-hand 
with the effective regulation of warehouse operators and CMs. As Ghana is in 
the process of passing a warehouse receipts regulation, such complementary 
reforms would be opportune at this time. Assistance should also focus on 
reducing the onerous stamp duty on secured transactions, introducing fast-
track enforcement and eliminating any legal uncertainties affecting the use 
of Repos. 
8.2.5 Côte d’Ivoire: support to the regulated WRS and legal reform 
Côte d’Ivoire is moving to implement a regulated WRS with considerable 
support of the government and stakeholders. Notwithstanding the support that 
IFC is already providing, it is recommended that the funding agencies make a 
special approach to the banking sector, government and other stakeholders to 
scope out potential for support. The focus should be very firmly on the banks 
as their participation will be key to the success of this initiative.
As in Ghana, it is proposed to accompany the planned regulatory reform 
with reform of the collateral registry and enforcement systems. The Côte 
d’Ivoire country report in Volume II indicates that financiers seeking to use the 
collateral registry (RCCM) are having considerable problems in terms of both 
its design and operation. At the same time, Côte d’Ivoire should be a testing 
ground for reforms throughout the OHADA region.
8.2.6 Mozambique: implement pilot and engage on drafting of the 
WRS Act
The recently founded WRS working group should seek to implement the pilot it 
identified during the study and the funding agencies should offer backstopping 
support.
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The drafting of a new WRS law can provide the opportunity to engage the 
government seriously about the legal and institutional framework for different 
kinds of warehouse receipting in Mozambique, including CMAs and SMAs. The 
following points, most of which were raised in the legal country study, should 
be placed on the agenda:
(a) cut down on onerous formalities, such as the need to notarise documents
(b) address the legal difficulties in taking security over commingled fungible 
goods
(c) design an alternative dispute resolution process to avoid a lengthy and 
costly court process
(d) create a reliable, searchable electronic collateral register, with a legal 
obligation to register security
(e) eliminate the administrative and financial burden (stamp duty) involved 
in reconstituting a pledge each time deliveries of goods are made
(f) define the rights and duties of parties to a warehousing contract and the 
negotiability of warehouse receipts
(g) provision for the possibility of electronic documentation.
8.2.7 Pilot enhanced coordination with LRP of food aid  
commodities 
We provided the rationale for this in Section 8.2, item (d), and suggested 
Malawi for piloting. It is recommended to seek high level support for the 
idea within WFP and donors which fund both WFP and market development 
activities of the kind discussed in this report. 
8.3 Further initiatives 
The country reports contain many proposals for support and some of them are 
highlighted below. This is by no means exclusive. Indeed, the key advantage 
of establishing the Commodity Programme would be its ability to identify and 
follow up on opportunities as it progresses.
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8.3.1 Warrantage c. in West Africa (especially Niger and  
Burkina Faso)
The Burkinabé government is committed to increasing the use of warrantage 
c. and other forms of warehouse receipting, but the Nigerien government 
seems to be less committed. If the funding agencies and governments decide 
to work together, they will require long-term engagement (i.e., a decade or 
so) with a view to extending it both horizontally (i.e., to a larger number 
of communities) and vertically (i.e., downstream, involving more complex 
cooperative structures, collateral managers, and/or public warehousing). The 
following activities should be prioritised:
(a) Developing national strategies embracing both warrantage c. and 
related approaches (collateral management and public warehousing); 
this should provide the basis for coordination between the players and 
the harmonisation of public sector interventions. It is important to avoid 
interventions that increase speculative risks faced by private players.
(b) Long-term institutional commitment (going beyond the duration of 
standard projects), but also a willingness to pull out or change tack if it 
is not producing results and/or the policy framework is not supportive.
(c) An up-dated inventory of warrantage c. lending in Niger and selected 
case studies (see 8.2.3 above). 
(d) Greater coordination between donors and development projects over 
the building of storage infrastructure, moving from the current project 
approach to a global approach – along the lines proposed in Section 
8.1(g). 
(e) Support for building capacity of the players (MFIs, CMs and POs) involved 
in development of local markets; this may take the form of another 
Projet Intrants type project, and/or a challenge fund approach where the 
targeted institution is free to choose the trainer or consultant concerned. 
(f) Simple legislative reform in support of the warehouse lending, notably 
to allow lenders to enforce their claims against defaulting debtors, by 
selling the stock by private treaty.
8.3.2 Ghana
The funding agencies should seek to work in concert with the USAID-ADVANCE 
project which is providing core support to GGC. The present high interest rates 
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seriously depress interest in warehouse receipts as a funding mechanism for 
maize; so more emphasis should be placed on their use in developing supply 
chains. On the one hand, they can serve as collateral against which buyers can 
provide credit to their rural suppliers; this will allow the buyers to push more 
financing out through their supply network, creating more demand for goods 
at the farm gate. On the other hand, suppliers can also use warehouse receipts 
as a means to transfer title to downstream buyers.
Ghana may be a good country to test the proposed warehouse funding model 
set out in Section 8.1(g). The Chairman of the GGC places a high priority 
on the building of such warehouses and the GGC can provide a rule-based 
structure for selecting beneficiaries and holding them to account. However, it 
is first recommended taking a close look at the functioning and performance 
of warehouse construction schemes already funded in northern Ghana by 
AGRA, USAID and others and find out what GGC has done to address corporate 
governance issues mentioned in Section 5.3.2. 
The funding agencies should also closely examine the Weinco contract-
farming regime. It constitutes an important breakthrough in the development 
of peasant agriculture, the issues and implications of which need to be fully 
understood by those seeking to develop agricultural markets in Africa. 
8.3.3 Cameroon
There have been some warehousing and inventory credit initiatives in northern 
and other non-cocoa areas of Cameroon; these include:
(a) a scheme for grains and agricultural inputs in northern Cameroon 
involving members of the cotton producers association (APCC), the 
MFI Crédit du Sahel, the cotton parastatal SODECOTON; and the Islamic 
Development Bank (as financier)
(b) the government and IFAD-backed PADMIR project which is specifically 
concerned with microfinance.
We recommend a mission to review exactly what has been done in this field 
and appraise the need and scope for additional work.
We also propose periodically monitoring progress with ONCC’s revolving 
line of credit to assist POs with the marketing of cocoa and coffee using 




The main recommendation in the case of Uganda is to build on WFP’s newfound 
determination to enforce grain quality standards in Eastern Africa; and for 
governments and other stakeholders to act in a coordinated fashion to ensure 
uniformity of testing procedures, standards and their application. Secondly, 
the government of Uganda needs to decide if it wants to see a continuation of 
the regulated WRS in that country and under what terms. In the authors’ view, 
the following principles are vital to its success:
(a) The near-term aim should be massive and regulatorily compliant adoption 
of the system, rather than impact on particular groups (small farmers, 
cooperatives, etc.), though these are clearly the ultimate beneficiaries. 
(b) There should be a convincing strategy for building scale on the demand 
and the supply side and thereby UCE’s financial autonomy.
(c) Regulatory compliance should be strict and and not de-emphasised with 
a view to achieving promotional targets.
(d) Selling should be streamlined, so as to minimise the transaction cycle. 
(e) UCE should be reformed, with a new ownership structure, governance 
and management, and with a fresh injection of capital.
If there could be a genuine meeting of minds on these points, the funding 
agencies may wish to offer some support.
8.3.5 Senegal
Most government and donor interest has been directed towards the use of 
WR/CM for rice in the Senegal River Valley (see Volume II, Senegal country 
report, Section 3.3) in supplying a domestic rice market of circa 1.3 million t, 
which mainly depends on imports from South Asia. Much has been achieved 
in organising the domestic supply chain and making the product more 
competitive with imports. Notwithstanding, the political issue of urban rice 
prices is making it difficult to bring this initiative to fruition. The priority is 
therefore for the government to define a robust policy and implementation 
framework that will allow people to continue profitably producing rice for the 
domestic market, obtaining better livelihoods than with alternative crops. 
The maize marketing initiative in Kaolack region (see Section 3.2 of the 
same report) faces a similar problem, in that it targets a major coastal 
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market (Dakar) with demand upwards of 100,000 t per annum, but which has 
excellent transport links to the World market. Rigorous economic analysis 
(with sensitivity analysis) should be carried out to determine if and under what 
circumstances it is profitable for farmers to supply the Dakar and as a basis 
for supporting this initiative.
The funding agencies should examine the potential for getting seed producers 
to institute a mutual guarantee scheme that will allow them to gain speedy 
access to funding against inventories (see Annex 4). 
The funding agencies may wish to coordinate with IFC, which is already 
working with the Ministry of Trade to develop warehouse receipting in Senegal.
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Study on appropriate warehousing and collateral management systems to 
promote access to finance through warehouse receipt finance (and other 
forms of asset-based finance) in favour of smallholder farmers in sub-
Saharan Africa
1. Background
Securing access to finance for smallholder farmers is a major challenge to address 
as part of collective efforts from the international community to achieve food 
security and fight poverty. More than 8 billion dollars of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) were dedicated to agriculture in 201043 and for many years 
support from multilateral and bilateral donors to agriculture has included projects 
and programmes with this goal. However, despite such support, the magnitude of 
demand for financing arising from the world’s 500 million smallholder farmers44 
(i.e., 2 billion people) calls for a change of scale which involves an increased 
participation from the private sector and commercial banks.
Various studies carried out by development institutions highlight the key 
role of value chain finance in agriculture, more specifically targeted at 
smallholder farmers. Such studies also advocate a wider use of physical asset 
collaterisation like warehouse receipt financing, one of the most appropriate 
tools available to create access to finance for such categories of farmers. 
Warehouse receipt financing is a loan extended by a bank (or microfinance 
institution) which is secured by a collateral created on a crop stored by a 
farmer in a warehouse operated by a third party or by a representative group 
of farmers collectively. The debt is represented by a specific instrument, a 
43 Source: OECD.
44 Source: “Investing in smallholder agriculture for food security” A report by the High Level 
Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, June 2013.
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warehouse receipt or warrant. Warehouse receipt financing enables farmers to 
access credit as they are in a position to offer lenders an asset which is safe, 
liquid and easy to monitor as a guarantee for the repayment of their loan. 
Thanks to warehousing, farmers do not need to sell their crop immediately 
after harvest and can increase their income if they manage to take advantage 
of price increases over time. When putting their 
efforts and resources together for storage and 
marketing of their crops, small farmers can 
reach a critical mass and therefore benefit from 
economies of scale and more bargaining power 
when negotiating with traders. Storage also 
helps reduce post-harvest losses. In addition, 
it involves a grading and certification process 
which adds value to productions and creates an 
incentive to produce quality. Standardisation 
improves fungibility of products which is 
necessary to access commodity exchanges and introduces a more competitive 
and transparent commercial process. 
Warehouse receipt financing also involves risks and limits which have hindered 
a wider development of such financing instrument. One of the main limits is 
the fact that, in most cases, warehouse receipt finance becomes available 
only after harvest. Financing of inputs and other investments is possible only 
if the financier structures proper value chain financing with various controls 
during the productive cycle (from inputs to transport to raw and processed 
commodities). Moreover, the cost of storage and financing, as well as insurance 
costs, may appear a deterrent to smallholders when compared to potential 
financial gains to be made on the sale of their crops. This cost issue is even more 
critical when crop volumes are too limited to accommodate transaction costs.
Risks associated to warehouse receipt financing mainly consist of risks 
associated with a decrease in prices during the period of storage and fraud 
or theft. Besides, the reliability of warehousing infrastructure and the 
professionalism of warehouse operators appear critical prerequisites for 
the development of warehouse receipt financing in a country. In addition, 
the introduction of an appropriate institutional framework for licensing and 
monitoring of warehouse operators can contribute to the creation of an 
enabling environment and help promote warehouse receipt financing.
Although warehouse receipt financing has now a good track record in a number 
of countries, it has not succeeded yet to mobilise financing commensurate with 
Warehouse receipt 
financing enables 
farmers to access credit 
as they are in a position 
to offer lenders an asset 
which is safe, liquid 
and easy to monitor 
as a guarantee for the 
repayment of their loan
157
the needs of smallholder farmers in Africa. Nor has it succeeded in channelling 
sizeable volumes of local agricultural production toward this storage and 
marketing approach. 
Based on this assessment, a report prepared by the International Finance 
Corporation for the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) in 201145 
highlights a series of recommendations to unleash the potential of warehouse 
receipt financing in developing countries. They include: 
·	 The setting up of appropriate institutional, legal and regulatory 
environment(s)
·	 The use of grades and standards to classify agricultural products and make 
them more tradable
·	 The enhancement of financial, technical and administrative capabilities of 
warehouse operators or entities in charge of warehousing in a country with 
a review of the way this business is organised and the introduction of an 
effective licensing and monitoring system
·	 An improvement of price risk management
·	 The establishment of indemnity fund(s) against potential fraud/theft or 
negligence from warehouse operators or against calamities. 
Different initiatives have already been launched to promote warehouse receipt 
financing, particularly within the Agricultural and Rural Finance working group 
of Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A)46, a partnership supported by 
several donors including the Agence Française de Développement and IFAD. 
The present study intends to further examine certain areas of concerns already 
identified in previous studies. It will focus on warehouse receipt operators and 
will review essential features of this business in specific countries and regions 
(including the regulatory environment, risk management, how this business is 
organised and supervised and the type of support required). 
In addition to warehouse receipt financing, the study will also examine other 
form of financing such as repurchase agreements (Repos) which could be 
45 “Scaling Up Access to Finance for Agricultural SMEs Policy Review and Recommendations”.
46 The MFW4A Partnership is a G8 initiative to support the development of Africa’s financial sector, 
overcome fragmentation and increase aid efficiency. Several donors and development partners 
have joined this initiative and more information is available at http://www.mfw4a.org/
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promoted if the conditions are met. Under 
a repurchase agreement, a buyer receives 
securities (warehouse receipts) as collateral and 
the seller agrees to repurchase the securities 
sold at a later date. Commodities are usually 
stored with accredited collateral (Repos) 
managers responsible for quality, grading 
and issuing receipts with agreed conditions 
for repurchase. When there is a commodity 
exchange, such receipts are often transferred 
to an exchange broker. Repurchase agreements provide a buy-back obligation 
on sales and are therefore employed by trading firms to obtain access to 
more and cheaper funding due to that security. Simpler modalities may exist. 
Examples are well documented in Latin America and Asia, but too little in sub-
Saharan Africa where opportunities to develop the potential of this financing 
tool are worth exploring.
2. Objective of the study 
The objective of this study is to foster the emergence of warehouse operators 
and entities in charge of warehousing (accredited collateral managers) in order 
to promote a wider use of financing based on physical asset collaterisation in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The study will focus on an analysis of the role of warehouse 
operators in connexion with warehouse receipt financing or repurchase 
agreements practices in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Niger, 
Senegal, Uganda, Mozambique and Cameroon. Such an analysis will comprise a 
legal and an institutional due diligence and will aim at: (i) identifying obstacles 
raised against the implementation of warehouse receipt financing by the 
warehousing system in place and (ii) making recommandations to support 
the efficient development of warehouse receipt financing and warehouse 
operators that can be operationalised in countries included in the scope of the 
study and possibly in member countries of the Treaty on the Harmonisation of 
Business Law in Africa (OHADA47,48).
47 OHADA counts 17 Member States in West and Central Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, 
Comores, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Central 
African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Chad, Togo. 
48 The OHADA Uniform Act has recently been reviewed concerning securities in order to 
facilitate access to finance. 
Repurchase 
agreements provide 
a buy-back obligation 
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3. Scope of the study 
3.1 Review of earlier and current studies, reports and experiences
The consultant will review projects, experiences and studies related to 
warehouse receipt financing and repurchase agreements, in particular ongoing 
projects from IFAD, USAID, FARMAF (funded by the EU) in countries covered 
by the study. 
The consultant will also review present and past experiences (including reasons 
for success and failure) concerning collateral management of agricultural 
products (local as well as imported products) and identify best practices. 
Meetings with stakeholders involved in agricultural imports (such as SGS, 
Veritas, etc.) and loans predicated on local produce can prove to be a useful 
source of information in that respect.
3.2 Review of Government policy and applicable laws and regulations in 
relation to warehouse receipt financing 
In each country, the consultant will examine the policy measures which might 
affect the development of warehouse receipt financing and assess whether the 
environment is an enabling one or not. 
In addition, the consultant will review, among others: 
·	 Relevant regulations in force (cooperatives, warrantage, collateral 
management, public warehousing, security, standards of agricultural 
products, etc.)
·	 The status of smallholders farmers49 and farmer organisations 
(“cooperatives or other forms of producer organisations”)
·	 The status of warehouse operators and other entities involved in storage 
of agricultural products (potential collateral managers)
·	 Financial solidarity mechanisms in place between producers within 
cooperatives (or other forms of producers organisations) or between 
warehouse operators, such as mutual guarantee systems
49 Legal status of “entreprenants” under OHADA for instance.
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·	 Contracts (including collateral management agreements) between 
stakeholders involved in warehouse receipt financing or repurchase 
agreements 
·	 Warehouse receipts or warrants, promissory notes, collaterals, bill of 
exchanges or any other form of documents related to stored agricultural 
products which can be traded, endorsed or discounted 
·	 The possibility of financiers’ taking a security interest in an existing or 
future agricultural production and conditions underlying the creation of 
such a security interest
·	 Record and registration of a security interest and (electronic) registries
·	 Eventual obstacles to the use of electronic warehouse receipts
·	 Conditions for the enforcement of a security interest created in favour of 
a financial institution by means of a warrant receipt related to agricultural 
products stored in a warehouse. More specifically, the consultant will 
examine the possibility for a financial institution to enforce such security 
interest without a court ruling
·	 Insurances of stored commodities and/or of loans in the event of the 
borrower’s death
·	 Support programs and approaches introduced to secure warehouse receipt 
financing and financing based on repurchase agreements (guarantee 
funds, refinancing, financing infrastructure, strengthening the capacity of 
operators, etc.).
Consultants are invited to add to this list any other matter they might consider 
relevant for the purpose of the review. In countries which are members of 
the Organizaton for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) 
relevant provisions of the OHADA Uniform Act (s) will also need to be taken 
into account for this review.
3.3 Review of the organisational and operational framework of warehouse 
operators (public or private entities, regional, national, local structures) and 
when the business of warehouse operators is not developed, review of the 
prevailing practices for storage of agricultural products. This review will involve:
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·	 Identifying the main stakeholders in a country (public or private, cooperatives, 
business organisations, regions, provinces or municipalities…) and the main 
characteristics of this sector (location/capacity, safety and robustness of 
storage infrastructure, type of productions stored in warehouse and benefiting 
from warehouse receipt financing). A relevant typology of warehouse receipt 
finance implemented in a country will be established.
·	 Describing the type of services offered by warehouse operators and potential 
accredited collateral managers (grading, classifying products at the time of 
storage, standardisation, bundling, secure storage facility, etc …) quality of 
services offered in terms of stock management and custody, cost of storage.
·	 Analysing the financial robustness of warehouse receipt operators, their 
capacity to invest and maintain storage infrastructure and how various 
stakeholders involved are organised and interact in a country.
·	 Examining whether warehouse receipt operators/collateral managers and 
farmers are insured and the type of cover available to them (risks insured, 
insurer and costs) more specifically concerning insurance of stored 
commodities and/or of loans in the event of the borrower’s death.
·	 Methods used for the valuation of agricultural products at the time of 
storage in a warehouse. 
·	 Analysing (i) contracts between farmers (or farmer organisations) and 
warehouse operators and (ii) contractual arrangements set up with 
banks and microfinance institutions for the purpose of warehouse receipt 
financing or financing based on repurchase agreements. Consultants will 
also study issues related to the responsibility of warehouse operators/
owner in the warehouse financing process and the possibility of legal 
action and indemnity in case of fraud and negligence. 
Specific feed-back on these matters will be sought from professional 
organisation in the agricultural sector involved in the storage of agricultural 
raw materials. 
3.4 Surveys of local banks, microfinance institutions and, as the case may 
be, non-bank lenders on their experience in warehouse receipt financing or 
financing based on repurchase agreements for agricultural products 
Surveys will focus on the following topics:
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·	 Their experience in terms of warehouse receipt financing and repurchase 
agreements: type of projects, average size of transactions, maturity and 
other terms of the loan, amount of the loan as compared to the valuation 
of the agricultural products stored in a warehouse and rationale for the 
determination of such amount. 
·	 Their risk perception for such transactions, transaction costs and 
profitability of such transactions.
·	 The volume of business of and relative to this, loss experience with 
warehouse receipt financing/repurchase agreements.
·	 Their expertise and resources mobilised in-house for this type of activity.
·	 The main obstacles and constraints they encounter.
·	 Their potential appetite and their views on the prerequisites for a greater 
involvement from their part in warehouse receipt financing/repurchase 
agreements as well as their needs in terms of support and incentives. 
3.5 Appraisal of the potential for warehouse receipt financing and 
repurchase agreements that could be developed in connection with the 
main agricultural productions in each country included in the scope of 
the study 
The initial analysis will focus on current warehouse receipt financing/
repurchase agreements practices in each country, which may include, without 
limitation and depending on each country’s specific context: paddy/rice, 
sorghum, millet and maize, cowpea, groundnuts, cashewnuts and cotton. 
Extension of warehouse receipt financing/repurchase agreements to other 
crops including, whenever relevant, processed perishable agricultural produce 
will also be considered as well as the possibility of warehouse receipt financing 
for livestock products will also be examined.
In relation with such appraisal, the study will also examine marketing 
approaches used for agricultural productions benefiting from warehouse 
receipt financing/repurchase agreements. This will include a review 
of market information systems used for monitoring prices and selling 
agricultural production. Technologies used as well as the involvement of 
various stakeholders in the process (smallholder farmers or cooperatives, 
warehouse owners/operators/collateral managers, microfinance institutions/
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banks, government bodies …) will be examined. The potential for marketing 
of agricultural products through commodity exchanges will also be examined.
3.6 Appraisal of economic and social costs and benefits of warehouse 
receipt financing 
In each country the consultant will:
·	 make an assessment of the impact of warehouse receipt financing and 
repurchase agreements on smallholder farmers’ revenues during the inter-
seasonal period
·	 study gender implications of warehouse receipt financing and repurchase 
agreements, including the degree of women’s involvement in the 
implementation of warehouse receipt financing/ repurchase agreements, 
women’s access to the benefits deriving from this practice and constraints 
to a broader inclusion of women in the overall process.
3.7 Recommendations expected from the present study will concern, 
among others:
·	 Amendment of national laws and regulations and if needed of the Treaty 
on the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) or of the OHADA 
Uniform Act(s). 
·	 Measures to be implemented and initiatives to be promoted concerning the 
organisation of warehouse operators/owners/collateral managers, which 
play a critical central role in warehouse receipt financing and repurchase 
agreements, in order to enhance their reliability, particularly in terms of 
legal and financial responsiblity towards different stakeholders involved 
in the process, farmers on one side and lenders on the other. This could 
include proposals concerning:
	■ Operators to be promoted in a country and models to be tested for 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in the warehousing business
	■ Organisations and structures to be introduced (for instance, the 
feasibility of financial solidarity mechanisms could be tested)
	■ Accreditation of socio-professional actors (feasibility, conditions and 
selection criteria)
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	■ The type of licensing, monitoring and regulation bodies that could be 
put in place
	■ Modalities for licensing (eligibility criteria and standards) and an 
appropriate legal environment
	■ Modalities for monitoring and regulation (including modalities of 
remuneration for monitoring and control)
	■ Types of insurance cover that could be provided  and modalities of 
insurance
	■ Proposed methodology for feasiblity studies for an indemnity fund 
against fraud and calamities
	■ Contractual arragements between the different stakeholders involved 
in warehouse receipt financing
	■ A relevant dispute resolution and arbitration mechanism
	■ Information systems or platform that might appear necessary
	■ Capacity building, technology transfer for the improvement of storage 
infrastructure and potential investment. 
·	 Approaches to be promoted to facilitate access to storage and warehouse 
receipt financing and repurchase agreements to smallholder producers.
·	 Institutional partners to be mobilised at a national level and their 
needs in terms of capacity building and training to ensure an efficient 
implementation of the recommended institutional and regulatory changes. 
Such institutional partners may include various ministries (Agriculture, 
Justice, Finance), professional organisations, chambers of commerce.
·	 Proposals for mechanisms to mitigate the main risks related to warehouse 
receipt financing and repurchase agreements (price fluctuations, risks 
during storage and risks of fraud/theft which might be based on stock 
management and valuation techniques).
·	 For each country included in the scope of the study (i) the identification 
of agricultural production from smallholder farmers likely to benefit to a 
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larger extent from warehouse receipt financing/repurchase agreements and 
(ii) the identification of appropriate incentives to promote a more active 
involvement of financial partners (local banks and microfinance institutions) 
interested in developing a warehouse receipt financing business.
·	 Recommendations for the greater involvement of women at different 
stages of warehousing and receipt financing/repurchase agreements and 
an improvement of women’ access to the benefits from warehouse receipt 
financing/repurchase agreements.
4. Methodology 
Consultants will review existing literature on the country and conduct 
interviews with stakeholders involved in warehouse receipt financing and 
repurchase agreements. They will also analyse relevant legal and regulatory 
texts and documents in connection with the different topics included in the 
scope of the study.
In each country included in the scope of the study, consultants will collect 
information about local warehouse receipt financing/repurchase agreements 
practices from concerned stakeholders: banks and microfinance institutions, 
non-bank lenders, warehouse receipt operators or warehouse owners, 
cooperatives and farmers organisations, professional organisations, ministries 
and relevant administrative bodies. Consultants will travel to such countries 
for the purpose of the study if they are not based locally.
Consultants’ work will be monitored by a Steering Committee comprising 
experts designated by the different institutions financing the present study. 
The Steering Committee will meet for a kick-off meeting and twice thereafter: 
(i) at the time of submission of the interim report and (ii) later at the time of 
submission of the final report. 
Consultants are invited to coordinate their work with other work undertaken on 
the same topic in each country included in the scope of the study (in particular 
with the initiatives supported by AGRA and the World Bank in Burkina Faso). 
5. Expected outcome and time frame  
An interim report concerning the review of applicable laws and regulations 
will be submitted within [90] days from the date of signature of the contract.
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A final report will be submitted within [150] days from the date of signature 
of the contract.
A final report, in the form of a main report and country profiles, including an 
executive summary, a table of contents, a list of references, a list of appendices 
and a list of acronyms will be submitted within [180] days from the date of 
signature of the contract.
A presentation50 of the main findings and recommendations of the study 
together with the participation of the consultants in the event organised for 
the occasion.
6. Budget and financing
The total budget for this study is capped at 150 000 , 50 000  per block. 
The study will be financed by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Technical 
Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU (CTA). Separate 
contracts will be signed with each institution based on the country profiles 
financed by each institution. Consequently, bidders are requested to submit 
proposals for each of the following blocks of countries: 
·	 Block 1: Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal
·	 Block 2: Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar
·	 Block 3: Cameroon, Mozambique, Uganda.
7. Qualifications 
Consultants are invited to form a multidisiplinary team including experts with 
legal expertise (in terms of business law and relevant national laws – OHADA in 
the case of West Africa), experts with a good experience of agricultural finance 
in Africa and warehouse receipt financing in particular as well as experts with 
competences in the field of warehousing and agricultural production funded 
through warehouse receipt financing. Experts should have a good fluency in 
French and Portuguese for the expert(s) working in Mozambique.
50 In form of a powerpoint presentation or another form to be further determined.
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1. Conclusions and themes from the legal due 
diligence
The legal due diligence covered a broad spectrum of applicable laws in each 
of the nine subject countries and it revealed broad differences in the legal 
systems of those countries. The subject countries include both civil and common 
law jurisdictions, with legal systems shaped by influences from anglophone, 
francophone, lusophone, and Islamic legal practice. Five of the subject countries 
are Member States of OHADA, resulting in strong similarities in the legal analysis 
between those countries, subject to some important local differences.
Each of the subject countries is at a different stage in relation to the 
introduction of specific laws and regulation relating to storage of commodity. 
Uganda is the only country of the nine which has passed WRS legislation, 
though draft legislation has been proposed in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and 
Mozambique. In Côte d’Ivoire, legislation also exists to regulate CMs. 
Overall, some key themes can be drawn from the legal due diligence as to 
commonly found barriers to the progression of commodity financing:
(a) Stamp duty liability. An important issue that applies to nearly all of the 
subject countries is the requirement to pay ad valorem stamp duty on 
security documents (with the exception of Uganda where pledges attract 
only nominal duty). This key barrier to financing could be removed by 
abolishing stamp duties and registration fees for security over goods in 
warehouses, particularly where financing is done through a warehouse 
receipts system. 
(b) Unsuitable requirements for taking security over stored goods. 
Generally speaking, security over stored goods in the subject countries 
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would be taken by way of a pledge (i.e., a possessory security). The minimum 
requirements for taking and perfecting a pledge vary. However, a written 
document is usually needed and there are sometimes onerous perfection 
requirements. The involved parties would benefit from the availability of 
more flexible means of granting security to financiers – for example, the 
ability to create an effective pledge over goods by delivery of a negotiable/
transferable warehouse receipt that evidences title to the goods.
(c) Lack of regulation of warehouse operators and CMs. In the majority 
of the subject countries there is little or no regulation of warehouses, 
warehouse operators, or CMs. As such, it would in principle be beneficial 
to implement systems to regulate warehouses and license warehouse 
operators and CMs. The potential effectiveness of regulatory structures 
in any country depends on the quality of governance and the financial 
viability of these structures will depend on scale economies and potential 
revenue sources, all subjects which promoters will need to consider. 
(d) Absence of negotiable warehouse receipts. With the exception of 
Uganda, warehouse receipts are not treated as negotiable instruments 
in the subject countries. The function of, and requirements for the form 
of, warehouse receipts vary between the subject countries. It would be 
beneficial to implement warehouse receipt systems to facilitate trading of 
goods within warehouses (without the need to move them), as well as the 
transfer of goods in and out of warehouses and for the taking of security 
over the stored goods. 
(e) Ineffectiveness of collateral registers. Another common theme from 
the legal due diligence is difficulties with the effectiveness of collateral 
registries. Where such registries exist, they are not always effective or 
reliable; and in some cases registering security can be time consuming. 
The situation could be improved by the introduction of electronic, or at 
least publically searchable, collateral registries for warehouse receipts. To 
be fully effective, such registries would need to allow instant registration 
of a financier’s interest in a warehouse receipt; it should be available for 
all relevant players to search and view (including, commodity owners, 
warehouse operators, CMs and financiers). Such registries would form 
part of a general eWRS register, whereby electronic warehouse receipts 
would be issued and negotiated.
(f) Difficulties for creditors in enforcing security over goods. A concern 
raised by the legal consultants in all the subject countries (with the 
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exception of Madagascar) is the extent of a secured financier’s rights to 
enforce a pledge over goods by private sale of those goods. Generally 
speaking, the legal due diligence revealed that parties must expressly 
provide for private sale in the security document (i.e., the pledge 
agreement between the borrower as pledgor and the financier as 
pledgee). Removing this obstacle by providing that secured creditors 
can enforce pledges over stored goods by private sale as a matter of law 
would assist financiers in avoiding potentially lengthy court enforcement 
procedures. However, excepting a case in Ghana, this legal issue was not 
reflected in the concerns raised by the technical due diligence, perhaps 
because financiers have so far not ventured much into Type C financing 
where they may be dealing with previously unknown borrowers and/or it 
is common practice to provide for the right of private sale in contractual 
documentation.
(g) Lengthy dispute resolution procedures. A common theme throughout 
the subject countries was the inefficiency of court enforcement 
procedures, which are often lengthy and potentially costly. Alternative 
dispute resolution processes exist. However, take up of these methods is 
not always high, and access to such procedures is inconsistent. Further, 
opting for alternative dispute resolution is not necessarily an effective 
way of avoiding court procedures as enforcement of, for example, arbitral 
awards may still involve resorting to court procedures. Peer-based 
alternative dispute resolution is a possibility for commercial disputes 
between buyers and sellers, but financiers are likely to be distrustful 
(as they will assume peer-based arbitrators are borrower-friendly). 
Financiers could be greatly assisted by providing access to effective and 
speedy dispute resolution procedures. This could include recourse to 
indemnity funds for financiers (and commodity depositors) where there 
is a warehouse operator or CM failure. 
2. Key legal elements for a regulated system of 
public warehouses
This section sets out some of the key legal elements of a regulated system of 
public warehouses. As discussed in the main body of the report, one of the 
key non-legal factors to be determined before implementing any such system 
is its scope, in other words, whether it will apply generally to agricultural 
commodities, or whether it will be implemented in respect of specific 
commodities only. 
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(a) The issue of warehouse receipts. The legal system should specify who 
can issue warehouse receipts and the format they must take, including 
requirements for the minimum information that receipts should contain. 
This information would typically include details of the commodity 
(including type and grade if applicable), the location of the commodity, 
applicable storage charges to be settled before the goods are released 
and notification of any security interests. 
(b) The status of warehouse receipts. The legal system should provide that 
a warehouse receipt is a document of title that is either negotiable or 
transferable51, meaning that rights to the underlying commodity can be 
transferred to third parties by transferring the warehouse receipt alone. 
The legal framework should provide for how warehouse receipts can 
be transferred and the legal rights obtained by a third-party transferee 
(including rights against the warehouse operator holding the goods and 
against third parties who may claim an interest in the goods). The system 
would provide the conditions for a warehouse receipt holder to retrieve 
the stored commodity, typically being presentation of the warehouse 
receipt and payment of any outstanding storage charges.
(c) Registration of warehouse receipts. Where a system provides for 
electronic receipts, the system should also include a central electronic 
register for the issuance and transference of receipts, accessible to all 
relevant parties, including financiers. Such a register would also allow for 
the registration of security interests against the receipts.
(d) Financing against warehouse receipts. Financing should involve 
lending against warehouse receipts or delivery of warehouse receipts as 
negotiable title documents. Where the financier wants to have security 
over the financed goods, the security regime will be relevant.
(e) Out-turn guarantee. The holder of a valid warehouse receipt must be 
clear as to what he is entitled to receive in terms of quantity and quality 
of produce. In the case of low-value and bulk commodities like grains, 
goods belonging to different depositors will usually be commingled by 
type and grade. The warehouse operator will need to guarantee delivery 
of quantity, type and grade of the commodity stated in the receipt (i.e., 
a full out-turn guarantee of quality) within a specified shelf-life or time 
limit. This is an important issue, because CMs do not include quality within 
51 See glossary for definition of these terms.
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the conventional out-turn guarantee. It is vital to ensure the transfer of 
warehouse receipts against unseen stock held in the warehouse; the 
buyer or financier must be able to count on receiving a certain quantity 
and quality as the grain is loaded out. Where goods are commingled, the 
system may allow for the like-for-like replacement of fungible goods. 
(f) In the case of higher value commodities and those subject to quality 
deterioration within the storage period, the warehouse operator may 
be held to less stringent out-turn commitments. In any case, high 
value commodities like cocoa are normally stored identity-preserved, 
as it is difficult to bulk different lots into an undifferentiated mass of 
homogeneous properties with very similar market value. 
(g) The recourse of a warehouse receipt holder if the warehouse 
operator fails to deliver back commodities according to its contractual 
commitments. This should additionally provide for a ranking for the 
order of claims in the event the warehouse operator fails to perform. For 
example, if the warehouse operator does not hold enough commodities 
to satisfy the claims of all warehouse receipt holders, the losses might be 
shared equally between all holders. Without this, the warehouse receipt 
holder would be left with only a contractual claim for damages against 
the warehouse operator, ranking with other unsecured creditors, which 
may not be attractive to financiers.
(h) Regulation of warehouses, warehouse operators and CMs. Such 
regulation would include setting criteria for the licensing of warehouses 
(including structural, financial and insurance requirements) and 
providing for legally-enforceable recourse for parties who suffer losses 
due to a warehouse failure. Effective regulation requires a regulatory 
body with monitoring and enforcement powers. The regulatory system 
must provide for sanctions against warehouse operators for failure to 
perform; these may include the revocation of licenses, exclusion from 
the system, intervention in or closure of the warehouse, blacklisting, 
fines and, for serious failures (such as fraud), criminal penalties. The 
regulator will also need the ability to intervene rapidly in, and take over 
the management of, failing warehouses so as to protect the interests 
of owners and financiers. This aspect of regulation will need to be 
reconciled with existing laws and practices concerning insolvency.
(i) Financial performance guarantees and indemnity funds. The system 
should provide for warehouse operators to provide performance 
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guarantees or to contribute to indemnity funds which give participants 
financial recourse in the event of performance failure.
(j) Offences of other participants. This would include, for example, 
penalties for a person depositing goods subject to a security interest 
and/or negotiating warehouse receipts representing goods subject to a 
security interest without declaring such interests.
(k) Ongoing regulation. In the context of a legislated system, for such 
a system to be sufficiently flexible to react to the development and 
changing needs of the market, any legislation implementing WRS should 
allow for the delegation of the determination of certain elements of the 
system to the relevant regulating authority. For example, the authority 
might have powers to determine the specific licensing criteria for 
warehouse operators.
3. Comparison of contractual approach with 
legislative reform
There are two different approaches to implementing a warehouse receipt 
system: a voluntary contractual approach (with a degree of reliance on the 
existing legal regime), or through legislative reform.
In some countries, the legal framework is sufficiently flexible for a successful 
warehouse receipt financing system to be created using contractual 
arrangements between the relevant parties. The table below considers some 
of the key legal concepts relating to warehouse financing; it compares how 
these can be addressed through private contractual arrangements or through 
legislative reform.
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Table 10: Goals and approaches
Legal issue/ 
goal
Achieving success through a 
contractual approach






A voluntary system will only be 
applicable to those who choose (or 
who are permitted) to join it. This 
type of system is likely to emerge 
in an already established industry 
with existing well-established 
participants (the case of South 
Africa with two companies having 
approximately 70% of total silo 
capacity). 
Legislative reform should limited 
to sectors of the industry at first. 
As observed in Uganda, a widely 
encompassing law that purports to 
apply to all types of warehousing 
but which the State does not have 
the capacity to implement might be 





For public warehousing to be 
truly public, any person who 
wants to store commodities 
meeting the criteria for storage 
must be permitted to do so. If 
this is provided by way of self-
regulation, it requires a degree of 
transparency from the warehouse 
operators. 
Legislated WRS could provide that 
any person who wants to store 
commodities meeting the criteria 




system are fit 
for purpose
Another issue is whether public warehouse operators can store their own 
commodities in the same facilities, issue warehouse receipts in respect 
of those commodities and trade those commodities. This report has 
provided evidence of both economic and business efficiency in favour of 
allowing warehouse operators to trade in the types of commodity they 
store for third parties, while at the same time highlighting the regulatory 




In theory, a self-regulating 
system could react more quickly 
to changes in the industry and 
market.
Changing laws is generally a slow 
process. Countries could side step 
the need to change laws by limiting 
legislation to the legal framework 
needed for WRS and then giving 
the applicable regulatory body 
discretionary powers to set and 
adapt the operational rules of the 
system.
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Legal issue/ 
goal
Achieving success through a 
contractual approach








Where no legislative regime exists, 
it is possible that Regulation can 
be achieved through voluntary 
membership of self-regulating 
organisations (e.g., Ghana 
Grains Council) with contractual 
enforcement and remedies. The 
success of such a regime will 
depend on political, economic 
and practical considerations. 
Regulation will need to be financed 
through levies on the members, 
though donors may fund on a 
temporary basis as they are 
currently doing in Ghana.
Legislative regimes can be used 
to regulate warehouses and 
operators. However, success will 
depend on political, economic and 
practical considerations, in view of 
which it will not be viable in some 
countries. A State-sanctioned 
regime might receive State funding 
(although this is not viable on a 
long-term basis) or permission 




A contractual system can provide 
for a full out-turn guarantee, in 
accordance with the rules of the 
system.
A legislated system can equally 
provide for a full out-turn 
guarantee, in accordance with the 





on failure of 
warehouse 
operator or CM
This could be achieved through 
self-regulation, where fees are 
collected from members to 
establish indemnity funds. The 
success of this would depend on 
the terms and scale of the scheme.
Legislation can provide for 
a regulator to take over the 
operation of failing warehouses 
and for indemnity funds, giving 
depositors and financiers the 
reassurance of State backing. The 
success of this would depend on 
the terms and scale of the scheme.
Sanctions 
for failure to 
perform
The sanctions under a voluntary 
system are likely to be limited 
to exclusion from the system, 
blacklisting and lawsuits.
A legislated system with a State-
backed regulator can potentially 
implement more stringent 
sanctions, including fines and, for 





Achieving success through a 
contractual approach
Achieving success through 
legislative reform






If local law does not recognise 
warehouse receipts as negotiable 
instruments, then delivery of the 
warehouse receipts to a buyer 
would not in itself be sufficient 
to deliver title. Contractual 
arrangements would be needed 
to effect the sale. This could 
be achieved by setting up an 
electronic registry, with users 
signing up to standard terms and 
conditions governing the rights 
attaching to warehouse receipts 
issued under them.
Legislative reform could provide 
that warehouse receipts are 
negotiable documents of 
title, meaning that a sale of 
the underlying commodities 
can be effected by delivery of 
the warehouse receipt. This 
mechanism is particularly useful in 
establishing commodity exchanges. 
However, this will only work where 
the buyer can have certainty that 
the underlying commodity exists 
and so such reform must usually be 
coupled with effective warehouse 
regulation, or the market will only 
accept as negotiable the WRs of a 
few multinationals and blue chip 
players. 
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Legal issue/ 
goal
Achieving success through a 
contractual approach






The system would need to provide 
for the rights obtained by the 
holder of a warehouse receipt, 
including a transferee. This would 
include rights against competing 
creditors and the warehouse 
operator, including in the case 
where a warehouse operator over-
issues receipts, meaning that there 
is not enough commodity available 
to meet all claims.
With the voluntary system there 
is the risk of claims from third 
parties outside of the system. For 
example, if a depositor grants 
security over commodity covered 
by a warehouse receipt to a third 
party. In this scenario, the rules of 
the voluntary system would not be 
binding on the third party creditor 
and the normally applicable rules 
of priority would apply. This could 
put a creditor who has financed on 
the back of a warehouse receipt at 
a disadvantage, as it may only have 
a contractual claim against the 
borrower rather than an effective 
security right.
In a legislated scheme, the risks 
set out in the left-hand box could 
be more easily eliminated, as the 
rights provided by the warehouse 






The system would need to provide 
for who can issue receipts and in 
what format (including whether 
physical or electronic). The system 
would need to provide for how the 
instruments can be transferred. 
As with a contractual system, the 
system would need to provide 
for who can issue receipts and in 
what format (including whether 
physical or electronic). The system 
would need to provide for how the 




Achieving success through a 
contractual approach
Achieving success through 
legislative reform







If local law does not recognise 
warehouse receipts as documents 
of title, then delivery of those 
receipts to the financier is 
unlikely to be sufficient to give 
rise to a possessory security. The 
warehouse receipts might still be 
useful to evidence control, but it is 
likely that the security would need 
to be separately documented. The 
success of this will depend on the 
relevant security laws.
Legislative reform could provide 
that warehouse receipts are 
documents of title, meaning that 
a pledge can be created over the 








If local law expressly prohibits this, 
it is unlikely that a contractual 
arrangement can be used to 
otherwise achieve this.
Legislative reform could 
specifically address issues 





Please see the box above rights 
obtained under warehouse receipts 
for a discussion of the concerns 
relating to claims of creditors 
outside the voluntary system.
The priority of competing creditors 







This could be achieved through a 
private organisation establishing 
a commodity exchange. This 
relies on the motivation of the 
participants to self-regulate. An 
effective grading system would be 
necessary. 
Legislative reform could establish 
an exchange, with a regulatory 
body to have oversight. Issues 
regarding motivation of the 
participants and the need for 




Where the law prescribes a certain 
procedure for enforcement (such 
as sale by public auction), it might 
be that the parties cannot contract 
out of such a procedure. If they can 
opt out contractually, the parties 
would need to ensure this was 
properly documented.
Legislative reform can provide 
for more effective enforcement 
procedures.
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Legal issue/ 
goal
Achieving success through a 
contractual approach








Where enforcement through the 
courts is a lengthy, expensive, or 
unpredictable process, it is possible 
that the parties could agree to 
alternative methods of dispute 
resolution, such as arbitration, 
mediation, or reference to industry 
body dispute resolution schemes 
(if any).
As part of the creation of a 
legislative regime for warehouse 
receipt financing, governments 
could consider creating alternative 
dispute resolution procedures, 
such as industry-specific 
arbitration, to promote the faster 
and cheaper settling of disputes.
3.1 Improving the prevailing legal environment to 
encourage existing commodity financing techniques 
to flourish
Where there is not the support or infrastructure for developing WRS, it 
is possible to consider making less drastic changes to the legal system to 
encourage commodity financing. Without legal intervention, it is not possible 
to provide for warehouse receipts to be recognised as negotiable documents 
of title. Therefore, the focus turns to the security regime and to taking steps 
to ensure creditors can easily take effective, enforceable security over stored 
commodity by other means.
For example, removing financial impediments to taking security, such as stamp 
duty and registration fees, can encourage financiers to enter into secured 
financing arrangements.
It would be possible to further improve the security regime in many of the 
subject countries by improving the functionality of collateral registers. 
However, even if registers are operationally efficient, they are only useful 
if used in practice and if they serve as effective legal notice to all parties as 
to the existence of a security interest. For example, by giving the holder of 
registered security the certainty of priority over any competing creditors. 
Alternatively, countries where registration of pledges is currently required 
could abolish this requirement by relying on the principle of pledge requiring 
possession of the secured goods. As only one party can have effective 
possession of goods at any one time, this should offer legal protection 
against third-party claims. This requires careful consideration of how to 
address the priority of competing security, including non-possessory security. 
Generally speaking, non-possessory security is subject to registration as 
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the most effective method of evidencing 
security interests to third parties. A possessory 
(unregistered) pledge would need to remain 
subject to any pre-existing registered non-
possessory security. As such, the improvement 
of the functionality of registers remains an 
important consideration even where pledges do 
not require registration. The legal consultants in the OHADA region suggest 
that registration at the RCCM can take up to 60 days. Delays like this create 
an additional risk where competing security interests might be granted within 
a short period of time.
To work in practice, this move would need to go hand in hand with regulation of 
warehouse operators and collateral managers, as a financier would generally 
rely on the constructive possession of those third parties.
In the OHADA countries there are currently two methods of perfecting a 
pledge: taking possession or registration with the RCCM. In the latter case, 
registration gives access to a pledge form, a potentially useful tool for 
commodity financing. However, in practice, parties appear to avoid registration 
and opt for perfection through possession. 
Addressing issues relating to dispute resolution
It is a common theme throughout the subject countries that dispute resolution 
through the courts is a slow process. While the legal due diligence uncovered 
information about the alternative dispute resolution techniques available in 
the subject countries, it is not clear that these are being used very much.
However, in most of the subject countries it is possible to avoid going to 
court to enforce security over commodity by relying on contractual self-help 
remedies (such as a contractual power of sale for the security holder). Reliance 
on such self-help remedies is preferable for financiers who will want to avoid 
having to resort to the courts where possible.
There are also other potential disputes that could arise in the course of a 
financing relationship (such as disputes regarding quality and, therefore, 
price). Peer-based alternative dispute resolution is a possibility for commercial 
disputes such as those between buyers and sellers. However, financiers are 
likely to be distrustful of this type of dispute resolution forum (as they will 
assume peer-based arbitrators are borrower-friendly).
The improvement 
of the functionality 
of registers remains an 
important consideration 
even where pledges do 
not require registration
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Whichever form of dispute resolution is chosen, it is important to try to achieve 
a situation where the underlying commodity can continue to flow through the 
supply chain while disputes are being resolved. 
3.2 Overview of key OHADA provisions 
This section has been written in conjunction with Bilé-Aka, Brizoua-Bi & 
Associés (Brizoua-Bi).
3.2.1 Background to OHADA law
OHADA stands for Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des 
Affaires (Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa). The 
OHADA treaty was signed at Port-Louis, Mauritius 17 October 1993 and entered 
into force 18 September 1995 (the Treaty). The Treaty was modified, amended 
and completed in Québec on 17 October 2008.
The objective of the Treaty is the harmonisation of business laws in the then 14 
and now 17 Member States by the elaboration and adoption of simple modern 
common rules adapted to their economies, by setting up appropriate judicial 
procedures and by encouraging arbitration for the settlement of contractual 
disputes.
The acts enacted for the adoption of common rules as provided for in Article 
1 of the OHADA treaty are known as Uniform Acts. 
To date, nine Uniform Acts have been adopted and, for some, revised. The 
Uniform Acts cover the following legal areas:
(a) general commercial law (entered into force 16 May 2011)
(b) commercial companies and the economic interest group (entered into 
force 5 May 2014)
(c) security interests (entered into force 16 May 2011)
(d) simplified recovery procedures and measures of execution (entered into 
force 10 July 1998)
(e) insolvency (entered into force 1 January 1999)
(f) arbitration (entered into force 11 June 1999)
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(g) accounting (entered into force 1 January 2001 and 1 January 2002)
(h) carriage of goods by road (entered into force 1 January 2004)
(i) cooperative companies (entered into force 16 May 2011).
Some of the Uniform Acts include provisions giving rise to criminal liabilities. 
Concerning these, the Member States may determine the corresponding 
criminal penalties as the Uniform Acts merely set out the offences.
3.2.2 The process for adopting Uniform Acts
The Uniform Acts are prepared by the permanent secretary office in 
consultation with the governments of the member states. They are debated 
and adopted by the Council of Ministers on consultation with the Common 
Court of Justice and Arbitration (Cour Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage) 
based in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Draft versions of the Uniform Acts are issued 
by the permanent secretary office to the governments of the Member States, 
who have ninety (90) days from the date of reception of the draft versions to 
submit their written observations to the permanent secretary office based in 
Yaoundé, Cameroon.
Considering the circumstances, including the complexity of the text to be 
adopted, such ninety-day (90) period may be extended for another ninety (90) 
days upon the permanent secretariat’s request. At the expiration of the period, 
including any extension, the permanent secretariat immediately forwards 
to the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration for its advice on the draft 
Uniform Act, together with the contracting parties’ comments and a report 
of the permanent secretariat. The court provides its advice within sixty (60) 
days after receipt of such request from the permanent secretariat. Upon the 
expiration of this last period, the permanent secretariat completes the final 
text of the draft Uniform Act and proposes it for inclusion in the agenda of the 
Council of Ministers’ next following meeting.
Adoption of the Uniform Acts by the Council of Ministers requires 
unanimous approval of the representatives of the Member States who are 
present and who have exercised their right to vote. For such adoption of 
the Uniform Acts to be valid, at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Member States 
shall be represented. Abstention does not delay adoption of the Uniform Acts.
Within sixty (60) days after their adoption, the permanent secretariat causes 
the Uniform Acts to be published in the Official Journal of OHADA. The Uniform 
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Acts become effective ninety (90) days after such publication, unless these 
Uniform Acts contain different preconditions to entry into force. 
The Uniform Acts are also published in the Member States, in their Official 
Journals or by any other appropriate means. This formality does not affect 
the Uniform Acts’ entry into force. 
3.2.3 Direct applicability of Uniform Acts
The Uniform Acts are directly applicable and overriding in the Member States, 
notwithstanding any conflict they may give rise to in respect of previous or 
subsequent enactment of the laws of the Member States.
3.2.4 Relevant provisions of the OHADA Uniforms Acts
The following section sets out some of the key provisions of the OHADA 
Uniform Acts relevant to commodity-financing which, in the absence of specific 
WRS legislation, provide the legal framework for carrying out warehouse 
financing in the OHADA countries.
The OHADA Uniform Act on Securities dated 15 December 2010 (the 
Securities Act)
The OHADA Securities Act largely addresses the legal requirements for 
taking security. In the absence of specific warehouse receipts legislation, the 
Securities Act provides a legal framework for conducting warehouse financing.
The Securities Act does not contain any restrictions on the types of entity 
that may grant security over goods; secured goods may be held directly by 
the financier or may be held by a third party (such as a warehouse operator or 
collateral manager) appointed by the borrower and the financier.
Some key provisions referred to the relevant country summaries are as follows:
(a) Taking security. It is possible to take security interests over a number of 
different assets, including security over tangible movable goods (Article 
92 et seq), security over receivables (Article 127 et seq) and security over 
bank accounts (Article 136 et seq). Security over tangible movable goods 
is taken by way of pledge (gage). 
(b) The pledge must be granted under the terms of a written pledge 
agreement between the grantor of the pledge and the beneficiary of the 
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pledge. The pledge agreement must specify the nature or kind of the 
secured goods, their quantity and the debt that the pledge is securing.
(c) Perfecting a pledge. A pledge agreement may be perfected (so that it is 
enforceable against third parties) by either:
(i) registration
(ii) delivery of the pledged goods to the creditor or an agreed third party 
(such as a collateral manager).
(d) Parties that opt for registration must register the agreement at the 
Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Mobilier (the RCCM) in paper or 
electronic form (Article 52). There is no mandatory timeframe for 
registering a pledge agreement with the RCCM, but priority of competing 
registered pledges will be determined by the order of registration. A 
registration fee must be paid to the RCCM when registering a pledge 
agreement. The fee payable varies.
(e) See paragraph 8 (procedure for registering security at the RCCM) below 
for more details on the registration process. 
(f) In practice, it appears that parties have a preference for a pledge 
that involves delivery of the goods to the secured creditor or (more 
commonly) a collateral manager under the terms of a tripartite collateral 
management agreement.
(g) This may be due to the fact that by taking possession of the secured 
goods (either actual or constructive) the creditor has better control of 
the goods. It should be noted that taking possession of the goods does 
not give the creditor ownership rights.
(h) However, in a scenario where a creditor does not take possession of 
the pledged goods (for example, a stock monitoring arrangement), 
registration of the pledge would be the only effective means of 
perfection.
(i) Insurance requirements in a non-possessory pledge over stocks agreement 
involving the issue of a bordereau de gage. Any pledge agreement between 
a financier and a borrower must provide details of the insurer that is 
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providing cover against risk of theft, fire and partial or complete damage 
of the pledged goods.
(j) Ranking of creditors in an insolvency. The Securities Act provides for 
the ranking of different creditors in the insolvency of a company (Article 
226). Priority is first given to meeting the expenses incurred in the sale 
and distribution of the company’s assets, followed by creditors of highly 
preferred wages and then secured creditors. For secured creditors, 
creditors with the first ranking perfected security have highest priority. 
Unsecured creditors have the lowest priority.
(k) The different ways of perfecting a pledge raise the issue of how priority 
is determined between two or more creditors who each have a pledge 
over the same goods. In such a scenario, the question of priority is to be 
determined on the basis of which pledge was perfected first. This would 
involve looking at whether possession of the goods in question was taken 
before the registration process was completed at the RCCM. This is also 
subject to the issue of whether the creditor taking the second pledge knew, 
or could reasonably have known, of the existence of the first pledge. If the 
second creditor did know, or should reasonably have known, of the existence 
of the first pledge, then the second pledge will rank behind the first.
(l) This issue of priority reflects the importance of conducting appropriate 
due diligence when taking security over goods in the OHADA countries, 
including checks with both the RCCM (as to whether there is any pre-
existing registered security) and checks with the pledgor as to the 
location of the goods, whose possession they are in, and whether there 
is any unregistered security over them.
The OHADA Uniform Act on the General Commercial Law adopted 15 
December 2010 and entered into force 16 May 2011 (the Commercial Act)
The OHADA Commercial Act contains provisions dealing with lease 
agreements and it permits a person to take a lease of land or premises for 
commercial, industrial, professional, or artisanal purposes. The provisions 
of the Commercial Act in relation to leases could be used to support field 
warehousing arrangements.
The Commercial Act (together with the OHADA Uniform Act on Companies 
Law) provide for certain requirements in relation to the registration of 
companies. 
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The OHADA Uniform Act on Cooperatives dated 10 December 2010 
(the Cooperatives Act)
Under the provisions of the OHADA Cooperative Act, cooperative societies have 
legal personality, are capable of entering into legal agreements (including loan 
agreements, sale and purchase agreements and security agreements) in their 
own name and have the power to sue and be sued in their own name. Under the 
Cooperatives Act, cooperatives have the power to undertake any activities that 
are in the best interests of its members. Further powers of a cooperative are set 
out in its constitutional document which is known as a statuts.
The Cooperatives Act requires that national cooperatives register with the 
cooperative registry established in their respective country.
The OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration dated 11 March 1999 (the 
Arbitration Act) 
The OHADA Arbitration Act provides for the resolution of disputes by 
arbitration and it applies to any arbitration proceedings in an OHADA Member 
States. The Act provides that arbitration is open to all persons with legal 
personality.
The Common Court of Justice and Arbitration is the principal arbitral body 
for OHADA; it is based in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Alternatively, OHADA Member 
States may establish local arbitration bodies.
3.2.5 Procedure for registering security at the RCCM
A pledge agreement must be registered at the RCCM in paper or electronic 
form. There is no mandatory timeframe for registering a pledge agreement 
with the RCCM.
A registration fee must be paid to the RCCM when registering a pledge 
agreement. The fee payable varies. In Côte d’Ivoire, the registration process 
is intended to take no more than 5 business days. However, registration can 
routinely take up to 60 days across the other OHADA countries.
Following registration of the pledge agreement, the RCCM will issue a 
document known as the bordereau de gage de stocks (the pledge form). This 
will specify details of the pledge, its registration date at the RCCM and the 
unique identification number assigned to it by the RCCM. 
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The pledge form serves as confirmation that the relevant pledge agreement 
has been successfully registered with the RCCM. It does not transfer ownership 
in the goods, and it is not a document of title.
The pledge form will be issued to the pledgor who is then responsible for 
endorsing the pledge form to the pledgee. The endorsement confers on the 
pledgee the quality and rights of a secured creditor. The pledgee may in turn 
subsequently endorse the pledge form to a third party who will then obtain the 
rights of a secured creditor in relation to the pledged goods. 
The pledge form is a potentially useful tool, allowing transfer of some rights in 
the underlying goods to third parties through endorsement. Development of 
this tool could potentially be used to support warehouse financing. However, 
in practice, it appears that most creditors will not obtain a pledge form as they 
do not opt for the route of perfection by registration. The issues around this 
would need to be addressed first.
3.2.6 Searching the RCCM register of security and the future of 
electronic registers
The RCCM maintains a register of all security registered with it that is publicly 
available. Any person wishing to search the register to see if any security has been 
registered over specific goods must submit an information request to the RCCM. 
The RCCM then has two days from receipt of the request to deliver a certificate 
stating whether any security has been registered over the goods concerned.
In the OHADA countries that are subject of this report, the RCCM register is 
not currently electronic. In practice, the RCCM registers are available only on 
submission of a request making it particularly difficult and sometimes time-
consuming to obtain information on a person.
The revised Commercial Act, adopted by the Council of Ministers 15 December 
2010 and entered into force 16 May 2011, provides for the set-up in each 
contracting State of an electronic national file. Each contracting State is 
to designate the body responsible for maintaining the national file and the 
information contained in the forms submitted to the national file will be 
treated as public information.
To all requests for information made to the national file, the clerk or the head 
of the competent organ in the contracting State shall respond immediately or 
at the latest within forty-eight (48) hours of receipt of the request. The request 
may be made and the corresponding response sent by electronic means.
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The national file includes, among others, an alphabetical list of natural and 
legal persons concerned by the form and dossier relating to the registration of 
collateral securities and leasing as well as statements of mortgages. It states 
any security interest registered against a person indicating the related data, 
all in alphabetical order.
With regard to Côte d’Ivoire, for example, this file is being set up at the 
commercial court of Abidjan and shall be operational soon.
The existence of this electronic and publicly-searchable registry would help 
to remedy some of, if not the main, concerns over the present security 
registration system and the way it may be consulted by the general public and 
encourage parties to register security.
That said, as discussed above, at present the common practice when taking 
pledges is to take possession (actual or constructive) of the goods, rather than 
relying on registration. Therefore, if the other problems with the registration 
system are not addressed, the introduction of electronic security registers 
might not have much practical effect in this area.
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Background 
The mutual aspect, whereby villagers in particular storage facilities are jointly 
and severally liable to the financier for their debts, accounts for much of the 
strength of Type A financing, with its high credit recoveries and low lending 
risks. It would be wise to build on this feature when trying to extend this 
approach to more communities and when trying to scale it up and make it 
more market-oriented. 
Africa has some experience with Mutual Guarantee Schemes (MGS) also known 
as Mutual Guarantee Associations (MGA, or Sociétés de Caution Mutuelle 
or SCM in French), whereby members who are players in a particular trade 
subscribe to a fund that underwrites their individual borrowing from financial 
institutions. The MGS is constituted by a group of enterprises belonging 
to a particular trade, and with similar characteristics and needs, and who 
subscribe to a guarantee fund that collectively underwrites their individual 
borrowing from financial institutions. The State may support the institution 
with additional funds or a counter-guarantee. According to the theory behind 
this approach, an organisation composed of highly interconnected SMEs that 
are professional peers can overcome the information asymmetry which often 
exists between banks and borrowers, and thereby better manage the lending 
risks and allow the bank to lend much more cheaply. The peer review process 
can be a powerful mechanism for controlling risk and opportunistic behaviour. 
National financial regulators following the guidance of Basel II will qualify 
guarantee societies as guarantors if their guarantee product is in line with the 
regulatory requirement, and on this basis, allow banks to reduce regulatory 
equity on their loan portfolio. 
MGS are concerned with the financing of a wide variety of activities. In the field 
of warehouse financing, French grain merchants and cooperatives established 
Annex 4: Mutual 
guarantee schemes
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an MGS (Caution Grainol) to guarantee financing against stocks owned by 
grain merchants and which allows them to access funds at low interest rates 
(EURIBOR +0.4-0.8%). However, it should be noted that Caution Grainol only 
guarantees loans against members’ own stocks, not against stocks of third-
party depositors. The indemnity schemes established by a number of American 
States (also in Bulgaria) do by contrast underwrite third-party stocks. These 
are State-owned schemes to which the licensed warehouse operators must 
contribute in compliance with their warehousing licenses and which protect the 
interest of both stock owners and financiers holding the warehouse receipts. 
Caution Grainol has 100 active members, shareholder capital of  27 million 
(the income from which is covers operating costs), and a guarantee fund of 
 300 million. Shareholder capital is constituted by requiring members to 
contribute of 1/30th of the credit they request. A member requiring financing 
must first make a stock declaration, following which it will issue promissory 
notes indicating stocks pledged to Caution Grainol, and against which the bank 
will lend. Caution Grainol and the regulatory institution, FranceAgriMer, carry 
out supervisory controls, most importantly an end of season stock-taking. 
Literature on mutual guarantee schemes suggests they have not been 
particularly encouraging in developing countries. Areeytey (2006) quotes 
adverse experiences in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, resulting 
mainly from governance and management weaknesses. OECD (2013), quoting 
examples from Senegal, said that many guarantee funds, especially MGS, 
have not had tremendous success, due to weak legal frameworks and non-
competitive banking sectors among other problems. UNIDO describes its 
experiences as mixed (FAO, 2013). We know of no African schemes for financing 
of warehouse financing.
Developing a mutual guarantee scheme for warehouses in Africa
Given constraints at the level of resources, public institutions and law 
enforcement, an African MGS will need a great deal of self-reliance and 
solidarity between members. Operationally speaking, the MGS will need a 
strong training and supervisory function to ensure compliance with rules 
covering the physical attributes of stores, crops storage practices, commodity 
standards, management, accounting and reporting. 
To achieve success, members of the MGS will need to: (1) be very highly 
motivated and prepared to contribute materially to the cost of the scheme 
from the outset; and (2) take firm action so as to recover sums paid out to 
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financiers under the guarantee, including expulsion, blacklisting and legal 
action. Hence, the first step for any promoter is to identify a group interested 
in the concept and to gauge their motivation to shoulder the risks involved and 
make the scheme work. He/she will also need to identify financiers willing to 
fund the stocks and reduce their interest rates substantially below those they 
would charge in the absence of the scheme.
External support might take the form of technical assistance in developing the 
necessary rules and partial funding for the guarantee fund and some initial 
operating costs, to match the members’ own financial contributions. 
Such an approach could be considered in various cases, such as:
(a) Stakeholder groups affiliated to the Burkinabé Interprofessional 
Committee for Cereals and Cowpeas (CIC-B). One of its members, the 
producer organisation FEPA-B, is composed of local associations which 
would like to establish their own warehouses and these could provide the 
membership. 
(b) Producers of certified seed, who need financing against their stocks 
at different stages in the production cycle. Jonathan Coulter (author) 
identified opportunities for doing this with groundnuts and paddy rice 
Senegal during missions in 2002 and 2012, respectively. 
In some francophone countries, notably Burkina Faso, significant effort has 
been devoted to organisation of value-chain players into groups by stakeholder 
type (professions); this might provide fertile ground for a MGS.
Any external agent interested in supporting such schemes should consider 
them against alternative means of providing funding, for example relying on 
collateral managers (of the kind that have also emerged in Burkina Faso) and to 
focus on strengthening their capabilities. In fact, there may be scope for both 
approaches. The mutual indemnity approach leverages local knowledge and 
peer pressure among members and the economics may be more favourable 
in smaller scale decentralised operations where collateral managers cannot 
generate the necessary scale economies. However, they require a high level 
of managerial and (above all) financial commitment in handling commodities 
which may be worth a large multiple of the individual members’ net worth. Net 
worth is also an issue with collateral managers, but they have the advantage of 
professional independence vis-à-vis the borrowers and their internal politics. 
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